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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The concept of anthropogenic climate change is now understood in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) as an urgent environmental problem enveloping the globe. It 
underlies recent claims that humanity’s impact on the Earth’s natural systems is so 
consequential that a new geologic epoch has begun: The Anthropocene, or the ‘human 
age’. Yet, IR’s increasing engagement and use of these scientific concepts raises 
significant questions the discipline has yet to address. For instance, if global climate 
change appeared in international politics only as recently as the late-1980s, what spurred 
this sudden emergence? If the Anthropocene appeared only after 2000, then how does 
this new concept affect the way we now think about global politics, the Earth, and even 
ourselves? This thesis answers these questions by arguing that the concepts of global 
climate change and the Anthropocene are neither immutable nor universal scientific 
truths or natural objects. Rather, they emerged when technological advances in nuclear 
physics and models tracing bomb radiocarbon intersected with the ways states govern 
their territories and subjects. The global nature or ‘climatic globality’ of these concepts, 
therefore, is a manner of conducting and steering human conduct and action by 
establishing the boundaries of subjectivity when they are thought. This is what Michel 
Foucault called governmentality. It is demonstrated in this thesis through a genealogical 
tracing of climate change in IR, focusing on how nuclear sciences, computational 
modelling technologies, and regimes of international governance, overlapped to form 
the climatic globality IR now takes for granted. Combining genealogy with the 
philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, a new form of global 
governmentality becomes evident. Through a technological and metaphysical 
subjectivism with the carbon atom as its substrate, the human self now asserts itself 
from atomic to global scales, as the maker, master, and steward, of the Earth.  
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Chapter 1 – Crises of Global Climate Change and the 
Anthropocene 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis explores how the application of scientific processes to a political territory 
can transform how human beings think, and how they are governed. It does so through 
an historical and philosophical analysis of two global environmental crises now 
commonly asserted to be affecting international politics today: anthropogenic climate 
change, and the rise of a new, human-induced geologic epoch called the Anthropocene.  
 
Through a genealogical methodology, it aims to illustrate how human subjectivity can 
be shaped and molded – from atomic to global levels – by certain concepts derived from 
the natural sciences when they are applied to politics. These concepts shape a human 
subject’s boundaries of thought, delimiting certain forms of political action whilst 
bracketing others. Hence, it argues that global climate change and the Anthropocene are 
neither innocuous nor objective scientific concepts or truths. Instead, both are 
conceptual technologies that shape how human beings place themselves spatially and 
temporally within their historical, social, and political world(s).    
 
As our current crises of climate change and the Anthropocene intensify, their 
transnational, global, and scientific status is eliciting increased concern and attention in 
the discipline of International Relations (IR). IR has long been critical of how the social 
sciences have generally examined these issues in a ‘top-down’ fashion, lamenting its 
overindulgence on theories positing international regimes and institutions as rational 
actors, or game-theorizing the choices of individual decision makers and citizens in 
establishing their personal preferences (Stripple and Bulkeley 2014; Helm and Hepburn 
2009). It is common to read that environmental crises previously discounted as ‘low-
politics’ are now gaining currency, portending a rise into the mainstream scholarship of 
the discipline in the near future. “Given these trends,” Deudney astutely predicted, 
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(1990, 461), “environmental issues are likely to become an increasingly important 
dimension of political life at all levels – locally, inside states, as well as internationally.”    
 
What each lens omits, however, is the crucial role and impact that human practice, 
action, agency, power, and subjectivity play in creating and knowing these global crises. 
Understanding how humans have now come to ‘think’ of climate change and the 
Anthropocene as normal or everyday concepts is thus the impetus of this project. For 
example, these issues are known to us today only through their creation and 
dissemination through incredibly complex computer models and simulations. Rather, the 
‘climate’ as we know it does not exist until it is made real by quantifying atmospheric 
flows of carbon at a global scale, requiring a deluge of data to be organised and 
translated by supercomputers into manners and forms only then suitable for human 
comprehension and knowledge (Edwards 2011; Oreske 2000). Yet, the science, history, 
and the effect(s) of these quantified concepts are largely ignored in IR. Self-declaredly 
critical IR scholarship tends to restrict itself to three approaches, exploring: (a) the 
imaginary of climate change, or how different cultures or polities might conceive of it as 
an issue or threat; (b) the role played by advanced or neoliberalism in generating and 
perpetuating this crisis; and (c) the “conduct of carbon conduct”, or the forming of 
individual selves and subjectivities through the regulating, monitoring, and even 
securitising of carbon (Stripple and Bulkeley 2014, 10). Yet, these approaches proceed 
without inquiring into what scientific concepts such as ‘carbon’ or ‘climate’ actually are, 
where they came from, or what it is they do when they are borrowed from the 
atmospheric sciences and implanted into IR discourses. What these critical accounts take 
for granted, therefore, are the conceptual and social preconditions for even thinking of a 
‘global’ climate change and an Anthropocene epoch in the first place: the (natural) 
sciences and technologies delimiting these concepts of Nature in ways that grant the 
space and potential for some forms of thought and action, whilst bracketing others. 
Notably, these critical approaches also tend to conflate the human ego, or ‘I’, with the 
concept of subject and subjectivity. Seeking to move beyond subject/object binaries, 
they gravitate towards (new) materialist or posthumanist approaches that eschew or 
claim to move beyond anthropocentric notions of the ‘I’ and the subject by adopting a 
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flat or relational ontology with all matter(ing). However, and as will be argued below, 
the combination of the ‘I’ with the subject is not immutable or universal, but it is part 
and parcel of the same conceptual (and metaphysical) grounds upon which IR’s 
Anthropocene and climate change discourses rest. By problematising this metaphysical 
foundation, this thesis avoids conflating the I and the subject, raising the possibility that 
a new understanding of the relationship of the human being to subjectivity, and to 
politics in the supposed ‘Anthropocene’ epoch, may therefore be emerging: not the 
familiar Cartesian self-certainty of subjectivity as the ‘I’, but rather, a subjectivity 
reconceptualised as a notion of the We. As will be argued below, this ‘We’ is emerging 
through a shared world picture of climatic globality that asserts the human species as a 
new entity stretching across time and space (see Chakrabarty 2009).  
 
As such, this thesis makes a new contribution to IR and the social sciences by 
problematising how our present concepts of a ‘global’ climate change and Anthropocene 
epoch have emerged and become commonplace through sciences and technologies 
embraced by the modern nation-state. Its first goal is thus to understand how these 
sciences and technologies have contributed to our thinking of climate change and the 
Anthropocene the way we commonly do today: as global crises made by, and hence to 
be resolved by, a human stewardship of all life on Earth.  
 
The second goal of this thesis is to expand upon the analytics of governmentality 
(Foucault 2007) and global governmentality (Neumann and Sending 2010; Larner and 
Walters 2006) now commonly used in IR. It does so by interpreting how recent 
applications of climate science and Earth system science (ESS) to planetary flows of 
carbon resembles the processes and dynamics captured through the application of 
statistics to the state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Foucault 2007, 2008). It 
thus detects a new style of thought or political rationality (Miller and Rose 2008, 14) 
emerging from the application of ESS to the globe. This is a form of subjectivity in 
which the human self relates itself to all forms of life and matter, as its steward or 
creator, through the shared medium of carbon. The range of this atom becomes a 
conceptual bridge between the subjectivity of the human ‘I’, and atomic and global 
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scales and referents. As later chapters of this thesis illustrate, it even bridges the present 
moment into futures of deep geologic time, and justifies IR’s recent use of quantum 
science and notions of ‘entanglement’. This new political rationality wrought by carbon 
– the endless thinking of human relations upon (carbonic) relations – is what is 
identified in this thesis as a new form of global governmentality: a “relationality”. How 
this relationality emerges through the sciences and technologies underpinning climate 
change and the Anthropocene, is thus one of the contributions this thesis project hopes 
to make to IR. 
 
In making this argument, this thesis embraces a genealogical methodology. It traces and 
interprets how we have come to take these familiar concepts – global climate change 
and the Anthropocene – as everyday or normal in our current discourse. In other words, 
this genealogy is nominalist at its outset, but upon looking back at the completion of this 
project, it tells a story. At its beginning in 19451 is a localized, objective, and sovereign 
state climate studied by nuclear physicists tracing radioactive bomb fallout – the 
radionuclide of carbon C-14 – throughout Earth’s atmosphere. The middle of this story 
is comprised of an organic form of carbon that replaces nuclear carbon as an object of 
international concern. What emerges is our current prognostication (and in some cases, 
implicit celebration) of a looming Anthropocene epoch, in which a carbonic anthropos – 
man, or the human2 – internalises this concept of atomic and global carbon into its own 
sense of self, and its own being in the world. The end of this story lies in how this 
emergent understanding of humanity and Nature in the Anthropocene shapes our 
commonsensical understanding of climate change and globality today. Confronted with 
an incalculable scale and uncertainty concerning these looming crises, the human 
subject now establishes certainty by implicitly reflecting these concepts back through 
itself: Anthropos – the human – as the self-certain destiny of Nature, and the maker and 
the measure of all things. Yet, here, humanity is subtly reconceptualised as a subject 
stretching across unprecedented spatialities and temporalities, or as a We, instead of an 
                                                        
1 The details of how this particular start date was selected is explained in chapters 2 and 4. 
2 Anthropos is a gendered Greek word for ‘man’, whilst gyneka is the Greek word for ‘woman’. The terms 
‘man’ and ‘human’ will be used interchangably throughout the thesis in reference to anthropos depending 
on the textual sources from which it is derived. Whenever possible, ‘human’ is preferred and used.  
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I.  This genealogical narrative aims not to declare a single or ironclad truth about climate 
change or the Anthropocene, therefore, but aims to help us to understand these concepts 
anew, creating the potential for IR scholars to think act differently when considering 
these crises of globality in the future.   
 
This project will now be elaborated in the remainder of this introductory chapter by 
examining its context, problematique, argument, methodology, and method, in greater 
detail. 
 
The Context: Crises of Climatic Change in the Anthropocene Epoch 
 
In December of 2015, the largest international conference ever recorded took place in 
Paris, France. It was conducted under the auspices of the 21st session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). ‘COP21’, as it was called, aimed to finally establish one shared universal 
agreement amongst the leaders of states, transnational corporations, international and 
multinational organizations, and civil society groups alike: to combat the growing threat 
of anthropogenic climate change to the future of humanity and to all life on the Earth. 
 
Concluding on 12 December, 2015, COP21’s ‘Paris Agreement’ was signed by 195 
countries. Its aim: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions so as to limit the global 
temperature increase of Earth to within 1.5 degrees Celsius of anthropogenic warming. 
As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared, this was both the most difficult and 
the most important agreement ever made. The Paris Agreement “is not a moment of 
talking about national perspective”, he stressed. “Good global solutions will help good 
local solutions,” and hence all nation-states must now “make final decisions for 
humanity” (UN 2015). In other words, international relations now had planetary 
implications, deciding the fate of humanity and the Earth alike. The scope of political 
action was no longer national or inter-national, but global. The future of the Earth was at 
stake. 
 
 11 
Yet, despite COP21’s recognition of the calamitous global impact that humanity is 
wreaking upon the bio- and geo-physical processes of the Earth, it is now extremely 
likely that the Paris Agreement is a “fantasy” that will fail (Tollerson 2015). In a recent 
joint statement to international media, some of the world’s top climate scientists warn 
that it was mere political fodder; a smokescreen or flare designed to placate or calm 
nervous domestic constituents, encouraging them to continue their carbon-based 
‘business-as-usual’ lifestyles whilst hoping that a sociopolitical environmental change 
was somehow on the horizon. “What people wanted to hear was that an agreement had 
been reached on climate change that would save the world while leaving lifestyles and 
aspirations unchanged”, these scientists claimed. “The solution it [COP21] proposes is 
not to agree on an urgent mechanism to ensure immediate cuts in [carbon] emissions, 
but to kick the can down the road” (Bawden 2016). Indeed, even as the ink on the Paris 
Agreement was still wet, stunned climate scientists balked at the agreement’s impossible 
targets; the economic and social reluctance of states and their citizens to reduce their 
consumption of carbon and fossil-fuels; the billions of dollars given to, and still spent, 
lobbying government representatives and diplomats to support powerful global fossil-
fuel corporations; the entrenchment and growing support of industries and 
infrastructures dependent upon carbonic economic production and transportation; and, 
most importantly, the flimsiness and weakness of a global agreement that is not legally 
binding, but voluntary in nature (McKibben 2015).  
 
Why would the UNFCCC push for, and widely celebrate and laud to the world, a Paris 
Agreement that scientists knew was doomed to fail? Geden (2015) has argued that it 
served a variety of domestic functions aiding the state: to create legitimacy for UN 
policymakers and the COP process; to create a moment for leaders and states to claim 
responsibility for saving the planet; and to mobilize further action around climate 
negotiations so as to spur future institutional changes that reduce carbon consumption. 
Other IR scholars highlight how this failure is typical of collective action problems 
arising from the anarchic nature of the Westphalian system; the selfishness of powerful 
states such as the US and China; or the increasing material consumption demanded by a 
growing global middle class now embracing forms of capitalist consumerism (Harris 
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2013; Depledge and Yamin 2009). “In short, nearly two decades after [the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol], states have yet to agree to binding emissions reductions that will prevent 
dangerous climatic change according to the best contemporary advice of Earth system 
scientists”, note Burke et al. (2016, 509). “Objects in this mirror are closer than they 
appear.”  
 
However, what these explanations omit is the wider discursive and background context 
within which climate negotiations, climate governance, and ultimately international 
relations, now take place. As van Munster and Sylvest (2016, 2) recently point out, if we 
do not treat states as bounded ahistorical units acting rationally throughout history, then 
what becomes visible are transformative and “crucial developments since 1945 – the 
nuclear revolution, the space race and the rise of global environmentalism – [that] have 
produced a politics of globality”. Globality typically refers to circumstances in which 
the human world is considered as a single place. It is not a timeless or universal 
condition, but “a social fact whose basic structure, genesis, dissemination and 
subsequent functions can be opened to historical and sociological inquiry” (Bartelson 
2010, 231). This raises the question of how exactly climate change, and events such as 
COP21, are ways of thinking and enacting political and social norms of an implicit or 
inchoate climatic globality.  
 
For instance, if we consider anthropogenic climate change not as an isolated (global) 
collective action problem, but as a social fact situated within the context of an emergent 
type of globality, then new connections and associations emerge. According to 
geologists and climate scientists (Zalasiewicz et al. 2010, 2231), it becomes 
encapsulated and integrated within a concept that “represents a new phase in the history 
of both humankind and of the Earth, when natural forces and human forces became 
intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other.” Just as climate 
science was the precursor for the development of an Earth System science (ESS), 
defined as an “integrative meta-science of the whole planet as a unified, complex, 
evolving system beyond the sum of its parts” (C. Hamilton 2016, 94), so human-made 
climate change here becomes the precursor for what geologists now call a human-made 
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geological epoch: the Anthropocene (Dalby 2015; Crutzen 2002; C. Hamilton, 2016). In 
other words, when considering the nature of climatic globality, we can no longer think 
of global climate change without situating it in the context of an overarching 
Anthropocene epoch. Indeed, “Today, the idea of Earth as a living organism or 
interconnected system of natural forces figures most prominently in debates about 
anthropogenic climate change”, note van Munster and Sylvest (2016, 8). This climatic 
globality is placed “at the heart of current claims that Earth has now entered a new 
geological epoch, the Anthropocene, defined by the central role of humanity in shaping 
Earth’s geological and ecological processes” (2016, 8).  
 
Global climate change is therefore framed as the essential precondition for the 
Anthropocene epoch, while the Anthropocene, in turn, is likewise grounded upon 
climate change as its conceptual foundation. The two concepts are now entwined. But 
what is the Anthropocene? First popularized by atmospheric scientists Paul J. Crutzen 
and Eugene F. Stoermer (2000), the Anthropocene implies that the Earth is now so 
scarred and damaged from the encroachment and abuses of humanity upon the 
functioning of its systems, that it has shifted out of the stable tranquility of its Holocene 
epoch of the past 11,500 years. Humanity’s abuse is “pushing the planetary system 
outside the biophysical parameters that humanity has known over the last ten millennia” 
(Dalby 2015, 8). It makes a human mark upon the Earth’s geological timescale, meaning 
that humanity has left a globally synchronous signal or marker across the surface of the 
Earth (i.e. a stratigraphic layer) and altered the operation of basic Earth systems and 
processes. “Human activity has clearly altered the land surface, oceans and atmosphere, 
and re-ordered life on Earth” (Lewis and Maslin 2015, 172).    
 
For IR, the Anthropocene foments new demands. Not for state-led forms of governance 
or for renewed energies to be poured back into familiar mechanisms or institutions of 
international relations. Today, we read that the Anthropocene demands new forms of 
planetary politics (Burke et al. 2016; Biermann 2014). Here, failure is shifted from 
climatic governance to an all-encompassing geologic globality: diplomacy and IR, as 
fields of knowledge and systems of institutions, have failed “because the planet does not 
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match and cannot be clearly seen by its institutional and disciplinary frameworks” 
(2016, 501). In other words, “IR is a malevolent ghost of the planetary real” (2016, 512, 
emphasis original).    
 
Considered in the context of these changing contours of globality, therefore, the Paris 
Agreement may be considered in IR in a new way: as both artifact and harbinger of the 
Anthropocene. Explicitly, and as noted above, COP21 was indeed doomed to fail before 
the conference ever began. Where this thesis project argues it succeeded, however, was 
on an implicit level: disseminating a specific form and way of thinking about climatic 
globality to states and their citizens. This way of thinking is one that acknowledges 
human planetary agency on a new spatial, temporal, and geopolitical scale.  
 
In this new geopolitical context of a human-made epoch, the impact of anthropos – 
humanity – upon the Earth’s climate, biosphere, and its planetary processes, overlies an 
implicit celebration of humanity and the human subject. “In a single lifetime we’ve 
become a phenomenal global force and there is no sign of a slowdown – in fact, our 
extraordinary impact on the planet is only increasing” (Vince 2014, 3). Categorical 
distinctions between humanity and Nature thereby lose their relevance and use when 
discussing the future of global politics (Dalby 2007). Global trade patterns, capital 
flows, and technological processes such as the Internet are now equated with Nature’s 
planetary processes and cycles. Lewis and Maslin (2015, 178) celebrate this re-placing 
of humanity back to “the centre of the universe”, reversing the implications of the 
discoveries of scientists such as Copernicus and Darwin that dissolved the image of 
humanity as the centre and measure of all things. On the contrary, today, these scientists 
declare that “To a large extent the future of the only place where life is known to exist is 
being determined by the actions of humans. . . . the power that humans wield is unlike 
any other force of nature” (2015, 178). Upon borrowing these scientific concepts and 
discourses, IR likewise moves beyond discussions of statist or physical security. As the 
centre of Nature, IR “has to be about what kind of world industrial humanity is making, 
and how to shape it so that civilization can persist in the new artificial circumstances of 
the Anthropocene” (Dalby 2014, 2). Across every discipline, therefore, many scholars 
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now appear all too ready to declare: “Welcome to the Anthropocene!” (Economist, 
2011). 
 
The Problem: Asserting Humanity as a Global Force 
 
Taking a step back from this celebration of human (atmospheric and geological) agency, 
it is this contemporary style or mode of thinking about the Earth, and its crises of 
climatic and Anthropocenic ‘globality’ now affecting IR, that this thesis aims to 
problematise and explore.   
 
To problematise is to bring “submerged problems” that are implicit in our everyday 
thought, up to its surface to view. It is a “practice of critique in the form of the historical 
problematization of the present” (Koopman 2013, 2).  
 
When considering the present context of contemporary globality outlined above, climate 
change and the Anthropocene depend upon a shared conceptual assertion of human 
(planetary) agency. Both make the notion that humanity affects or even controls Nature 
into a truism. For instance, as Vince writes, “Earth is now a human planet. We decide 
whether a forest stands or is razed, whether pandas survive or go extinct, how and where 
a river flows, even the temperature of the atmosphere” (Vince 2014, 5). Or, to take a 
general statement from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): 
“Discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean 
warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature extremes and wind patterns ” 
(IPCC 2007, 10); or, even within critical scholarship from IR, take the notion that in the 
Anthropocene “we have moved past debating the truth of global climate change and its 
prevention to having to think about how we are going to live in the world we have 
created” (2016, 505). Thus it is humanity’s explicit destruction and control over the 
processes of the planet that is naturalised. It is evinced through the climatic globality 
outlined above. However, the implicit social context of this globality – that humanity is 
indeed a global and a planet-making force – remains tacitly assumed. The human subject 
becomes the inexorable destiny of Nature, so that “man is no longer just another species. 
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We are the first to knowingly reshape the living earth’s biology and chemistry. We have 
become the masters of our planet and integral to the destiny of life on Earth” (Vince 
2014, 7). 
 
Once problematised, this assumption raises new ontological, epistemological, temporal, 
and even existential questions that have yet to be explored in IR. For instance, how did 
the concept of ‘climate change’ become a way of thinking that humanity is an agent 
capable of making the planet, Nature, or the Earth? How, despite IR’s self-declaredly 
critical stance towards incorporating scientific methodologies and concepts, did natural 
sciences such as “Earth system science, with its powerful computer models, its massive 
datasets, and its complex understanding of ecological systems,” (Burke et al. 2016, 504) 
become normalised and embraced as reflecting “the true scale and systemic complexity 
of the planet in a way that International Relations does not” (Burke et al. 2016, 505)?  
 
 
The Argument: The Emergence of a Global Governmentality 
 
Contrary to their use in IR, climate change and the Anthropocene are not simply 
concepts arising from a new understanding of transnational relations, problems of the 
global commons, or a newfound recognition of political globality. Nor are they objective 
scientific concepts or truths drawn from atmospheric and climatic sciences, or ESS, that 
can be nonchalantly imported and applied to IR scholarship without considering their 
philosophical and conceptual foundations. These concepts have a past that affects how 
we can use them in the present (Crist 2013).  
 
By tracing and interpreting the historical and conceptual emergence of how we have 
come to ‘know’ these global climatic crises as integral components of our present 
moment, they may be understood anew: as conceptual technologies, devices, or 
discursive tools that evince an underlying political rationality – a style of thought, or 
way of rending reality thinkable – through their normalisation in our political discourse 
(Miller and Rose 2008, 16). In other words, climate change and the Anthropocene are 
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concepts that actively shape, steer, and delimit subjective thought in specific ways, 
bracketing some conceptual possibilities or forms of knowledge, whilst fostering others 
(Hulme 2009). They are components of what philosopher and historian Michel Foucault 
(2007) has described as governmentality: a way that one’s subjective “conduct of 
conduct” and “management of possibilities” can be crafted and shaped without the 
exterior force of a sovereign or disciplinary power determining its action from above 
(Foucault 2002a, 341).  
 
The primary argument of this thesis is that the concepts of climate change and the 
Anthropocene reveal a new form of global governmentality. It emerged only recently 
from an overlap and crystalisation of nuclear sciences, technologies, and state practices. 
Yet, it is a form of global governmentality grounded not upon familiar and well-tread IR 
notions of security, population, society, the state, nor even (neo)liberalism (see 
Neumann and Sending 2010; Joseph 2012; Corry 2013; Vrasti 2012; Walters 2012). It is 
instead grounded on a new type of global scientific process that captures and orients life 
in very specific ways today. This type of global governmentality transcends new scales, 
spatialities, and even temporalities. It ranges from atomic to global levels, and from the 
linear seconds and hours of the ‘clock time’ of statist Western modernity, to the deep 
geological time of Earthly epochs. What grounds and sustains this new form of 
governmentality? Underpinning the conceptual foundations of climate change and the 
Anthropocene, it is most visible in practices tracing and politicizing “a part of all living 
matter on Earth” (Lövbrand and Stripple 2006, 217), as something “put into the 
atmosphere by anyone, anywhere on the Earth [that is] globally atmospherically 
circulated” (Deudney and Mendenhall, 26). It is what is commonly accepted as the 
essence of the human being, organic matter, the climate, the Earth, and all life itself: the 
carbon atom.  
 
From this tiny atom, a “global calculation . . . a new form of global rationality, of a new 
calculation on the scale of the world”, emerges (Foucault 2008, 56). It ties the essence of 
each human subject, with every breath exhaled, to the social and global crises of 
globality noted above. Through carbon, humanity may thus be directly related to every 
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‘thing’ as both a creator and destroyer, steward and master. It conducts conduct through 
subjective relations, or by the enmeshing and relating of the human subject to every 
potential referent through this carbonic connection or entanglement, rather than by 
institutional or governmental dictates or regulations typically exposed through 
governmentality analytics in IR. 
 
This new understanding of (global) governmentality and its carbonic or atomic 
subjectivity leads to the second argument of this thesis. Rather than the governmentality 
described by Foucault and embraced in IR, the sciences of GCMs and ESS fosters a 
political rationality grounded upon, and disseminating, a metaphysical subjectivism. It is 
what is defined here not simply as governmentality, but as ‘relationality’.  
 
What is relationality? It refers to how, through the spread and adoption of Western 
scientific concepts such as climate change, “Every relation to something—willing, 
taking a point of view, being sensible of something—is already representing; it is 
cogitans, which we translate as ‘thinking’” (Heidegger 1977b, 150). Relationality 
fosters a technological form of subjectivism through the adoption and use of its 
concepts. These delimit the boundaries of subjectivity, in a way that each subject re-
presents the world back to itself, as an object, or world picture: “What is, in its entirety, 
is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it 
is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (Heidegger 1977b, 130). In other words, 
this world picture orients every thought as a relation between a human self as a 
Cartesian ‘I’, and that to which the thought relates to, as its object (see chapter 2). 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the concept of the Anthropocene, where the human 
subject globalises the essence of its own life – the carbon atom – through the projection 
and calculation of planetary processes. “In the planetary imperialism of technologically 
organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme,” wrote Heidegger (1977b, 
152), “from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there 
firmly establish itself.” It is in understanding anthropos as maker and master of both 
climate and Earth, that relationality underpins globality.  
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Indeed, in defending this secondary argument, this thesis observes how Foucauldian 
analytics of governmentality are closely related to the analyses of Western metaphysics, 
science, and technology, as described by Heidegger (1977a; 1977b) and Hannah Arendt 
(1998; 2006). Hence, the insights from these philosophers are used alongside and at 
times even combined with, governmentality analytics. Taking care not to ‘Add Foucault 
and Stir’ (S. Hamilton 2014), the project ensures that their philosophical claims and 
foundations are congruous and consistent in order to defend its primary arguments. For 
instance, whilst Foucault’s accounts excel in describing how the constitution of 
subjectivity can be shaped within established limits or boundaries so as to facilitate 
governance (i.e. by and through the state; the grid; the subject; etc.), the technological 
metaphysics of Heidegger and Arendt are able to describe how these ‘bounds’ or 
thinking ‘subjects’ are first able to be ‘thought’ of or cognised at all (see Elden 2001).   
 
Although delving at times into geography, natural science, and ecological thought, this 
thesis project should ultimately be considered as a work of IR theory. Its theoretical 
tools and methodologies are derived from philosophers that excel in detailing how 
science, technology, and the concept of cycles and processes, intersect with life and 
politics in modernity or postmodernity. It thus hopes to make a contribution to IR and 
the social sciences by highlighting new and fruitful ways of approaching the analytical 
tools of genealogy and (global) governmentality. IR has forgotten how the concept of 
governmentality itself emerged from the application of scientific rationalities to Nature, 
in that, “what characterizes this new art of government [governmentality] . . . would be 
much more a naturalism than a liberalism” (Foucault 2008, 61). In a like fashion, this 
project analyses how the sciences of ESS shape our own political rationalities in the 
present moment when they are applied to scales and forms of life other than bodies 
within a nation-state: in this case, it is processes of carbon on a global scale.  
 
The chapters below trace the history of how this climatic global governmentality 
emerged and was facilitated through these concepts of climate change and the 
Anthropocene, concretising in the relationality steering our thought and conduct today. 
It begins with an analysis and interpretation of the sciences and technologies used by the 
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state since 1945 to bring the ‘global climate’, and then the Anthropocene, into being: 
computerised simulation models known as ‘general circulation models’, or GCMs. It 
then moves on to describe the practices, rationalities, and everyday concepts with which 
this global governmentality is now entwined today, within our own conduct and 
subjectivity.  
 
What this thesis aims to do (and not to do) 
 
As Foucault once phrased it, “People know what they do; they frequently know why 
they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (quoted in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 187). The chapters that follow are thus an attempt to 
combine philosophy with empirical research into climate change, carbon, and the 
Anthropocene, with the purpose of highlighting for IR what our conversations about 
these concepts are doing today. This thesis, therefore, aims to diagnose what thinking 
about climate change and the Anthropocene in IR, does.  
 
It must be stated that this thesis is not intended as a traditional ‘history’ of climate 
change, the Anthropocene, nor of globality (see Fleming 1998; Weart 2003; Stevens 
1999; Edwards 2010; Kahn 2014; Bartleson 2010). Histories of these concepts would 
require an immense literature review across both the social and natural sciences, and 
hence it is beyond the scope of this project (see chapter 2). With its genealogical 
impetus, it instead aims to examine our present moment rather than claim to shine a light 
on the past.  
 
Likewise, this thesis is not a critique or rejection of the sciences and technologies 
examined herein, nor does it dispute the findings and research indicating that 
anthropogenic climate change is unequivocal (IPCC 2013). It agrees that humanity’s 
impact upon the Earth’s systems and processes might be so deleterious and damaging, 
that they could leave a stratigraphic mark upon the planet, or transform the Earth’s 
systems. In other words, it does not dispute the seriousness of global climate change, nor 
the Anthropocene epoch, for the future of the planet. As Foucault, Heidegger, and 
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Arendt would agree, the sciences that calculate and quantify Nature as bounded forces 
now able to be harnessed by humanity, are indeed incredibly powerful. Technology 
surely provides benefits to humanity in countless ways, and has been increasingly 
imbricated in studies international politics (see Skolnifoff 1993). Rather, the goal here is 
to critique how the particular truths underlying climate change and the Anthropocene – 
i.e. humanity’s impact upon, and future stewardship of, the Earth – came into being, and 
how these concepts are used in IR today. The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to analyse 
how the conceptual underpinnings of climatic globality shape our thought. This should 
not be misconstrued as an attack on the scientific, normative, or ethical implications 
derived from them (see chapter 8).  
 
Genealogical Methodology and Methods 
 
This thesis offers a theoretical and philosophical analysis of how the concepts of climate 
change and the Anthropocene have emerged over time, and it interprets what it is they 
do to subjectivity when they are thought. Although its genealogical methodology is 
outlined in detail in Chapter 2, it is important to distinguish here at the outset of this 
project the differences between its overall methodology and its method.  
 
Generally put, whilst a methodology is the background philosophical context through 
which research takes place, its method is the concrete application of these philosophical 
principles to the world in order to acquire information or data about it. As succinctly 
phrased by Jackson (2010, 25), “methods are techniques for gathering and analyzing bits 
of data, whereas methodology is ‘a concern with the logical structure and procedure of 
scientific enquiry’.” Indeed, when this thesis is viewed as a whole it provides a clear 
methodological procedure illustrating how its genealogical revelations were arrived at. 
Yet, how it arrived at its specific method and the distinct topics explored in each 
chapter, and the flow between the variety of topics problematized in chapters 3 to 6, 
differs from this methodology and so must be elaborated here. The point is that the 
(seemingly, at first) distinct topics and historical problematisations comprising chapters 
3 to 6 were in no way random, nor selected haphazardly. They were chosen after the 
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author of this thesis attended a unique and specific event in London, 2015 (see below), 
that served to concretise the important research questions and topics explored in this 
thesis thereafter. This event must be elaborated upon briefly in this introduction, so the 
distinct topics, research questions, and hence historical methods engaged in chapters 3 to 
6, can be fitted within the overarching methodology of this project. 
 
As Kendall and Wickham argued in their guide Using Foucault’s Methods (1999, vii), 
“First of all, it may be suggested that there are no such persons as ‘Foucaultians’ and 
that there is no such thing as a ‘Foucaultian method’.” Although Foucault’s 
methodology was typically a nominalist genealogical critique of tacit or everyday 
referents and assumptions, his method constantly changed depending on the problem he 
was examining and the resources and texts he had available to contribute to his historical 
analysis. Indeed, when considering method, a genealogy is inexorably a contingent and 
personal event: it is always simultaneously constrained and freed by the subjective 
limitations and possibilities a researcher has at hand as they engage their genealogical 
methodology in their present moment. In the case of this thesis, the distinct topics of 
chapters 3 through 6 and the historical method used in each to collect the information 
fitting within its overarching methodology – i.e. the genealogical and historical 
problematisation, practice, rationalitiy, and emergence, of climatic globality – was 
shaped and determined by an event on 8-9 January, 2015, at King’s College in London, 
UK. This event, ‘UK Climatology 1960-1985 and the Emergence of Climate 
Modelling’3, was a private and invite-only gathering featuring influential figures in the 
history of the digital and computerised simulation models of the climate. Climate 
modellers included John Mitchell and Peter Rowntree of the UK’s Meteorological 
Office, Lennie Smith of the LSE and the University of Oxford, and even the prominent 
Phil Jones of the University of East Anglia (perhaps most notable for his central role in 
the 2009 event known as ‘Climategate’, or the hacking of emails of climate modellers in 
an attempt to manipulate their conversations so as to discredit their epistemic 
                                                        
3 This event was held 8-9 January, 2015, in the River Room of the King’s Building (Strand Campus) of 
Kings College London. It was part of the international project ‘Shaping Cultures of Prediction: 
Knowledge, Authority and the Construction of Climate Change’ that was coordinated by Dr. Mathias 
Heymann (Centre for Science Studies, Aarhus University).    
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community as malicious or conspiratorial). The purpose of the event was to gather 
world-leaders in climate science and modelling – especially those contributing to and 
influencing the historical development of its computer models and codes – to discuss the 
nature and emergence of climatic knowledge, its competing epistemic cultures, its 
technologies, and how the predictive tool of the ‘general circulation model’ came to be 
fraught with such controversy; even as it became the dominant global research strategy 
for climate science and atmospheric fluid dynamics. Throughout this event, 
geographers, sociologists, and historians of science discussed their own intimate 
involvement with, and thoughts on, the development of climate models and the rise of 
‘global climate change’ to its current status of a crisis of global governance. The end of 
the event culminated in a discussion of the climate’s relation to the concept of the 
‘Anthropocene era’.  
 
Upon hearing the rare conversations and insider debates taking place amongst this 
notoriously attention-shy community of climate scientists, four central themes emerged. 
These themes, and the research question(s) engendered by each, would thus become the 
pieces forming the overall methodological focus of this thesis: first, the history of Cold 
War and nuclear sciences developing alongside climate models; second, the relationship 
of GCMs to political speech and action, and how they could be reconciled; third, the 
apparent intractability of complex communicating modelling data and results to 
international political audiences at the level of state and global governance; and finally, 
the climatic emergence and modelling of the Anthropocene epoch as the next stage of 
Earth system science and climate modelling. Hence, because “the prime method for any 
researcher inspired by Foucault is an historical method” (Kendall and Wickham 1999, 
60), the historical problematisation of each of these four central themes came to occupy 
and fill the methodological contours outlined in this thesis. They were selected based 
upon the intimate discussions of this select group of climate modellers, scientists, and 
historians, and which were also reiterated at a similar event in February, 2016.4    
                                                        
4 This latter event was entitled ‘Climate change and the art of the (politically) possible: climate 
governance and the Paris Agreement’, and took place 24 February, 2016, at King’s College London. 
Although directed more towards the critical social sciences and the recent COP21 climate conference, this 
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Positionality: the subject remains, not as ‘I’ but as subiectum 
 
How is this thesis positioned in relation to works of critical IR scholarship that have 
recently engaged with climate change and the Anthropocene? In short, it disagrees with 
the philosophical stance of a large majority of this literature, which asserts climate 
change and the Anthropocene to indicate humanity’s obvious entanglement, 
enmeshment, or relational attunement with Nature and the Earth (see Burke et al., 2016; 
Harrington 2016).  
 
By adopting frameworks of ‘new materialism’ or derivations of Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) (see Latour 2016; Salter 2016), this group of critical IR scholars5 asserts that 
global environmental crises evince and demand a new understanding of materiality and 
agency that overcomes outdated modernist binaries of subject/object, nature/culture, 
mind/body, individual/state, etc. In other words, critical IR scholarship now assumes 
that the Anthropocene inexorably demands a flat or relational ontology, leading towards 
a new ‘human condition’ (Grove 2015). What this implies, however, is that any 
interpretation of the limits of human thought, or critiques aiming to expose the historical 
and social boundaries of human subjectivity – i.e. the considerations commonly ascribed 
to continental philosophy – are labeled as anthropocentric, outdated, or even indicative 
of the modernist binaries that IR must now eschew in favour of embracing its new 
material entanglement with Nature. Examining the constitution of the human subject is 
thus discouraged. Rather, the point becomes to privilege networks and overlaps of 
matter and materialities, and the ethical responsibilities to respect and steward them: “all 
entities – whether it is atoms or governments – stand on equal ontological footing to 
begin with. The associations established between them make the difference of whether 
one becomes more powerful than the other” (Müller 2015, 30). In sum, these attempts at 
eliminating subject/object binaries is assumed to be imperative in order for IR to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
event subtly repeated the same themes of the earlier 2015 conference. It thus served to affirm the topics 
and historical content explored in chapters 3-6 of this thesis. 
5 It should be noted that IR’s engagement with the Anthropocene is very new, and hence this thesis 
engages works such as Burke et al. (2016) and Harrington (2016) consistently because they are the 
frontrunners of what is increasingly emerging as a subfield of critical IR. 
 25 
embrace humanity’s material entanglement with Nature and Being. Discussions of 
climatic globality thereby become a way of understanding and asserting this blurring-
together of humanity and Nature, subject and object, so that the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ 
fade away (Harrington 2016). 
 
Critics of these new materialist approaches to politics and IR lament how they collapse 
history, culture, tradition, and social context, into networks of materiality that ignore the 
intangible historical and social construction of human subjectivity. Rather than only 
binaries of subject/object or culture/nature, it is also race, power, religion, history, and 
the intangibility of thought, that also incidentally fades away. The constitution of 
thought and subjectivity is taken as a vestigial effect, or an anthropocentric aftershock, 
of overlapping networks and relations of matter. As a result, because every 
‘objectification’ of thought is pre-ordained by this group of scholars to be an 
anthropocentric and epistemic violence against Nature, an ethical affirmation or 
entanglement with Nature simply replaces socially-derived and “logically informed 
analysis of the conditions of objectification, and thus, of their contestation” (Rekret 
2016, online). Although this thesis agrees with this critique – in that social and historical 
context is crucial for understanding thought, action, and politics today – it expands upon 
it in the chapters that follow, by considering anew its metaphysical roots. As noted 
above, this involves differentiating between subjectivity as an ‘I’, and the subject in-
itself, as ‘subiectum’: that-which-lies-before. It argues that critical IR scholarship 
embracing concepts of ‘entanglement’ from new materialism and ANT has actually 
conflated the I and the subject, thereby replicating the very metaphysical subjectivism 
always contained within Western subject/object binaries (see chapter 6). However, what 
is meant by these terms, ‘subject’ and ‘subiectum’? 
 
Take, for example, the recent ‘Planet Politics Manifesto’ (Burke et al. 2016). To be 
clear, this is a genuine, creative, and important and commendable text in critical 
environmental IR. It lays out a groundbreaking style and agenda for disciplinary and 
social change pertaining to looming environmental crises and catastrophes. However, at 
a conceptual and philosophical level, it embraces and exacerbates the tacit metaphysical 
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subjectivism and celebration of humanity that this thesis aims to expose and critique. As 
such, the ‘Manifesto’ is used throughout this thesis to exemplify the metaphysical 
subjectivism implicitly produced in IR’s critical climate and Anthropocene discourses. 
For instance, and echoing established critiques of new materialism’s rejection of social 
power relations, the manifesto eschews historical and social accountability since “we 
need not focus on who is responsible [for the global ecological crisis]” but must work to 
protect the Planet through a politics of entangled Being (Burke et al. 2016). It asserts 
that a “new consciousness is visible” now, because in the Anthropocene, “The Other is 
always already inside, so bound up with us in a common process that it no longer makes 
sense to speak of inside and outside . . . This may finally be the death of Man, but what 
will come next if this face is lost in the rising tides?” Throughout the manifesto’s list of 
ten commandments or goals – from the transformation of the ‘being’ of man to calls for 
a global ethics – the human subject, assumed to be the ego or I, is framed as being 
assimilated or rendered facile by new, relational, object oriented ontologies, in an 
increasingly pressing climatic and Anthropocene entanglement. So, “no being is truly 
autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum 
physics.” As noted above, and as will be explored throughout this thesis, this is indeed 
the general position of critical IR’s engagement with climatic globality and the 
Anthropocene. 
  
To repeat once more: the position of this thesis is that these claims for Anthropocene 
ethics and entanglements conflate the human ‘I’, with the concept of ‘subject’, 
mistakenly eliminating the consideration of the latter by discounting the former. In 
doing so, and in rejecting historical and metaphysical accounts that trace how specific 
social practices and conditions shape specific modes of thinking, or rationalities – 
including those shaping how the ‘I’ came to be – they also mistakenly reject the notion 
of subject, and hence, of object. In other words, the I is mistaken as the only possible 
grounds for subjectivity. Why is this an issue? Quoting Heidegger (1977 128): “We 
must understand this word, subiectum, however, as the translation of the Greek 
hypokeimenon. The word names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers 
everything onto itself. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of 
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all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I.” As will be explored in the 
chapters that follow, the attachment of the subiectum to the ‘I’ was a recent historical 
event culminating in Cartesian philosophy and a calculative representationalist 
metaphysics that placed one’s self-certainty not as a being-in the presence of things, 
Gods, groups, chains of Being, etc., but in the modern ego or I as the new foundation or 
subiectum (see chapers 2 and 6). Therefore, when critical IR scholarship now conflates 
the I with the subject and asserts the ontological primacy of matter over any 
subject/object binaries, it ignores how the subiectum is not actually limited to the I, but 
can (and has) actually shifted away from it, towards a new grounds for certainty: a new 
metaphysical subiectum. In the social and historical transformations spurred by today’s 
emerging climatic and Anthropocene globality, this subiectum is in fact emerging as 
something else entirely. Indeed, as this thesis argues, the new sense of certainty and 
security within our epoch-making global crises of climatic globality belies an assertion 
and formation of the ‘We’ of the human species as subiectum (for instance, see 
Chakrabarty 2009, and chapter 7). 
 
Although this thesis is sympathetic to the genuine desire of critical IR scholarship to 
foster a healthier or more secure climatic globality, it ultimately disagrees with its 
bracketing of the social and historical conditions that shape human thought and 
subjectivity. This results in discourses mistakenly asserting the ontological primacy of 
entangled materiality over the historical and social transformations that continue to 
shape thought and subjectivity today, yet which remain detectable through genealogical 
inquiries such as the one conducted here. The position of this thesis, therefore, is not one 
aiming to celebrate or ‘save’ the I, ego, or individualism from critique or dissolution. 
Far from it. Rather, the positionality of this thesis stresses that the subiectum can and 
does change metaphysically and historically across time, and these unexpected moments 
and events of transformation are to be critiqued and engaged – precisely in and through 
the application of genealogical methodologies to the recent emergence of climatic 
globalities, and concepts such as the Anthropocene.        
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Overview of Chapters 
 
This thesis will now proceed as follows, expanding upon the general arguments and 
issues touched upon in this introductory chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a theoretical and methodological overview of the theories and 
philosophies used in this project: genealogy and governmentality. A description of 
genealogical methodology is thus set forth, highlighting what this thesis identifies as 
four crucial stages for every genealogical analytic: problematisation, practice, 
rationality, and emergence. This genealogical framing grounds each of the chapters that 
follow in this thesis, in that each chapter represents one of these key stages in a 
genealogy.  
 
Whilst genealogy provides the methodological impetus and framework of this thesis, it 
is governmentality that best diagnoses how and why these twists and turns in carbonic 
climate discourses occur. Hence, chapter 2 also explores IR’s ongoing ‘global 
governmentality debate’, arguing that the discipline’s literature reifies neoliberalism by 
asserting its global presence as an a priori foundation for analysis. It argues that 
governmentality is not limited solely to diagnoses of liberalism, but is coeval with the 
metaphysical demarcation of Being and subjectivity best explicated by Martin 
Heidegger’s (1977a) concept of technological ‘enframing’, and his description of 
technology fostering a subjectivist world picture (1977b). This opens the possibility for 
forms of global governmentality to be conceptualised through the global spread of 
Western science and technology, as evinced in later chapters of this thesis through 
GCMs and ESS, as well as in the framing of the concepts of climate change and the 
Anthropocene. Enframing, in other words, governs contemporary governmentality, and 
the technological subjectivism or ‘relationality’ we see in climatic discourses today. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the problematisation of climatic change in our modern era. It 
begins with a short literature review of historical and recent texts that situate ‘the 
climate’ throughout Western history. This establishes the reader within contemporary 
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mainstream and critical accounts of how and why we have come to ‘think’ of the 
climate as we do today: as a global object or entity, which is now assumed even by 
critical scholars and geographers as “a privileged analytical entry point for interrogating 
the connection between globality and the Anthropocene in more detail” (Randalls 2016, 
146). This is not, as might be commonly assumed when mentioning the words ‘history’ 
and the climate, an examination of carbon dioxide (CO2) per se. Rather, it is a 
genealogical tracing of the development of the technologies that bring the climate into 
being as a thinkable and knowable object: GCMs, and their development in nuclear 
physics and research into atomic weaponry after World War II. This chapter reveals how 
the surprising emergence of anthropogenic ‘global’ climate change came not from 
environmental research nor from the natural sciences, but from investigations into 
nuclear fallout and later prognostications of a global nuclear winter; concepts that first 
popularised and spread the notion that humans could impact their planet globally, and be 
impacted, as ‘one world’. 
 
Chapter 4 examines in greater detail the practice of how the climate is brought into 
being through GCMs. Despite these GCMs delimiting clear global climatic threats noted 
in chapter 3, even up to our present moment, there are increasing lamentations over the 
lack of collective and individual “action” concerning this climatic threat. COP21’s Paris 
Agreement is only one example of many. Thus, by examining how the global climate is 
manifested through the GCMs used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in greater detail, this chapter isolates the practice of bringing the climate into 
being as a type of metaphysical enframing, described by Heidegger (1977a). Once 
enframing is determined as the technological essence of the GCMs disclosing the 
climate, then the conceptual essence of climatic globality is argued to be contradictory 
to forms of social and subjective thought required for substantive political action. In 
other words, the concept is constructed by GCMs in such a way that it blocks or 
prohibits the unpredictability required for political debate and action. Hence, the failure 
of climatic governance and the spread of a concept of climate that is, conceptually, 
antithetical to substantive political action. Paradoxically, the failure of governance 
indicates the success of this enframed concept. 
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With this failure of political action and governance demonstrated to be inherent to GCM 
technology, chapter 5 interprets and elaborates how the political rationality 
underpinning the concept of climate change is enacted internationally. Following from 
chapter 4, it notes how inaction in global climate governance is referred to as a failure. 
Yet, this ongoing failure raises an important question: if international collective action is 
required so as to heal, fix, or prevent further damage to the climate, was there ever a 
concept of the global climate that was not damaged, broken, or in need of international 
governance? This chapter reveals how our naturalized concept of a ‘global’ climate 
actually emerged in international relations only as recently as the late-1980s, framed 
from its outset as an always already broken or damaged object resulting from failures of 
governance to steward the Earth. It is thus an implicit ‘rationality of powerlessness’ that 
emerged alongside notions of the global climate since its international political 
inception; from the 1979 World Climate Conference, to its global spread in the mid-
1980s by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to its naturalized 
meaning today. Thinking of climatic globality, therefore, has always pre-emptively 
framed the human subject as something ineffectual or powerless against the climate. 
 
It is at this point in the genealogical tracing of this thesis project that our contemporary 
global political rationality emerges: when GCMs are applied to ESS, they give rise to 
the concept of the Anthropocene and a globalised and carbonic notion of the human self. 
Combining the insights from chapters 3-5, chapter 6 details how the climatic and 
technological underpinning of the Anthropocene builds upon the carbon of climatic 
change, to manifest a new and global form of biopolitics and governmentality. As noted 
above, this rationality asserts the essence of all (human) life and industry — the carbon 
atom — as the measure and centre of everything. When Nature becomes pre-reflectively 
projected, quantified, and conceived as a calculable and carbonic human construction, 
then every thinkable object becomes related back to the human as its creator and steward 
in a powerful form of subjectivism: a global governmentality as relationality. As such, 
chapter 6 can be considered as the ‘keystone’ of this thesis project. 
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From the emergence of this carbonic relationality in the Anthropocene, Chapters 7 and 8 
then use this genealogical insight to diagnose and interpret how we ‘think’ about 
climatic globality within our present moment. First, chapter 7 analyses how the concept 
of the Anthropocene transforms our understanding of temporality. Although the spatial 
reach of the Anthropocene across the globe is assumed and often discussed, its temporal 
reach across geologic or ‘deep time’ has not been examined in IR (on time, see 
Hutchings 2008). However, if the common claims that we are entering an Anthropocene 
epoch are taken seriously and adopted, then our tacit and naturalised understandings of 
political and human time, temporality, and history, must be irreparably transformed in 
turn. Politics and IR, however, are not equipped for deep time as such. Hence this 
chapter argues that the globality of the Anthropocene’s deep time effectively ends 
human time and history as we know it. It fosters a new eschatology and cosmology of 
human influence over the cosmos, re-asserting its own subjectivism into deep time, as 
the measure and centre of temporality. It takes the Anthropocene’s establishment of a 
‘golden spike’ as a global marker that is both human, and within deep or geologic time, 
replacing what Christ’s birth represented for modern Western, human, calendrical clock 
time. As years are replaced by epochs, however, humanity can now only relate to itself 
as a species (Chakrabarty 2009), and so once again the spectre of the Anthropocene as 
Heidegger’s portent of the planetary imperialism of technologically organised man, is 
raised (1977a).  
 
Chapter 8 analyses IR’s recent incorporation of security into Anthropocene discourses. 
It argues that its most prominent impact on IR today comes not from predicting or 
hazarding looming physical threats or violent future conflicts. Instead, it threatens our 
present ontological security: our deep and normalised conceptions of humanity and what 
it means to be a human ‘self’ in a stable and continuous world. By replacing the 
foundation of ontological security in modernity – the uncertainty of death – with a new 
uncertainty of anthropos – grounded on relationality as an existential discontinuity, 
borne of our own human selves – the Anthropocene manifests the need to secure 
humanity from humanity. It is what this chapter describes as the Paradox of the 
Anthropocene, or the task of securing oneself from oneself. Attempts to re-instill the 
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certainty of a stable human self within an uncertain Anthropocene epoch become 
evident when considering IR’s recent import and reification of the concept of 
‘entanglement’ from quantum physics and sciences. Entanglement is a form of order 
that once again makes certain the human self’s relation to Nature. However, by 
examining the discrepancies between Anthropocene globality, and quantum science and 
entanglement, this chapter also argues that what emerges in Anthropocene security 
discourses is a dis-entanglement from Nature. Concurrent with the overall findings of 
this thesis, it diagnoses these calls for an ethical entanglement as overlying a 
relationality positing a human interconnection with everything. It is an attempt to secure 
a consistent sense of self, in an incalculable and otherwise insecure future epoch. 
 
Finally, this thesis concludes with a brief overview of this project, and what its 
arguments imply for IR and the social sciences going forth. It discusses some of the 
limitations inevitably encountered in its research, the implications that its conclusions 
have for IR as a discipline, its impact on established scholarly literatures, and the 
potential it creates for future research into new forms of climatic globality. It also 
discusses the potential for a new methodology of ‘global genealogy’ that could work 
well with the form of global governmentality embraced throughout this project.
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Chapter 2 – Genealogy, Governmentality, Technology:  
De-naturalising Globality1 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter details the methodological and philosophical foundations of this thesis.  
 
It has two aims. First, its methodological goal is to elaborate the genealogical 
framework that structures the overall argument of the thesis. A methodology is 
considered here as a logical structure and procedure for the conduct of inquiry, or for 
how an investigation into a ‘world’ can ‘hook-up’ to that world (Jackson 2010). Since 
this thesis inquires into a world comprised of the conduct of conduct – i.e. subjectivity, 
and its social and historical emergence – it selects as its methodology what Michel 
Foucault called genealogy. It begins by reviewing four key steps or components to 
conducting a Foucauldian genealogy, with each step linking up to corresponding 
chapters that follow. These steps involve the problematisation, practice, rationality, and 
emergence, of the concepts of globality that were noted in chapter 1.  
 
Second, this chapter elaborates the philosophical arguments contained within each of the 
following chapters. Each chapter varies somewhat in its use and combination of 
Foucauldian, Heideggerian, and Arendtian philosophies, depending on the specific 
problem being examined therein. In other words, each individual chapter appears unique 
when examined closely, as a self-contained piece of the overarching puzzle of this 
project. Foucault, Heidegger, and Arendt are engaged in different combinations and 
ways in a bottom-up fashion, depending on the question being examined. Yet, upon 
stepping back to view this overall project as a whole, each argument ultimately 
contributes to a coherent and concise genealogical rendering of the globality of climate 
change and the Anthropocene.  
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter are published in Hamilton, S. (2017). A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR: How 
‘ontology’ emerged from the Inter-Paradigm Debate. International Theory, 9(1)., pp. 136-170; Hamilton, 
S. (2016). The measure of all things? The Anthropocene as a global biopolitics of carbon. European 
Journal of International Relations, (online) pp. 1-26. 
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In pursuing its second (philosophical) aim, this chapter also makes a novel contribution 
to IR and global governmentality studies. It establishes the groundwork for a form of 
global governmentality that is based upon technological metaphysics. This contributes 
to the discipline of IR and the social sciences by freeing governmentality from its 
dependence upon discourses of (neo)liberalism, thereby opening a wide variety of 
potential processes and rationalities that future practitioners of governmentality studies 
may pursue. It does so, first, by stressing the relevance of genealogy to governmentality 
analytics. Second, it then distinguishes governmentality from its recent conflation with 
liberalism, by revisiting the work of Foucault in which he first developed this analytic 
(2007). This move reveals how governmentality emerged from discourses of Nature, 
when scientific and technological processes were applied to the territory of the state. 
Hence, if governmentality first emerged when scientific processes and mathematical 
forms of physics were applied to processes of life and to the state, then there is no 
reason that new (or as yet, undetected) forms of governmentality do not exist in similar 
ways and fashions, unbeknownst to scholars today.  
 
In arguing these points, a synthesis of governmentality with the continental philosophies 
of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, is thereby made possible. Whilst the former 
excels in analysing the historical constitution of the human subject in relation to 
(meta)physics, technology, and the nature of worldly Being (see Heidegger 1962; 
1977a; 1977b), the latter excels in situating this technological metaphysics as a medium 
for political action and inaction in modernity (Arendt 1998; 2006). As noted in chapter 
1, Heidegger’s concept of technological ‘enframing’ and the way in which it projects 
and establishes the boundaries of subjectivity is reminiscent of Foucault’s description of 
governmentality. Arendt’s work is thus able to connect Heidegger’s technological 
metaphysics to Foucauldian social frameworks, and notions of power and subject 
formation, in ways complementary to governmentality analytics (see Dolan 2005; 
McWhorter 2003; Dreyfus 2003). Whilst enframing ‘governs’ governmentality, 
Arendt’s insights into the historical constitution of the social connects this technological 
focus with the workings of the human condition. 
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The remainder of this chapter will now engage genealogical methodology, 
governmentality analytics, and the philosophy of Heidegger and Arendt, in greater 
detail.   
 
Conducting a Genealogy 
 
Most commonly associated in IR with Foucault (Vucetic 2011), a genealogy is a way to 
analyse, historicise, and denaturalise commonplace or immutable practices, subjects, 
objects, referents, and truths. In showing how forms of knowledge and meaning that are 
considered to be universal or obvious are actually temporal and historical, a genealogy 
thereby opens the possibility for transcending the limits and boundaries that these 
concepts create in our contemporary styles of thought. If an ahistorical universal is 
historicized and re-conceptualized as being temporal and malleable, then the possibility 
to think and do otherwise than what came prior to its genealogical analysis, is created 
(Walters 2012, 118; Saar 2002, 233; Bevir 2008; Foucault 1991, 2000a).  
 
In this thesis, four key stages in genealogical analytics will be highlighted and explored. 
Each stage occupies its own chapter: problematisation (chapter 3), practice (chapter 4), 
rationality (chapter 5), and emergence (chapter 6). Yet, prior to exploring the meaning 
or purpose of these stages, it is crucial to ask: what is the point of actually engaging in a 
genealogical analytic? Why not engage in a simple historical reading of past historical 
texts on climate change or the social construction of the globe (see Bartelson 2010)?  
 
A genealogy is conducted because it avoids the twin fallacies of what are labeled here as 
‘presentism/finalism’. Presentism occurs through the unintended projection of our 
contemporary discursive meaning(s) into the past, thereby mistaking present referents as 
being coexistent or contiguous with the past. Finalism occurs by accidentally 
(pre)determining or assuming the historical development of a current referent as 
developing along a progressive or linear teleological path, from a kernel or germ in the 
past into its present and immutable form (Bartelson 1995; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). 
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Unbeknownst to us, these implicit presentist/finalist ways of thinking invariably 
determine how our current concepts, knowledge, and thought, conceptualizes our 
world(s).  
 
Indeed, the most prominent histories of climate science, climate change, and the 
Anthropocene typically develop their concepts along a similar and shared linear 
trajectory. What is considered to be important in each account is pre-determined from 
today’s present standpoint, then projected into the past, and then developed up to its 
fulfillment in the present moment. Seemingly without fail, each history reminds readers 
of a very familiar narrative: that in the early nineteenth century, Joseph Fourier 
recognized that the Earth’s atmosphere retained heat radiation; in 1859, John Tyndall 
realised this warming was controlled by the accumulation of CO2 gas; in 1896, Svante 
Arrhenius first developed a theory of ‘greenhouse warming’ in which an accumulation 
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions could warm the Earth’s atmosphere; that this theory 
was eventually traced and expanded upon by proceeding generations of scientists and 
geologists, such as Guy Stewart Callendar in the 1930s; that after World War II, the 
Cold War allowed meteorological and climate scientists to expand their research into the 
atmosphere in new ways, finally allowing Charles D. Keeling to document clear and 
increasing atmospheric concentrations of atmospheric CO2 from an observatory in 
Mauna Loa, Hawaii, giving rise to the infamous ‘Keeling Curve’. And the rest of this 
well-known story of climatic globality, as the expression goes, ‘is history’ (see Fleming 
1998; Weart 2003; Stevens 1999; Bolin 2007).  
 
Although valuable and informative, these are histories of the past from the 
presentist/finalist perspective of our present moment. It is this perspective that this 
project aims to avoid. The point of a genealogy, rather, is not to target the past from the 
present, but to target the present moment itself. A genealogy looks not into bygone 
times, but into a mirror. This “radical historicism” works by establishing 
“delegitimizing, denaturalizing perspectives on the processes of subject constitution and 
construction” (Saar 2002, 237). In other words, the point of a genealogy is to uncover a 
surprising history about the foundations of our own naturalized style of thinking. By 
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revealing how everyday concepts previously assumed to be banal or without history 
actually emerged into being unexpectedly and contingently from forgotten problems and 
events, conclusions previously un-thinkable prior to the genealogy taking place, may 
thus emerge. 
 
As Biebricher has noted, it is impossible to review every single one of the numerous 
studies invoking genealogy, and Foucault’s own inconsistent use of the term makes a 
genealogical method “difficult to pin down” (2008, 365). Simply put, there is “no single 
genealogical method” (Walters 2012, 7). That being said, this chapter will now offer an 
heuristic guide for conducting a Foucauldian genealogy, using four steps exemplified by 
the chapters that follow: problematisation, practice, rationality, and emergence. As such, 
this chapter, and this thesis, is not an ironclad declaration of what every genealogy was, 
is, should, or can be. It should be considered as a recipe or toolkit that scholars may 
draw upon in the future when conducting their own.  
 
(a) Problematization 
 
A genealogy begins by selecting a commonsensical or naturalized truth – a referent from 
the present – to be “problematized” (Foucault 2000b; Hoy 2008, 276-81; Koopman 
2013). This involves the challenging task of considering its current, universal, or taken-
for-granted form, as a contemporary solution to a forgotten problem. What we have to 
do with our everyday assumptions, or the “banal facts” of our referent’s obvious truth, is 
to “try to discover—which specific and perhaps original problem is connected to them” 
(Foucault 1983, 210). The genealogist’s task, therefore, becomes “to grasp the general 
form of problematization that has made [the referent] possible” for us to think about in 
the present, in its current “historically unique form” (Foucault 2000a, 318). With no 
universals allowed, the initial questions of a genealogy thus become: What problem 
once existed to which this referent was a solution? And after it had emerged into thought 
and being, how did it become the axiomatic or commonplace referent we think of today?  
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This thesis has selected the globality of climate change and the Anthropocene as 
referents to be problematized. Hence, what underlying problem allowed these concepts 
to emerge in IR, and to assume the naturalised global form(s) in which scholars 
understand them today? This underlying problematisation will be explored in chapter 4. 
 
(b) Practice 
 
Secondly, every genealogy should select a form of practice within which its 
problematized referent is commonly embodied or materialized in thought and discourse. 
For Foucault, thought – or thinking – is always in process as an endless interplay of 
delimiting truth/falsity, right/wrong, good/bad, etc., and it is what constitutes our 
‘knowledge’ about anything. Knowledge, as a collection of accrued thought(s), channels 
and manifests thought into ‘action’, or behavior that becomes visible on the surface of a 
practice. A material, socially meaningful pattern or “system of action” is thus inhabited 
by this ongoing interplay of thought and knowledge (Foucault 2000c: 201).  
 
In being enacted empirically “in and on the material world”, a practice thereby makes 
visible the discursive background conditions that imbue its associated referents with 
meaning (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4). A practice makes intangible knowledge visible 
(Neumann 2002). If interpreted carefully, therefore, a practice may act as a window to 
the constitution of subjectivity underlying it. A genealogy thus proceeds through “the 
problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the 
practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed” (Foucault 1992, 11, 
emphasis original).  
 
For instance, in discourses of climate change and the Anthropocene, it has become a 
truism that atmospheric cycles and processes – especially those of carbon and CO2 – are 
axiomatic considerations when discussing global environmental change and governance 
issues. Indeed, climate change is “by its very nature a global problem   . . . [and] 
mitigating global climate change can only be achieved efficiently through international 
collaboration” (Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001, vii). “‘Solutions’ to putatively global 
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problems have figured multiple, often competing views of agency and power at many 
scales”, claims Edwards (2016, 189). And yet despite this supposed variety of global 
scales, it is always “carbon accounting for self-monitoring individuals; carbon trading 
in national and international markets; carbon taxes imposed by governments on 
corporations and consumers; or military concern with climate change as a threat to 
international security” (emphasis added), to which scholars gravitate. Therefore, it is this 
practice of bringing cycles of carbon into being so as to be politicized climatically – i.e. 
made possible to enter politics, through the complex technologies of GCMs – that is 
explored in chapter five.  
 
(c) Rationality 
 
Prior to delving into past problems, texts, or interpretations, a genealogist should first 
interpret what their chosen referent and practice’s contemporary ‘rationality’ is. 
Generally put, a rationality is the everyday background or discursive frame through 
which thought filters, elaborates, accrues, and organizes knowledge. It is the historically 
specific style of thought that orients the way(s) in which reality is rendered thinkable 
and debatable for subjects in a given time and place (Miller and Rose 2008, 16). A 
rationality determines the historical possibility of what surfaces in every practice: 
 
One is not assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they 
[practices] could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms 
of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe 
themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play 
within them, because it is true that ‘practices’ do not exist without a 
certain regime of rationality. (Foucault 2002a, 229) 
 
Once a genealogist interprets the rationality undergirding their current problematized 
practice, they may then compare it with rationalities of the past. Without this careful and 
detailed historical comparison, a genealogical critique is difficult, if not impossible. 
“[W]e are thinking beings”, Foucault claimed, and so we act “on the specific ground of 
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a historical rationality. It is this rationality, and the life and death game that takes place 
in it, that I’d like to investigate from a historical point of view” (2002b, 405).  
 
This is also what makes a genealogy a nominalist analytic capable of escaping the 
fallacies of presentism/finalism affecting IR’s dominant historical narratives. Prior to a 
genealogical analysis taking place, it is impossible to anticipate from one’s present 
standpoint where, how, and when, past rationalities will overlap, transform, and emerge 
into what we have mistakenly assumed is the natural or immutable referent we are so 
familiar with, and have thus problematised.  
 
As noted in chapter 1, a widespread and subtle practice engaged in by scholars when 
conceptualising global climate change and the Anthropocene is that of powerlessness 
and failure. Evinced through the warnings of the inexorable failure of COP21, and 
ubiquitous when considering the failed COP19 conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 
2009 (see Harris 2013), practices and discourses highlighting the presence or spectre of 
failure seem endemic to concepts of climate change and the Anthropocene. Even 
textbooks, for instance, now commonly begin by asking: “How should governments 
respond to the apparent failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference on climate change?” 
(Falkner et al. 2011, 202; Harris 2013), whilst climate scientists lament how attempts to 
curb this failure fosters ever more increasing “failure, rancor, and disillusionment. . . 
Few are holding their breath [for solutions]” (Hulme 2014, viii). Chapter 5 thus traces 
how a ‘rationality of powerlessness’ emerged when the concept of a ‘climate’ became 
global, by being conjoined to these notions of failure. In other words, the style of 
thought scaffolding the ‘global climate’ was always one that was broken, powerless, 
failing. This rationality is illustrated in international conferences in the 1970s and 80s, 
as the global climate become an object of concern and (global) governance.  
 
From these overlapping discourses of globality – nuclear problematiques, GCMs, and a 
rationality of powerlessness and failure – a new form of thought then crystalises. The 
precise nature and form of this ‘globality’ is one that is identified in the next stage of 
this genealogical project in chapter 6: emergence.  
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(d) Emergence 
 
As a genealogist documents, traces, and interprets the surface of past practices and 
rationalities, they will at times appear obscure or even irrelevant to one’s 
presentist/finalist perspective. Why? Lost or foreign styles of thought will naturally 
appear as alien or banal when considered from one’s present(ist) vantage point. Yet, this 
step demands patience from the genealogist, for whilst they are parsing through these 
seemingly lost or irrelevant rationalities, an important and transformative ‘event’ should 
occur at an unanticipated or unexpected moment. This event is the unexpected 
‘emergence’ of one’s own contemporary referents, concepts, or rationalities into being.  
 
As Foucault stressed, ‘emergence’ is not an origin, which implies a primordially pure 
and truthful universality that “assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the 
external world of accident and succession” (1991, 78). Rather, detecting the emergence 
of one’s problematized concepts is an invitation to examine this accidental overlap and 
congelation of practices once thought to be unrelated or disparate. Interpreting their 
underlying rationality anew, it should then be embraced as an opportunity for the analyst 
to examine the complex circumstances surrounding this event. ‘What forgotten problem 
of thought created the conceptual space that this rationality and referent filled? What 
combinations of concepts fused together into these new forms? If it was once emergent 
and new, what contributed to its becoming ossified and naturalized until appearing as 
normal, universal, or unquestionable in the present?’ (For example, see Walters 2012, 
132; Foucault 1991; Foucault 2000c, 201; Koopman 2013, 15). By interpreting and 
uncovering the unexpected historical emergence of the problematised referent and its 
rationality, the genealogist thereby gains a new understanding of how their present 
subjectivity and perspectival standpoint came into being and became thinkable. Hence, a 
history of the present, rather than one of the past. 
 
As noted in chapter 1, today’s dominant rationality relies heavily upon concepts of 
humanity and globality as being part of an inexorable “geostory that integrates, shapes 
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and counterweights not only human history but also the geo-human future: the 
Anthropocene epoch” (Edwards 2016, 193). Indeed, the emergence of the rationality 
underpinning this supposed epoch will be discussed in chapter 6, which argues that its 
globality is evinced through what this thesis identifies as a global biopolitics of carbon, 
consisting of a technological subjectivism defined as relationality.  
 
In following these steps, an enhanced capacity for a new analysis of global climate 
change and the Anthropocene, and critiques and interpretations of the concepts 
sustaining them, is facilitated. This analysis and interpretation is what is taken up in 
chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, in which the temporality, security, and notions of 
‘entanglement’ that are currently in vogue in discourses of the Anthropocene, are 
(re)considered. 
 
Genealogy and (Global) Governmentality  
 
This thesis answers the call of many IR and Foucauldian scholars to combine 
genealogical analytics with governmentality (Dean 2010; Biebricher 2008; Saar 2002; 
Andersson 2013; Walters 2012). Indeed, “Foucault is quite explicit about the fact that 
his investigation of governmentality was to be conducted in conjunction with the 
methods that he had previously grouped under the rubric of genealogy” (Walters 2012, 
113). Why? Like genealogy, governmentality aims to analyze subjectivity in ways that 
avoid the fallacies of presentism/finalism, or the application of concepts to referents 
from the ‘top-down’.  
 
A top-down application of governmentality mutes the subtle shifts in knowledge, 
empirical investigation of practices, and discovery of random and contingent overlaps 
and encounters, that a genealogy offers to those willing to brave dusty archival pages. 
Approaching any topic solely through the lens of governmentality, therefore, risks this 
applicationism through an “aerial” view that runs dangerously close to “refashioned 
grand theory” (Walters 2012, 114; May 2005). So, whilst genealogy provides a 
nominalist interpretation of how concepts emerged contingently and unexpectedly to 
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shape the way we think, governmentality embraces the shock of this denaturalisation to 
elaborate the systematic and technical nuances of the operation of these concepts within 
conduct (Neumann and Sending 2010, 10). In other words, a genealogy provides the 
history of our present, whilst governmentality analyses the conduct of this present. Its 
forms of visibility, or ways of seeing and perceiving; its distinctive ways of thinking, 
questioning, and producing truth; its specific ways of acting, intervening, and directing, 
through forms of knowledge and technology; and its ways of forming ourselves as 
subjects through technologies and knowledge practices (Dean 2010, 33).  
 
For IR, a discipline generally wedded to theorising statist units, systems, and structures 
within decentralized or anarchical realms (Hollis and Smith 1990), combining 
genealogy and governmentality offers new analytical insights into politics and human 
behavior. It exposes the “productive and micropolitical dimensions of power over [IR’s] 
traditional concerns with instrumental control or structural domination; discursive and 
practical dimensions of politics over concerns with political agents and structures; and 
epistemic and technical dimensions of governance concerns with authority and 
institutions” (Jaeger 2013, 26). It can analyze anew how the subjectivity of a human 
agent is delimited, channeled, and regulated through tacit actions and technologies 
commonly overlooked through statist lenses.   
 
This takes us to the focus of this thesis: the axiomatic globality of climate change and 
the Anthropocene. Can governmentality go as ‘global?’ as these concepts?1 Indeed, a 
burgeoning new global governmentality literature is emerging in IR (for a small sample, 
see Neumann and Sending 2010; Joseph 2012; Corry 2013; Death 2010; Jaeger 2010; 
Merlingen 2010; de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010). It seeks to “problematize the 
constitution and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states”, 
thereby conceiving of global governance and globality in a new way: as a constellation 
                                                        
1 It should be noted that the term ‘global’ is itself contested, but this debate will not be explored here due 
to space constraints. This thesis defines the concept or notion of ‘the global’ as a physical, ontological, 
and epistemic referent “that can directly affect humankind as a whole, both as object and subject (or as 
target and actor), in a nearly equal and potentially lethal manner” (Cerutti 2007, 2). For an excellent 
overview of debates and meanings surrounding ‘the global’, see the edited volume Framing the Global 
(Kahn 2014).  
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of (liberal) govern-mentalities, rationalities, or patterns of thought, that are now 
“becoming detectable at the global level . . . reconfigur[ing] the relations between states 
and other actors” (Neumann and Sending 2010, 16). However, some argue that this 
“scaling up” of governmentality to a global scale is less than an “interrogation of 
liberalism than a prop to reworked liberal accounts of the international arena” (Selby 
2007, 325). This has resulted in what Vrasti (2013, 50) has called a “global 
governmentality debate”.1  
 
The global governmentality debate is split into two camps: one supporting it as an 
analytic of international and global processes, and one rejecting its possibility by 
restricting it to the socioeconomic conditions within nation-states (for a fuller treatment, 
see Hamilton 2014). It is worthwhile to review the basic arguments of both sides in 
order to contextualise global governmentality in IR today, and to see how this thesis 
moves beyond this debate.  
 
On the one hand, opponents of global governmentality typically argue that: (1) There 
exist essential and unbridgeable methodological, ontological, and epistemological 
differences between domestic and inter-state governance, and a truly ‘global’ 
(neo)liberal rationality of governance. One cannot simply scale Foucauldian templates 
for micro-levels upwards to the macro-level of the state system (Selby 2007; Joseph 
2013). (2) Global governmentality ignores the uneven distribution of (neo)liberalism 
and capital accumulation across states, sublimating the importance of local political 
conflicts by tacitly presupposing the ontological existence of a ‘global’ realm of politics 
as an apologia for IR’s academic literature and analysis (Joseph 2010; 2013; Chandler 
2009; 2010). (3) ‘Global’ governmentality ignores Foucault’s own assertions that 
governmentality, as an analytic, be confined solely to problematiques of the state, and of 
liberal government (Selby 2007; Joseph 2010; 2013).   
 
                                                        
1 For the most heated exchanges in this global governmentality debate, see the dialogue established 
between Kiersey (2008); Chandler (2009); Kiersey (2009); Rosenow (2009); Chandler (2010); Kiersey et 
al. (2010); and Joseph (2010). 
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On the other hand, advocates of global governmentality analytics respond that: (1) The 
historically unique and unprecedented emergence of globalised state relations can 
indeed buttress and describe newly-emerging global governmentalities, because they 
operate as “universal, but not truly global” rationalities (Vrasti 2013). A state’s 
economic performance or structure may not sufficiently reflect the level that neoliberal 
economic rationalities have permeated and shaped the subjectivities within its 
populations, i.e. into enterprising or entrepreneurial individuals. (2) That 
governmentality is not manifested solely by, nor within, preordained discursive spatial 
demarcations, such as towns, cities, or states. Instead, it emerges through multifarious 
types of practices, occurring anywhere between an assortment of types of agents at 
various levels of self, family, group, institution, state, economy, etc. Where there are 
competing knowledges, actions, and conducts, in other words, there is a fluid and 
implicit form of government fueling the impetus for, and possibilities of, inter-action 
(Kiersey et al. 2010). (3) Neoliberal rationalities are not limited to the state, as evinced 
by their promotion amongst international and non-governmental organizations that 
generate and evince new problematics of liberal governance across the globe, thickening 
the international with economically and politically liberal norms and rationalities 
(Neumann and Sending 2007; 2010). The diffusion of norms considered ‘liberal’, such 
as human rights, democratic political governance, and free-market economics, is 
indicative of this liberalisation of the international into the global. 
 
Finally, proponents of global governmentality also argue that power, existing only as a 
relation conducting the knowledge and thought between actors, is not limited to the 
successful operationalization or implementation of state-led initiatives. It can be equally 
as effective in failed attempts at liberal governance (Methmann 2014), democratic 
governance (Cruikshank 1996), or as self-governance and self-formation (Dean 1995). 
In other words, a liberal initiative does not always have to ‘work’ for it to change and 
determine the implicit boundaries conducting how people think and act. We remain 
governed by our failures just as much, if not more so, than our successes. 
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However, a problem that arises is that both sides of this global governmentality debate 
remain fixated or dependent upon liberalism as the foundation for both ‘the social’ and 
governmentality itself. It is taken for granted that, as Barry et al. (1996, 8) declare, “it 
was only with the emergence of liberalism that it was possible for a domain of ‘society’ 
to emerge”, and hence that “liberal political reason is the historical condition of the very 
object of their [social science] disciplines – ‘society’” (1996, 9). This implies that there 
is no governmentality without liberalism as a medium for analysing social conduct 
(hence, the critiques of Joseph 2010, 2013). What this thesis argues, however, is that the 
opposite is in fact the case: liberalism arose only after the application of scientific 
processes to a bounded polity (i.e. the state) were made; society and liberalism only then 
emerged as tangible objects from these calculations, rather than vice-versa.  
 
In other words, and as will be argued below, governmentality is ultimately determined 
not by liberalism, nor by society, but by the application of scientific practices and 
processes to forms of life within a bounded space. This implies that a ‘global’ 
governmentality depends not upon the reach of liberal norms or capital, nor even upon 
states or the international system, but upon the type and form of scientific processes and 
procedures bringing life and the human subject into being in certain ways.  
 
It is thus to the forgotten underpinning of governmentality, as first argued by Foucault – 
Nature and scientific processes – that this chapter turns.   
 
The Emergence of Governmentality: Nature, Science, and Calculating Processes 
 
The previous section highlighted the temptation of what has been called the 
“applicationism” of governmentality in IR (Walters 2012): “that is, treating 
governmentality as a fixed set of concepts and tools that one simply applies to empirical 
projects, whatever the topic.” In this light, neither side of the global governmentality 
debate questioned the liberal roots of governmentality, instead applying it to economic, 
statist, or global problems.  
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This thesis rejects this applicationism by stepping back to reconsider the conceptual 
foundation of governmentality itself. It acknowledges IR’s penchant for liberal 
applicationism in its global governmentality debate, as well as the diverse scholarship 
on forms of liberal carbon governmentality that either accept or ignore this danger (see 
chapter 6). Yet this thesis is able to circumvent these problems by developing a form of 
governmentality that exists and functions separately from both liberalism, and from the 
state, whilst not being hostile, exclusive, nor antithetical to either. This new conceptual 
foundation for global governmentality analytics can be found not by debating about its 
future applications, but by returning to the philosophical foundations and texts from 
which the analytic emerged. 
 
When considering global (environmental) crises, despite today’s debates over complex 
carbon markets, carbon accounting, or biopolitical and liberal climate governmentalities, 
we must remember that the essence or core of Foucault’s biopolitics – and 
governmentality – was not liberalism or society. It was Nature, and how “the sciences of 
nature, and physics in particular” brought both Nature and political dynamics and forces 
into being (Foucault 2007, 296). Nature was the “other face” of governmentality, 
“something that runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you 
like, its indispensible hypodermis” (Foucault 2008, 16).  
 
Why Nature, and not liberalism or society? According to Foucault, the development of 
(liberal) political economy emerged only after the natural sciences isolated Laws of 
Nature based upon physical cycles and processes. Applied to human beings, “if there is 
a nature specific to the objects and operations of governmentality, then the consequence 
of this is that governmental practice can only do what it has to do by respecting this 
nature” (Foucault 2008, 16). Take the liberal market, for example. Only once the 
market’s “natural” cycles and mechanisms were first identified in the 18th century by the 
physiocrats, by applying scientific conceptions and processes used to study Nature to a 
flux of bodies within a polity, could new truths then emerge into discursive circulation: 
the concept of ‘population’ as a new object of investigation with its own movements and 
laws, for example, came into being. Once this statistical object emerged, it could be re-
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considered or redefined as economic, as social, etc. Contrary to its liberal application 
today, therefore, governmentality was first drawn not upon the canvas of society or 
liberalism, but upon Nature and processes detected by scientific naturalism. “[I]f we 
take them up at their origin, you can see that what characterizes this new art of 
government I have spoken about [governmentality] would be much more a naturalism 
than liberalism” (Foucault 2008, 61). 
 
In this regard, Foucault notes how the politics and philosophy of Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace echoes the background philosophico-scientific rationalities in vogue at this time, 
analogising politics from Nature’s processes. “Nature intended the entire world, the 
whole of its surface, to be given over to the economic activity of production and 
exchange”, prescribing even “juridical obligations for man, but which nature has in a 
way dictated to him secretly, which she has, as it were, marked out in the very 
arrangement of things, of geography, the climate, and so on” (Foucault 2008, 57). 
Natural science was the analytical bedrock here. Likewise, society itself emerged from 
discovering Nature’s secrets through calculative investigations. It was not a self-evident 
statistical agglomeration resulting immediately from market calculations or liberal 
political economics, but arose only when scientific cycles and rhythms previously 
applied to biological life processes – the Laws of Nature – were developed alongside the 
state. “It is society as a naturalness specific to man’s life in common . . . as a domain, a 
field of objects, as a possible domain of analysis, knowledge and intervention” that 
emerged from scientific processes as an object of study and intervention, claimed 
Foucault (2007, 349). “We are dealing with processes that can be known by methods of 
the same type as any scientific knowledge”, shared and assumed amongst scientists and 
economists alike as their “scientific rationality” (2007, 350). Again, this highlights the 
importance of the primary aim of this thesis: questioning how scientific processes are 
applied to Nature today, and what (unexpected) rationalities, patterns, or objects, might 
emerge from them when considering the axiomatic globality of climate change and the 
Anthropocene.  
 
 49 
Prior to Foucault, Arendt had also highlighted how the biological cycles of labour, when 
transposed from the privacy of the household (economia) upwards to the state level, 
created a nation-wide form of ‘housekeeping’ grounded upon statistical calculations 
(1998). For Arendt, like Foucault, this fostered the rise of the social realm and the liberal 
economy by making the private life processes of the economia into the public realm of 
social and political economy (see chapter 6). The point here is that, in order for 
‘governmentality’ to emerge, scientific rationalities that were typically applied to Nature 
were transposed to human beings within a polity. Science undergirded both society and 
liberalism, and not the other way around.  
 
However, dominant social and scientific rationalities shifted when the natural sciences 
re-conceptualized Nature less in terms of natural flows and cycles, and more as a 
machine capable of being constructed artificially. Here, Foucault describes a general 
transition away from the biopolitical governmentality that first isolated ‘natural’ 
economic processes of flow and exchange within the police state, to something new. 
Contrary to the physiocrat’s, Kant’s, and Smith’s use of Nature, in the 20th century 
German ordoliberals expunged this “naïve naturalism” and its claims to a “pre-existing 
nature, to a natural given that [the state and society] brings with it” (Foucault 2008, 
120). At this point, government was, apparently, no longer predicated on obeying 
Nature’s cycles but on “making” and securing the state artificially by establishing forms 
of economic freedom and markets that brought the state into being, post hoc (Foucault 
2008, 87, 102). “Can the market really have the power of formalization for both the state 
and society? This is the important, crucial problem of present-day liberalism”, notes 
Foucault, “and to that extent it represents an absolutely important mutation with regard 
to traditional liberal projects” (2008, 117). Here, for Foucault, governing a society 
becomes explicitly severed from understanding Nature’s cycles and processes. 
Dynamics of enterprise, competition and the homo economicus as consumer, become 
strategies through which governments intervene in, and regulate, society. Indeed, IR is 
now familiar with this as a market rationality and legal order that brings the state into 
being under conditions of liberal, and eventually, advanced (neo)liberal government 
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(Foucault, 2008, 145-146). It remains the foundation of both sides of the global 
governmentality debate, examined above. 
 
This brings us to one of the philosophical arguments of this thesis. If Foucault (2008, 
22) is correct in asserting that “…only when we know what this governmental regime 
called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is”, and if liberalism and 
‘the social’ was the result of a crystallization of the “sciences of Nature” applied to 
politics and life, then there is no reason that this implicit link between science, Nature, 
and biopolitical and governmental rationalities, does not exist today in some undetected 
form.  
 
Indeed, if governmentality is a nominalist analytic, we must assume that undetected 
scientific rationalities might still be conducting our mentalities and rationalities in 
discourses of globality, climate change, and the Anthropocene, in ways still unknown to 
us. Rather than mute governmentality with a top-down liberal analytic, it thus behoves 
us to pursue a genealogical inquiry into our present conduct, whilst keeping this 
connection between scientific rationality and subjectivity in mind. In other words, a 
‘global governmentality’ may not be liberal, but scientific.  
 
The theoretical and philosophical task of this thesis in the following chapters, therefore, 
is to problematise how modern sciences of GCMs and ESS have interacted with human 
beings and with the state to shape the concepts of climate change and the Anthropocene 
into the axiomatic concepts we conceive of today. If a tacit homogeneity once made “the 
dynamics of politics and the dynamics of physics […] more or less contemporaneous” 
(Foucault 2007, 296), then it is by analyzing the sciences and physics of the 
Anthropocene, and their making of Nature into an object now destined by humanity, that 
new biopolitical and governmental forms and possibilities can emerge. 
 
In order to do so, this thesis expands upon an oversight or omission made by Foucault 
himself. Foucault was clear that the basic concept of governmentality emerged through 
the genealogy of the state and governmental reason that he was conducting throughout 
 51 
his 1977-78 lecture series (2007, 354). Indeed, ‘governmentality’ emerged suddenly and 
unexpectedly on 01 February, 1978. At this point, Foucault laments that “Basically, if I 
had wanted to give the lectures I am giving this year a more exact title, I certainly would 
not have chosen ‘security, territory, population.’ What I would really like to undertake is 
something that I would call a history of ‘governmentality.’” (Foucault 2007, 108). This 
raises an important question: why is it that governmentality arose only at this point? 
What caused Foucault to suddenly develop the concept, and expand upon it throughout 
the rest of his 1977-78 lectures?  
 
He began his 1977-78 lecture series by focusing on how biological components of the 
human species became politicised and naturalisd as “bio-power” in the West (2007, 1). 
Yet, he then moves quickly into discussing scientific understandings of “circulation” 
(2007, 16-19). What he struggled with, at this early point, was reconciling the 
mechanisms and apparatuses of security he eagerly sought, with his earlier notions of 
sovereign power (i.e. macro forms of juridical power over a territory) and with 
disciplinary power (i.e. micro forms of power, or the structuring of local bodily spaces 
into distributions of hierarchical and functional elements) (Foucault 2007, 20). 
Answering this question would respond to his critic’s accusations that sovereign and 
disciplinary power were one-dimensional and unidirectional top-down inscriptions of 
violence and force, branded upon a dominated human body. Now, in 1977-78, Foucault 
sought to create space for a power encapsulating human agency and freedom within the 
social realm (McNay 1996, 85).  
 
He thus ventures into the biology of Lamarck and the physics of “Newton and the 
Newtonians” so as to “account for action at a distance of one body on another”, acting 
through what he called the space of the milieu (2007, 20). The point here is that the 
milieu – grounded on Newton’s classical model of physics, explicating the action at a 
distance of one body upon another – is a set of natural and artificial givens bearing on 
all subjects, “a field of intervention in which . . . one tries to affect, precisely, a 
population” (2007, 21). Through it, population appears as an object that can be explored 
through the circulation and scarcity of grain, rather than the dictates of sovereign or 
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disciplinary power (see the 18 January, 1978 lecture). What he concludes as 
“fundamental” from this is not sovereignty nor discipline, but “A physics of power, or a 
power thought of as physical action in the element of nature” that can only be carried 
out through the “freedom of circulation” of a new technology of power (2007, 49). But 
what is this new technology of power?  
 
In his next lecture (25 January, 1978), he examines how the quantitative analyses of 
smallpox affects the milieu, realising that calculation is what circumscribes or gives 
bounds to the population as existing in a place, space, and time (2007, 60). He concludes 
from this that “the mechanism of security does not function on the axis of the sovereign-
subject relationship . . . They are connected to what the physiocrats called physical 
processes, which could be called natural processes” (2007, 65). Based upon the 
application of biological and physical processes and concepts to the state, “the central 
point of all this” becomes a form governmental action oriented around the specific 
processes of a calculated population (2007, 66). With the physiocrats and eighteenth 
century economists, the population becomes “considered as a set of processes to be 
managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (2007, 70). 
To govern, one must now respect and deploy “reflected procedures of government 
within this nature, with the help of it, and with regard to it”, especially as the population 
becomes known biologically as a human species, rather than as “mankind” (2007, 75).  
 
It is at this point, through the application of Newtonian physics and scientific processes 
to the human species as the new political medium or ‘object’ of population, that 
“government” emerges as the new technology of power sought by Foucault (2007, 76). 
“Hence the theme of man, and the ‘human sciences’ that analyze him as a living being, 
working individual, and speaking subject, should be understood on the basis of the 
emergence of population” (2007, 79). What he identified as an “era of governmentality 
discovered in the eighteenth century” (2007, 109), therefore, emerged genealogically by 
interpreting how scientific processes of Newtonian physics, the milieu, circulation, and 
quantification, circumscribed life that was bounded within a territory. Indeed, Foucault 
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remained adamant that scientific naturalism and physics remained “the permanent 
correlative” of biopolitics and governmentality going forth (2008, 16). 
 
Now, a mistake of Foucault’s (he was still human, after all) was later to use this 
technology of governmentality retroactively. He inserts it backwards in time, to cover 
his first series of lectures, as if the concept had always existed, and could be traced on a 
continuous or linear timescale outside of his own genealogical rendering. For instance, 
in his last lecture of 05 April, 1978, he now claims that governmentality was always a 
part of the milieu, discourses of circulation, etc.: “A new governmentality is born with 
the économistes more than a century after the appearance of that other governmentality 
in the seventeenth century. The government of the politiques gives us police, and the 
government of the économistes introduce us, I think, to some of the fundamental lines of 
modern and contemporary governmentality” (Foucault 2007, 348).1 What this implies, 
however, is that Foucault succumbs to a presentism/finalism of his own. He makes his 
notion of governmentality – one that emerged through the specific notions of Newtonian 
physics and circulation – into an atemporal or ideal theory or concept, that can be used 
at any time. So, rather than an analytic of a form of subjectivity that existed in one place 
or form, and not in others, it becomes a foundation for – as he uses it in 1978-79 – 
(neo)liberalism. This results his later 1978-79 lectures (see Foucault 2008) treating 
governmentality more as a top-down analytic of liberalism, than as the contingent 
historical technology that emerged genealogically, through practices and processes of 
science and physics being applied to life in a polity. In 1978-79, physics is paid some lip 
service, but ultimately stops being problematized and examined. In its place, artificial 
competition replaces the “naïve naturalism” of the market as a sort of natural given 
(Foucault 2008, 120). The population is still heavily invoked, but its conceptual 
foundation upon Newtonian physical processes is forgotten. 
 
                                                        
1 This is certainly not to say that governmentality cannot be applied, as an analytic of power and 
subjectivity, to a variety of times, places, spaces, and relations of individuals (see Foucault 2007, 108-
109). Rather, it is to say that in making this move during the context his 1977-78 lectures, Foucault omits 
how his genealogical project resulted in the emergence of this concept as a specific technology from 
specific scientific processes. The danger thus becomes generalising these specific processes, to other 
times, places, spaces, and relations of individuals, without the correlative genealogical investigation.  
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If governmentality is correlated permanently with science and physics, this would imply 
that changes in one indicate changes in the other. Indeed, preceding this inversion of 
scientific naturalism into an artificial liberalism, Foucault briefly highlighted a “type of 
rationality considered valid within the natural sciences. In short, what we can broadly 
call technology” (2008, 115). “Technicization of state management, of control of the 
economy” was connected with the rise of Nazism and state control of the market, and 
then to the state’s refusal to govern the market through this technicization after World 
War II. Yet, the scientific rationalities underpinning this artificial ‘rationality of 
technology’ – was assumed by Foucault to function according to the calculative and 
statistical regimes that had emerged earlier, through naturalism. The problem here is that 
naturalism, Newtonian physics, and the milieu, were clearly outdated sciences at this 
point, especially with the rise of quantum mechanics (see chapter 8). Rather than a 
renewed genealogical ethos, the market, society, and technicization remain treated as an 
unproblematic and unexamined background context for later analyses of the artificiality 
of neoliberalism. Or, to put it another way, the permanent correlation between science, 
physics, and government, is broken here. Technology and physics becomes an 
instrumental part of liberalism, statistical normalization, artificial standardization, and 
individuation, rather than being problematized in-itself, or interpreted as to how it might 
correlate as a new technology of power. Thus, whether the permanent correlative 
between science, Nature, technology, and political practice, remained in new forms 
within this rationality of technology and its concomitant marketisation, was left 
unexplored.  
 
What this omission implies is that today’s biopolitical and governmentality analytics 
remain based on Foucault’s interpretation of outdated sciences and technologies from 
the 16th to early-20th centuries (e.g. circulation, the milieu, force dynamics, and 
Newtonian physics). Concepts we take for granted in Foucauldian literature in IR and 
the social sciences – those that emerged from Foucault’s 1977-78 foray into physical 
processes, such as population, society, and governmentality – thereby retain the 
underlying scientific rationalities derived from, and for, the bygone natural processes of 
the French physiocrats. In other words, although the software of biopolitics and 
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governmentality appears modern, it is actually its hardware (i.e. Newtonian physical 
processes and calculations of nature) that is antiquated. Specific views of Nature and 
science have since changed, but ‘the population’ remains as an object nonetheless. This 
is a curious discrepancy for a nominalist analytic stressing historical contingency. Yet, 
the underlying correlation between transformations in scientific rationality, technology, 
and political reason, may remain just as strong today. All that remains is for a 
genealogical analysis of these concepts and practices to be undertaken so as to escape 
presentism/finalism and applicationism. This is a gap in this literature that this thesis 
hopes to fill. 
 
This thesis engages the physics and sciences that correlate Nature with politics today, 
the sciences of GCMs and the ESS. These underpin the globalities of both climate 
change and the Anthropocene. In so doing, it reveals a new form of global 
governmentality “which is, as it were, tête-à-tête with the art of government” in a new 
relationship of “knowledge and power, science and decision” (Foucault 2007, 351). 
Indeed, despite the global governmentality debate being deadlocked in its contestations 
over liberal rationalities and their scope, “nations clash over scraps from the economic 
pie – but at the planetary spatial scale, the atmosphere and oceans circulate unrestricted” 
(Edwards 2016, 190). It is precisely these processes of planetary circulation – i.e. 
atmospheric and oceanic processes, and their concomitant technicization into the 
globalities we take for granted – that will be explored in the following chapters. 
 
Prior to the genealogical investigation of these scientific processes, it is important to 
clarify the constitution of this “technicization” or “rationality of technology” itself; the 
one hinted at – but then omitted – by Foucault. 
 
Technology, Rationality, Metaphysics: Bringing subjectivity into Being 
 
If the philosophical basis of this thesis analyses how scientific processes and discourses 
of Nature correlate with politics, then climate change and the Anthropocene are 
excellent concepts to problematise. The existence, essence, and knowledge of both is 
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grounded not upon liberalism, capital, nor markets, but upon the technicisation of 
Nature itself: the calculation of global physical processes, i.e. computerised simulations 
of atmospheric and oceanic fluid dynamics (see Heavens 2013).  
 
Although they are taken for granted as banal or ‘natural’ in common discourse and 
parlance, notions of a global climate and Anthropocene epoch are borne out of 
incredibly complex simulations and models. These models quantify and calculate the 
physical processes of the Earth’s fluid dynamics, and make them cognizable or 
amenable to human comprehension. As Edwards (2010, xiv) succinctly phrases it: 
“Everything we know about the world’s climate—past, present, and future—we know 
through models” (emphasis original). Indeed, our knowledge of the global climate and 
Anthropocene “would be impossible without the use of global climate models (GCMS) . 
. . [which] are powerful computer programs that use physical processes to replicate, as 
accurately as possible, the functioning of the global climate system.” (Fenech et al. 
2007, 133). As odd as it sounds, whenever we think of ‘global climate change’ or ‘the 
Anthropocene’, we are channeling and manifesting concepts derived and congealed 
from computerised data.  
 
Generally put, all GCMs are based upon the physics of atmospheric fluid dynamics, 
which simulate planetary heat exchange and circulation throughout the atmosphere and 
oceans (models linking atmosphere-oceans may also be called AOGCMs). Although 
GCMs are discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it is important to highlight here their 
conceptual dependence upon simulations embracing modern physics. Generally, to 
make the global climate or Earth system thinkable, these models engage two steps: first, 
creating a “dynamical core” that simulates large-scale atmospheric movements through 
primitive equations of fluid motion, represented in numerical grids. Second, the “model 
physics” of planetary processes too complex to compute, emanating from molecular to 
atmospheric scales, must somehow be represented. This occurs through a “sub-grid-
scale physics indirectly by means of parameters (mathematical functions and constants 
that capture the large-scale effects of smaller-scale processes without modeling them 
directly).” (Edwards 2010, 146). This is also called Parameterisation. So, following 
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Foucault, how is it best to theorise or analyse how the physics and processes detailed by 
these GCMs and their grids of ‘parameterizations’ are applied to politics and 
international relations today? How should we interpret the operation of the scientific 
rationality underpinning them? 
 
It is here where the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt are able to fill 
the void or lacuna regarding technology and physics that was left by Foucault. Each 
goes beyond Foucault’s limited account of technology by engaging not only processes 
of mathematisation and physics, but their underlying meta-physics. Indeed, echoing 
Foucault’s discussion of historical regimes of truth, Heidegger (1977b, 115) writes that 
“Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and 
through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is 
essentially formed.” Since Foucault’s problem was always “to see how men govern 
(themselves and others) by the production of truth . . . the establishment of domains in 
which the practice of true and false can be made” (2002a, 230), there is an obvious 
symmetry here concerning the historical fluctuation of thought and truth, and its 
concretisation in shared practices.  
 
First, it must be stated that to explore the many overlaps and disagreements between the 
complex and substantial works of each of these thinkers would be well beyond the scope 
of this chapter, and even this project (for a small sample of such comparisons, see Villa 
1996; Villa 2006; Milchman and Rosenberg 2003; Rayner 2007; Dreyfus 1989; Elden 
2001; Nichols 2014; Iyer 2014; King and Stone 2007). Rather, since this chapter’s aim 
is now to elaborate how genealogy and governmentality analytics can illuminate today’s 
‘rationality of technology’ left in the dark by Foucault, it focuses on a point where each 
of these thinkers overlaps: a point that Foucault (2005, 14) called the “Cartesian 
moment”.     
 
The Cartesian moment was an historical event and transformation in Western thought. It 
was at this moment that the West’s understanding of the relationship between humanity, 
science, and physical nature, was problematized in unprecedented ways. Prior to it, in 
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the sixteenth century, it was commonplace knowledge that everything in nature testified 
to God’s dominion over and through the “entire fabric of the world, natural or human, 
and [it was] apparent on every level of existence” (Toulmin 1990, 127; Arendt 2006). 
Indeed, at this time and through this cosmology, it was simply known that both politics 
and Nature were governed by the same laws: “What God is to nature, the King is to the 
State” (1990, 27), and so order, hierarchy, and nature, operated according to their place 
and rank in a great chain of Being. The human self was not yet a ‘subject’ certain of its 
own being as an ‘I’. Instead, the human self was certain only of its own “obligation to 
Christian revelational truth and Church doctrine . . . in which the salvation of man’s soul 
is made certain and guaranteed for him” (Heidegger 1977b, 148). At this point in time, 
the self was not yet a subjectivity.  
 
The Cartesian moment occurred when these Aristotelian and medieval-scholastic 
understandings of Nature, politics, and the world – i.e. the self’s certainty of its being 
and place within Christian doctrine and its certainty of salvation – transformed into our 
modern “cultural paradigm” through the philosophies (i.e. sciences) of Newton, but 
especially of Descartes (Dreyfus 2006, 354; Foucault, 2005; 2007). Rather than 
remaining part of a divine chain of Being, the adoption of Descartes’s science fomented 
a metaphysical and cultural paradigm shift in which humanity became certain of its own 
self as its conceptual foundation. Or, as Heidegger (1977b, 148) writes, it was a “freeing 
of man [from Christian doctrine] to freedom as the self-determination that is certain of 
itself.” It resulted in what we know today as the subject, or the capacity to think of 
our/selves in a world as a self, a subjectivity, or an ‘I’, represented or contrasted against 
external objects. From this Cartesian moment, a cosmology emerged in which 
subjectivity was in contrast to objectivity. Arendt (1998, 254) likewise highlighted this 
as the most important moment in modern philosophy: “an exclusive concern with the 
self, as distinguished from the soul or person or man in general, an attempt to reduce all 
experiences, with the world as well as with other human beings, to experiences between 
man and himself.”  
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And thus in this Cartesian moment, we see the problem of ‘government’ breaking out 
suddenly in the “sixteenth century with respect to many different problems at the same 
time and in completely different aspects” (Foucault 2007, 88). The emergence of 
subjectivity transformed politics. Yet, why would this ‘subjectivity’ be connected to 
political transformations in government and states? This concerns how the self as 
subjectivity or ‘I’ relates to truth as objectivity: through measurements and calculations, 
such as population arithmetic. Suddenly, after the Cartesian moment, subjective truth 
became a form of knowledge representing an accurate picture of the external object-ive 
nature of the world, back to oneself, or ‘I’ (Foucault 2005; Heidegger 1977a; 1977b). 
“The Cartesian approach”, writes Foucault (2005, 14), “refers to knowledge of the self, 
as a form of consciousness . . . the modern age of the history of truth begins when 
knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to truth”. Truth, as a self-certain 
knowledge that the cogito of the subject – the I – possesses about external objects (2005, 
17). Finally, Foucault adds that: 
 
What’s more, by putting the self-evidence of the subject’s own 
existence at the very source of access to being, this knowledge of 
oneself (. . . in the form of the impossibility of doubting my existence as 
subject) made the “know yourself” into a fundamental means of access 
to truth. (2005, 14) 
 
Therefore, the Western cultural paradigm became grounded on subjectivity and the ‘I’ 
as a self-certainty, deriving truth about objective Nature through calculative or 
measurable scientific practices.  
 
What is crucial about the Cartesian moment for this thesis is twofold: first, it is the 
moment when sciences such as population arithmetic (i.e. statistics) are first able to be 
applied to the state, thereby detecting processes that led to the emergence of society and 
governmentality (Foucault 2007). Indeed, this transformation comprised “an epoch-
making . . . social epistemology” (McCormick 2014, 240), made possible through 
subjectivity as a new foundation or grounds for being. Second, not only does Heidegger 
share Foucault’s emphasis on this moment as a cultural paradigm shift, but he identifies 
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it as being technological at its conceptual root. In other words, underpinning this 
Cartesian moment, is a metaphysics of technology that suits the ‘rationality of 
technology’ omitted by Foucault. 
 
How is the application of scientific processes to life, technological? For Heidegger 
(1977a, 22), the Cartesian “modern physical theory of nature prepares the way first not 
simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology.” This essence of 
technology is actually nothing technological, if by ‘technological’ we are referring to the 
explicit, commonplace, anthropocentric understanding of machine or digital technology 
that we have taken for granted today. Instruments or networks comprised of computers, 
automobiles, rockets, mobile phones, the internet, etc., that humans use as means to 
ends. This is indeed the “material or physical” rendering of technology that is usually 
embraced in IR (Skolnikoff 1993), splitting into camps of technological determinists 
(i.e. technology is autonomous), or social constructivists (i.e. technology depends upon 
intersubjective meaning). Technology is then discussed in an abstract way, or it is used 
as an explanatory variable in a vague fashion (Herrera 2007). However, even in IR, “No 
technology is truly autonomous; they are all partly social. Yet neither are the political 
meanings of technologies infinitely malleable” (Herrerra 2007, 575). Technology for IR 
depends on what one makes of it. 
 
Heidegger successfully avoids this conundrum by defining the essence of technology as 
a particular metaphysical rationality, or way of revealing beings and referents as being 
‘true’ for humans in a group, or within their shared cultural paradigm. This 
technological metaphysics is what grounds an age (1977b). Its essence is what 
Heidegger called the ‘enframing’ (Ge-Stell) of Being, 1  the way that a subjectivity 
implicitly challenges every object forth into cognition for itself, as a representation to be 
measured or calculated. Enframing thus explains why modern technology must always 
increasingly “employ exact physical science” (1977a, 23), such as the application of 
                                                        
1 Enframing denotes “Modern science’s way of representing [that] pursues and entraps nature as a 
calculable coherence of forces”, or “the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., 
challenges him forth to reveal the real in the mode of ordering”, regulating, securing, and calculating, 
called “standing reserve” (Bestand) (1977a, 17. Also, for an application in IR see Alt 2015).  
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processes to relations of bodies (Foucault 2007, 349). With self-certainty grounding 
subjectivity, it must challenge-forth, set upon, and thus order reality as objectivity in 
order to always be sure of itself.  
 
Hence, Foucault’s rationality of technology is neither material nor social, but is a 
metaphysical way that subjectivity delimits being(s) and reality for the Cartesian I: as an 
endless collection of external objects, the relations between which may be quantified 
and calculated ad infinitum. Indeed, from the Cartesian moment onwards, it is 
“Circumscribing [enframing, that] gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing 
does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what, after production, it will be” 
(Heidegger 1977a, 8). The transformations in government achieved through the 
sciences, processes, and statistics that circumscribed the bounds of society and 
population in the emergent state – what we know as governmentality – are, therefore, 
technological. And through understanding this (metaphysical) rationality of technology, 
the question of whether enframing governs governmentality, becomes an interesting 
consideration of this project going forth through each chapter. 
 
Although enframing and governmentality have been touched upon in IR (see Alt 2015; 
Michels, 2012; Joronen 2008; 2013), in many ways these accounts resemble that of the 
liberal applicationism of governmentality noted above. In IR, enframing is not used as a 
conceptual tool for detecting new modes of being or thought, but it is declared in a top-
down fashion as an always already omnipresent and nefarious force, sweeping away the 
innate ‘being’ of whatever referent scholars choose to apply it to. For example, in 
arguing that enframing is the metaphysical essence of a global neoliberal 
governmentality, Joronen (2013, 357, emphasis original) asserts that “neoliberalisation 
is a process of ontological violence, which does not merely govern the conduct of 
individuals . . . but also enframes all entities for the use of market forces”, and thus 
“represents everything that is nihilist in a contemporary world-economy:” planetary 
homelessness, aimlessness, mischief, and “the constant devaluation of nature and human 
existence as mere stocks of profits” (2013, 360). In other words, this structural or top-
down applicationism of enframing and governmentality makes them akin to an old-
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fashioned Marxist ideology critique. It thus appears that any topic involving 
quantification and a human subject is automatically predestined as a “violence against 
Being” itself. Like governmentality, when enframing is restricted to applications already 
predetermined as negative or harmful, the opportunity to detect new relationships 
between technology and human subjectivity is likewise bracketed.  
 
The final section of this chapter elaborates how this project avoids this applicationalism, 
by using the philosophy of Arendt to mediate between Heidegger and Foucault’s 
understanding of the social.  
 
Technology, Subjectivity, and the Human Condition 
 
In the few instances where enframing and governmentality are used together, they are 
indeed conflated with domination or neoliberalism. This arises because there remains a 
theoretical gap between these two concepts and thinkers. It exists in what some scholars 
have previously identified as Heidegger’s account of Being and metaphysics, and 
Foucault’s account of power and subject-formation (Dreyfus 1989). Whilst Heidegger 
focuses on the epochal and technological emergence of things, Foucault gravitates 
towards the ways subjects are formed by these technological things (Elden 2001, 15). 
This creates the question of how each angle of their shared technological rationality 
actually intersects in a single social and political realm, where speech, debate, action, 
revolution, and violence, actually occurs. It is to mediate this political gap, therefore, 
that this thesis embraces the work of one of the foremost thinkers on the social and the 
human condition: Hannah Arendt. 
 
Whilst Arendt’s view of technology and Cartesian subjectivism provide a dialogue with 
(and at times, a critique of) Heidegger’s technological metaphysics (Villa 1996; Yaqoob 
2014, 7), her grasp of social conditioning and the effect of scientific rationalities upon 
the human condition – as well as foundational insights into the nature of power and 
biopower – overlap with that of Foucault (see Dolan 2005; Owens 2006, 157). As the 
Cartesian moment transformed human consciousness into the ‘I’ of subjectivity, Arendt 
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also notes how an “Earth alienation supplanted Aristotelianism with an understanding of 
nature as a range of universal processes located in infinite and homogenous space” 
(Yaqoob 2014, 13). Arendt likewise concurs that “the social” or society “is a relatively 
new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and 
which found its political form in the nation-state” (1998, 28). Prior to Foucault’s 
discussion of biopolitics, Arendt was already theorising how the “emergence of society” 
and “the rise of the social” transformed what was once private matters within the 
household – the economia – into matters of public concern for all: “the bodies of 
peoples and political communities [became translated] into the image of a family whose 
everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a giant, nation-wide administration of 
housekeeping” (1998, 28). A pre-Foucauldian notion of biopolitics. 
 
Unlike monarchy or sovereignty (but akin to governmentality), for Arendt, society 
operates according to “a kind of no-man rule” which “expects from each of its members 
a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 
‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement” (1998, 40). Echoing Heidegger and anticipating the work of 
Foucault, she argues that science and politics share a metaphysical foundation akin to 
technological enframing. Indeed, “through society it is the life process itself which . . . 
has been channeled into the public realm” (1998, 45) sublimating unpredictable political 
action and the sovereign and hierarchical power of God and King, for the stable and 
mechanistic processes best captured by “statistics, that is, the mathematical treatment of 
reality, [which] was unknown prior to the modern age” (1998, 43). Arendt is able, 
therefore, to link the technological metaphysics underlying the Cartesian moment to the 
modern sociopolitical constitution of subjectivity and government in our present 
moment. What results – and as will be argued in chapters 4, 6,7, and 8, – is a reduction 
of all human and subjective experience of Nature, world, and self, to the exclusive 
concern with (human) life as always, and everywhere, reflecting and seeing itself 
(Arendt 1998, 254; Heidegger 1977a, 27; Foucault 2005). If “man is the measure of all 
things”, then man becomes the only being outside of this technological metaphysical 
means-end relationship; meaning that everything, including Nature, society, politics, and 
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the state, must become reflected back to himself as a means to humanity’s own end 
(1998, 158). It should be stressed that, although Heidegger and Foucault are used 
predominantly throughout this thesis, Arendt’s thought is no less important, nor less 
powerful or compelling. Readers of this thesis should carry her identification of 
calculation with subjectivism throughout each chapter.  
 
A brief example concerning globality in IR points to the benefit of using these three 
thinkers in tandem in this thesis. At the outset of The Politics of Globality, van Munster 
and Sylvest quote Heidegger in their epitaph. It is a quote based on the metaphysics of 
enframing (although van Munster and Sylvest do not elaborate on this). The epitaph 
reads: “The fundamental event of modernity is the conquest of the world as picture” 
(Heidegger, as quoted in van Munster and Sylvest, 2016, 1. Also, see Burke et al. 2016, 
504, who uses this quote in a similar way). However, in the context of globality as IR 
conceives it (i.e. spatially and politically), this is a misquote. Heidegger’s ‘world 
picture’ is neither a spatial nor geographical world picture, as van Munster and Sylvest 
assume. Nor is it referring to an emergent ‘globality’, as the authors suggest, when 
humans first “set eye on the Earth” during NASA’s Apollo missions. Heidegger’s 
‘world picture’ does not actually refer to a picture of the world.  
 
Instead, Heidegger’s world picture refers to the way enframing represents being(s) 
metaphysically and subjectively: as representational objects, to be calculated by an ‘I’, 
or as a subject always measuring itself in-relation to things as objects. A ‘world picture’ 
could therefore be on an atomic level, entirely local to and contained within an 
individual subjectivity. Or, it could be global, but only channeled through the 
representation of a subjectivised ‘I’, or subjectivity. It involves only a subject ‘picturing’ 
any external object in its ‘world’, re-cognizing or picturing it back to itself as a re-
presentation. The world picture is not the Earth or the planet, as IR has framed it thus 
far. 
 
Yet it is not Foucault, but the work of Arendt that is best able to provide a link from this 
Heideggerian metaphysics to the conduct of conduct. For instance, she argues that this 
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form of world picture ushers in “the end of the common world” because it is seen from 
only one perspective (Arendt 1998, 51). If politics depends upon multiple perspectives 
sharing in and debating about their world – “To live together in the world means 
essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is 
located between those who sit around it” (1998, 52) – then Heidegger’s planetary 
imperialism of subjective enframing is linked to how technological power “subjugates 
and makes subject to” (Foucault 2002a, 331), and how governmentality “is both an 
individualizing and totalizing form of power” (Foucault 2002a, 331). Connecting the 
two is Arendt’s notion of the human social and political world, for “the world, like every 
in-between, relates and separates men at the same time” (1998, 52). As will be argued in 
chapter 8 when this thesis examines IR’s use of quantum entanglement, Arendt is thus 
able to capture how the sharing of this world picture ‘subjugates and makes subject to’ 
by reflecting human perception backwards upon itself, measuring itself. It is each mind 
holding itself within its own picture. This notion of ‘world’ and the way that subjectivity 
is actively conditioned through what Arendt calls the vita activa will be elaborated in 
chapter 4.  
 
It should also be noted that Arendt’s philosophy supports Heidegger’s and Foucault’s in 
ways that overcome the shortcomings of the recent new materialist bent of critical IR 
scholarship (see chapter 1). Rather than ontologising and reifying materiality to assert 
that entanglement overcomes modernist subject/object binaries, Arendt stresses how any 
consideration of the human subject also demands a researcher consider the intangible 
aspects of the human condition. Although language, speech, and memory are not 
material, “for all [their] intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of 
things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the ‘web’ of human relationships, 
indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality” (Arendt 1998, 183). The 
position of this thesis, and its use of Foucauldian, Heideggarian, and Arendtian 
philosophy, is indeed that the intangibility of human thought and its historical 
transformations are essential to understanding today’s concepts of climatic globality. 
Just like Foucault’s assertions that ‘power’ has no materiality because it is a subjective 
relation between actors, so Arendt concurs that power “is to an astonishing degree 
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independent of material factors, either of numbers or means” (Arendt 1998, 200). 
Language, speech, and memory emerge only through the interaction of plural human 
beings with one another, but their intangibility makes them no less important. Without 
their creation within the plural interactions that delimit a human social world through 
speech and its concomitant flux of power relations, there is no Earth, ‘matter’, or 
materiality to speak of at all: “Without being talked about by men and without housing 
them, the world would not be a human artifice but a heap of unrelated things to which 
each isolated individual was at liberty to add one more object.” Going forth, each 
chapter thereby probes the historical conditions of thought that allow things and objects 
to come to ‘matter’ in the ways and aspects IR scholarship considers them today. 
 
In sum, the goal of this chapter was to outline the philosophical combination of thinkers 
that fills the genealogical framework of this thesis going forth: how the worldlessness of 
Arendt, the planetary metaphysics of Heidegger, and the governmentality of Foucault, 
all coalesce around the historical constitution of modern human subjectivity as an 
aftershock of the Cartesian moment. What ‘matters’, therefore, is not simply materiality, 
but the manner in which thought itself is shaped in particular times and places, and 
through what practices. How these aftershocks now ripple through our social and 
political world in the concepts of climate change and the Anthropocene, therefore – are 
indeed well-suited for the genealogical inquiry that the next chapter initiates. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that enframing and governmentality are complementary when 
seeking the ‘rationality of technology’ omitted by Foucault. Both share a dependence on 
practices as shaping (inter)subjectivity, and importantly, both share an historical 
relativism that grasps Foucault’s genealogy as correlative with Heidegger’s historical 
ontology. A Foucauldian genealogy, as a “critical ontology of ourselves”, fits well with 
the “historical ontology” of Heidegger (Elden 1996, 2003). Although both Heidegger 
and Foucault understand ‘truth’ to be not universal but historically contingent, shaping 
the subject through collective practices that are unique to time, place, and world, there 
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still remains a gap between the two. Arendt’s thought thereby acts as a necessary bridge 
between these two philosophers, connecting the former’s technological metaphysics 
with the social and human conditions that conduct power and subjectivity for the latter.
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Chapter 3 – Our Climate is Nuclear:  
Problematising the Climate1 
 
 
There is little evidence that any change in the structure of world order is likely to come about in the years 
ahead, unless it is provoked by a catastrophe of awesome proportion. But let us not be deceived. . . The 
first need is to awaken the consciousness of men and women everywhere to the causes of their distress.  
Richard Falk (1972, 3) 
 
Time is short. And survival is at stake.  
              Federation of American [Atomic] Scientists (1946, 159) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter problematises the globality of anthropogenic climate change. It asks how 
climate change became known and commonly considered today, alongside nuclear war, 
as “the greatest threat human society has ever faced” (Mann 2009, 230). Indeed, despite 
climate change entering discourses of global governance and public consciousness only 
in the late 1980s (van Munster and Sylvest 2016), and despite the threat of a nuclear 
catastrophe actually increasing since the end of the Cold War (Mecklin 2015), today it is 
common to read that “only nuclear weapons and climate change deserve the name of 
global challenges” (Cerutti 2012, 314; 2009). Thus, how did climate change become 
such a prominent global problem so quickly? How did it emerge to become considered 
by publics today as the greatest threat to the world (Pew Research 2015)?  
 
This chapter argues that climate change did not develop alongside nuclear war as a 
global problem, but instead, emerged directly from it. Indeed, from its conceptual 
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter were submitted as Hamilton, S. (2016). Our Climate is Nuclear, to the 
International Studies Association’s (ISA) Environmental Studies Section (ESS). It received the 2017 ISA 
ESS Graduate Student Paper Award.   
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formation in postwar GCM technologies tracing radioactive fallout, to the first global 
climatic change popularised through fears of a nuclear winter, at its conceptual root, our 
climate is nuclear.  
 
To demonstrate how our contemporary problematique of climate change is nuclear in its 
formation and dissemination, this chapter provides a genealogical analysis of a unique 
textual archive: the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Since the testing of the first atomic 
bomb detonation at the Trinity test site near Alamogordo, New Mexico, USA, on 16 
July 1945, Bulletin has assessed “scientific advancements that involve both benefits and 
risks to humanity, with the goal of influencing public policy to protect our planet and all 
its inhabitants” (2016). Indeed, Bulletin and its famous ‘Doomsday Clock’ act as a 
“widely recognized visualization of the likelihood of a global catastrophe . . . dependent 
not on single events but rather on the perceived trend of ‘human society’” (Vuori 2010, 
256). Notably, with Bulletin incorporating “runaway climate change” alongside nuclear 
war in 2010 as “the two gravest threats to civilization” (Vuori 2010, 256), the 
transformation and development of climate change within the catastrophic trends of 
Bulletin thus offers the potential for a genealogical analysis of the climate’s emergence 
as a global problem. 
 
As argued in chapter two, the first step in a genealogical analysis is to problematise a 
referent. To problematise the global climate, however, is not to simply analyse it with a 
critical mindset, or to review the many histories of this concept. Therefore, this chapter 
does not ask the obvious question (from today’s perspective or standpoint) of when or 
how the global climate began to change into a problem, as many histories have already 
done (see below). Instead, it asks how the recurring problem of climate change first 
became global.  
 
This chapter takes as its foundation three starting assumptions, both common and 
axiomatic in IR when adopting the catastrophic narratives of climate change and nuclear 
war noted above: (1) That the “‘Global’ refers to everything happening worldwide” 
(Weiss 2013, 28), making a global threat “lethal and planet-wide”, affecting every state 
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and human being (Cerutti 2012, 317). (2) Global climate change must also, therefore, 
result “from an acceleration of the same global chemical and biological processes that 
have protected life on Earth for millions of years” (Weiss 2013, 79). In other words, 
what IR perceives to be new and pertinent about global climate change is its recent 
politicisation, rather than its naturalness or global nature. Its globality is understood to 
be axiomatic. (3) There is indeed a widespread recognition and acceptance that global 
climate change emerged in IR and global governance literatures as a problem in the late-
1980s, after the formation of international regimes and institutions such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 decided to take concerted 
collective action to combat it (Rowlands 1992; Brenton 1994).  
 
With such a broad disciplinary range, scope, and history, this chapter will first provide a 
condensed (and admittedly presentist, Western, and Eurocentric) history of the general 
concept of climate change. This section is not intended to be a critical or comprehensive 
overview of the entire concept of ‘climate’, because this task would far exceed the scope 
of a single chapter, let alone an entire thesis. In accordance with this genealogy, this 
short history is to establish (1) a baseline of how and why climate change is commonly 
understood today as it is, and (2) how this chapter’s tracing of climatic discourses in 
Bulletin offers a new and alternative problematisation of this referent.  
 
A Brief History of Climatic Change 
 
Contrary to popular belief, the climate was not always global in scope. It was typically 
interpreted in a variety of different ways by different cultures and polities in disparate 
geographies and environments. Previously, there was no such concept as a global nor 
planetary climate, but only a multitude of local, regional, and ‘sovereign’ state climates 
(these are also detailed in chapters 4 and 5). That is, until after WWII, when the “post-
1950s era of satellites and computer models and a globally connected network of 
institutions and practices” enabled a new construction of a global climate to slowly 
congeal (Hulme 2010, 560; Miller 2004).  
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Histories of the climate’s change from regional to global spatialities, and its science, 
politics, and governance, have occupied many books that may be consulted for a general 
historical overview (for a small sample, see Fleming 1998; Hamblin 2013; Weart 2003; 
Bolin 2007; Stevens 1999; Edwards 2010; Behringer 2010; Ruddiman 2010; Lamb 
1995; Brooke 2014; Flannery 2008). The brief history of climatic change offered in this 
section highlights only the transitions made from a politics of plural regional climate(s), 
to the difficulties of calculating single global climatic referent. 
 
In pre-Socratic Greece, the word κλίμα, or Klima, was used in the sixth century BCE by 
Parmenides “to differentiate between five zones on the surface of the supposedly 
spherical world” (Hulme 2009). The ancient Greeks were the first to make regular 
observations of, and derive theories of, weather and climate (Stevens 1999, 68). At this 
time, Klima or ‘climate’ as we know it today, referred to the slope or inclination of the 
Sun’s rays upon the Earth’s surface, depending upon one’s particular region or latitude 
(Collingwood 1945). At this point, humans were imbricated with Nature, sharing its 
cycles and processes, and considering its presence as a part of human life and existence. 
It was Socrates that broke new ground by positing a theory of the human mind and its 
operation as being external to the world-organism of Nature and the body (physus). 
Under this guise, with Klima existing separately from the human being as an external 
variable that could affect human behavior, Aristotle soon claimed that the mind and “the 
vapours and exhalations of a country” were linked to the quality of air and climate 
(Fleming 1998, 11). He then produced the first comprehensive text written on weather 
and climate: the Meteorologica, from which our modern term ‘meteorology’ was 
derived (Aristotle 2017). This “became the Western world’s reigning authority on 
weather for more than two millennia” (Stevens 1999, 69).  Likewise, Ptolemy then 
extended the ancient Greek idea (eidos) of varieties of physical climates depending upon 
place and latitude, by developing it into seven klimata that “persisted as the 
conventional framework for explaining different climates” from the second century AD 
to the Renaissance period (Hulme 2009, 5). In general, where civilisation flourished, the 
climate was assumed to be politically civilised in kind. Where civilisation perished, the 
climate was therefore savage.  
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In the Middle Ages, however, regional climates rather than the latitudes of klimata made 
important political and cultural inroads upon Western societies. In Old Europe, for 
example, the crime of witchcraft replaced fears of epidemics depending upon climatic 
conditions. The “persecutions of inner enemies for their supposed influence on the 
physical environment” allowed a politics of blame to explain climatic changes. So, 
during a long and cold period eliciting famine and starvation, the “emergence of a new 
crime [witchcraft] was closely connected to the waves of climatic hardship during the 
earlier phases of the Little Ice Age” (Behringer 1999, 336). Witch-hunts reached their 
peak in the 1630s during the Thirty Years War, connected directly to fears that witches 
manifested this onset of climatic political instability and its concomitant political 
turmoil. As the climate warmed again and the ‘Little Ice Age’ came to an end in Europe, 
the crime of witchcraft dissolved into a more academic interest: how human behavior or 
sin might impact local and regional climatic conditions. It was, Behringer notes (1999, 
345), “more than a mere metaphor that the sun of the Enlightenment ended the era of 
witch-hunting” in Europe. With climatic stability having returned by the end of the 
seventeenth century, judges dismissed cases of witchcraft with cheerful remarks that 
there were no laws against flying (Neumann 2006, 98). 
 
With the arrival of the Enlightenment, new observations of foreign lands and foreign 
climates such those of the New World, appeared. The presence of indigenous peoples 
and their societies made it clear to Europeans, eager to expand their territories through 
conquest and imperialism, that it was possible to prosper in more than the temperate 
latitudinal climates originally determined by Aristotle and Ptolemy. Led by the scientific 
principles of Newton and Galileo, and the philosophy of Descartes, “This is where 
Modernity begins for many purposes”, notes Toulmin (1990, 9) “… the historical phase 
that begins with Galileo and Descartes’s commitment to new, rational methods of 
inquiry.” For the first time, under this new metaphysical understanding of Nature as 
measurable in relation to a subjective ‘I’ (see chapter two), the climate became an object 
of scientific inquiry that could be measured according to objective scientific principles, 
and related back to the human subject. Just like human subjectivity, “Descartes provided 
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the governing philosophy and the general method that ever since have formed the basis 
of modern science, including the science of weather and climate” (Stevens 1999, 72).  
 
However, just as it was possible to prosper in foreign climates, so it was also possible to 
be debilitated. Although still regional in scope, objective and measurable climates now 
became even more politicised at this time in forms of climate determinism (Sörlin 
2009). Polities and peoples were now accepting that regional climates could change, but 
not through any human act or agency. It was now the inverse. As Greek thought merged 
into the classical era, a “widely held view” came to assert, to take one example, that 
Mediterranean travellers would turn black at the Equator, or else die. “The experience of 
encountering forbidding climates through journeys into unexplored territories, and the 
anxieties of such climatic encounters”, thus exerted a powerful divisionary force 
between rival polities (Hulme 2009, 38). One did not want to inhabit their rival’s 
climate, lest they become their rival. 
 
This determinism spread throughout Europe quickly. For example, noted diplomat and 
historian Abbé Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’s 1719 Critical Reflections claimed that a 
favourable climate stimulated genius in certain nations by infusing the human being 
with their local air, soil, and water. This distilled nationalities with a specific “cultural 
vintage” like a fine wine. “During the life of a man, and as long as the soul continues 
united to the body,” Du Bos wrote, “the character of our minds and inclinations depends 
very much on the quality of our blood . . . [which] depends vastly on the air we breathe; 
. . . Hence it comes, that people who dwell in different climates, differ so much in spirit 
and inclinations” (1748, 177-178). Different nations have different characters, therefore, 
because of their different sovereign climates. Montesquieu (cited in Fleming 1998, 16-
17) echoed Du Bos’s warning of changing climates, advocating in 1748’s The Spirit of 
the Laws that a “good life” could only be lived within the same climatic region and 
country, because a nation’s geographic location determined the spirit of its politics. A 
bad sovereign climate, therefore meant a bad state, and bad citizens. 
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With this in mind, the colonisation and industrialisation of America was conducted with 
the intention of facilitating anthropogenic regional climate change(s). It was believed 
that a human-induced warming of regional climates would make the American 
wilderness suitable to the advancing white European civilisation. Deforestation, for 
instance, would ameliorate the American climate to “make it more fit for European-type 
civilization and less suitable for the primitive native cultures” (Fleming 1998, 18). 
Manifest Destiny as regional climate change quickly became part of the American 
Republican national ideal, as expressed by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and 
Thomas Jefferson, who are credited with taking the first meteorological measurements 
in America. Utilising new Enlightenment tools and mathematics to document weather 
through the recording of data, “Throughout his life, Jefferson maintained that human-
induced climate change due to settlement would be proved by extensive measurements”, 
and would thus increase the use of American land for settling and agriculture (Fleming 
1998, 33).  
 
What was lacking, however, was a way to document this climatic change. This is where 
population arithmetic enters climatic observation. In 1686, Edmond Halley had sought 
to go beyond the latitudinal zones of Ptolemy by theorising that warmer air rushed to the 
equator, creating the trade winds required for navigation. “Halley’s term ‘circulation’, as 
well as his notion that the atmosphere must ‘preserve the Æquilibrium’, remains in use 
today” (Edwards 2011, 128). Like Halley, in Les Meteores Descartes attempted to show 
“that the weather can be explained by the general physical principles that be believed 
determined the physical behavior of the universe” (Stevens 1999, 72). The elaboration 
of these principles fell into error because of a lack of quantitative and calculative tools 
that could go beyond sensory perception to grasp the complexity of atmospheric physics 
(Stevens, 1999, 72). Later, as quantitative and data-driven forms of observation got 
underway, a mathematised and physics-driven understanding of climate emerged as 
laws were reduced to mathematical expressions. Finally, “this meant they could in 
theory be combined with data to analyze and calculate the behavior of the atmosphere” 
(Stevens 1999, 77).  
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Just like the application of physics to the state (Foucault, 2007), applying basic physical 
laws to the climate transformed how it was understood scientifically and politically. 
Like governmentality, statistics catalysed the discipline of climatology because 
“statistics extracted from the data made it possible, for the first time, to look for patterns 
and cycles in the climate’s behavior” and to hence to identify their laws (Stevens 1999, 
82). State-led initiatives to systematise and standardise “the physicality of climate” 
through national and international networks of meteorological measurement and 
observation, quickly appeared (Hulme 2009, 6). By 1839, the study of climate was, 
according to Oxford’s John Ruskin of the Royal Society, “not for a city, nor for a 
kingdom, but for the world. It wishes to be a central point, the moving power, of a vast 
machine, and it feels that unless it can be this, it must be powerless; if it cannot do all, it 
can do nothing” (Quoted in Fleming, 1998, 35). 
 
To make an international climate viable, states now required extensive cooperation 
grounded upon uniform scientific measurements. As calculable spaces became larger, 
the need for international integration increased. Through the standardisation and 
codification afforded by statistics, “the key to good government,” it was “only through 
quantifiable data and statistical research that one could uncover the laws of progress, in 
society as well as in nature” (Mazower 2012, 100). Prior to World War I, however, 
climate science had hit a wall engendered by the human condition itself: statistical 
calculations now took months to complete by hand, and “numerical techniques capable 
of approximate solutions” to the mathematical models of atmospheric dynamics 
proposed earlier by Norwegian Vilhelm Bjerknes’ “primitive equations” model, and 
Lewis Fry Richardson’s “numerical forecasting method”, were simply impossible to 
create due to their complexity (Edwards 2011). 
 
Indeed, Bjerknes and Richardson had formulated brilliant mathematical models, 
basically dividing regional (and then by extension, global) climate(s) into a series of 
‘Cartesian grids’ comprised of primitive notions of motion and state. In them, “mass, 
momentum, energy, and moisture are conserved in individual interactions among 
individual parcels of air”, much like today’s GCMs. The problem, however, was the 
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inability to compute and calculate the interaction of these Cartesian grids. Prior to World 
War II, these painstaking calculations were completed almost by hand, and took weeks 
at a time. Finally, in the 1930s, “These problems led meteorologists to abandon 
numerical modeling for the next two decades” (Edwards 2010, 130). Calculating the 
nonlinear fluid dynamics of regional climates, in other words, went far beyond the 
abilities possessed by a human being. In their place, geological inquisitions into ice 
ages, soil, and sediment deposits, popularised notions of climatic change only in 
geological timescales considering ice ages lasting thousands of years. Glaciology was 
thus the main representative of climatic change throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century (see Kunzig and Broecker 2009).  
 
Up to the 1960s, therefore, a popular notion of global warming or climatic change 
resulting from CO2 or carbon emissions, simply did not exist. Climate change was made 
of ice and ice ages spanning geologic epochs, and no human agency was detected within 
it. Indeed, “geophysicists studied phenomena within a region, often not even a nation 
but part of a nation” (Weart 2003, 35), and anyone interested in climate change was 
focused on geologic scales and the ebb and flow of massive ice sheets across continents.  
 
This is an important point: despite common narratives in IR and the social sciences 
today claiming that, “when Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius published his path-
breaking work on human-induced climate change in 1896, the problem [climate change] 
was articulated with reference to the global flows of carbon between the atmosphere and 
the oceans” (Methmann 2012, 9), there was no such agreement amongst scientists nor 
did it exist in public awareness. Nor, in fact, did Arrenhius’s work on CO2 regain 
attention until well after World War II (Fleming 1998; Weart 2003). In fact, even as late 
as 1969 (as will now be explored below), Bulletin admits that it was unsure how climatic 
change was actually caused. “How may all these fluctuations of climate be explained? 
Numerous hypotheses exist, . . . Consequently the search for the answer continues” 
(Borisov 1969, 44). Well into the 1970s, therefore, “The basic causes of these variations 
in the global climate machine are as yet unknown. Many suggestions have been offered, 
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but we must learn much more about how the [vast] machine works before basic causes 
can be reliably evaluated” (Fletcher 1970, 44). 
 
Why was the CO2 theory of climatic change not accepted nor popularised, until well into 
the 1970s and 1980s? Knowledge of atmospheric fluid dynamics remained rudimentary 
until John von Neumann, a scientist “deeply involved in the Manhattan Project, selected 
weather forecasting over many other possible applications for the earliest electronic 
digital computers” whilst working at Princeton University after WWII (Edwards 2012). 
To resolve the impossibility of calculating by-hand the nonlinear fluid dynamics of the 
atmosphere, with one of the first digital computers, von Neumann created one of the 
first GCMs. Yet these GCMs were not designed for any climatic change, but were 
primarily applied to fluid dynamics equations analysing shock waves from nuclear 
explosions. It just so happened that these were very similar to simulations of 
atmospheric motion, and hence, could be applied – only later on – to what would 
become the ‘global’ climate, too. Hence, after WWII, based on the work of von 
Neumann, generations of nuclear weapons designers and climate modellers began their 
studies from the same textbook: Richtmyer’s Difference Methods for Initial Value 
Problems (1957).  
 
From its outset, therefore, the capacity to simulate atmospheric dynamics required for 
modern meteorology and climatology – the knowledge and concepts operating from its 
scientists, to its GCM supercomputers, to its funding – began within military and state 
projects seeking to understand and weaponise Nature so as to gain tactical nuclear 
superiority (Edwards, 2010; Hamblin, 2013). With this in mind, it is to the pages of 
Bulletin, and its discussion of nuclear (and eventually) climatic catastrophes, that this 
chapter turns so as to trace and interpret the interaction of nuclear and climate 
discourses. 
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The Problematique of Our (Nuclear) Climate: One World or None 
 
After the atomic devastation of World War II, there were general calls in academia and 
the public alike for a form world order. Recognising how the selfish behavior of states 
could lead to atomic chaos, it was now thought that a world order or world state could 
“avoid the most fearful [atomic] catastrophe” by appealing directly to the conduct of 
individuals. Citizens could thus be of a shared world, rather than of many particular and 
divisive nationalities (Woodward 1949, 23). As Rienhold Niebuhr phrased it, until some 
type of world state developed, it was only grace or chance that could prevent “self-
annihilation until the day when humanity regained control of the trials and travails of 
modern society through some form of global polity” (Bartel 2015, 276).  
 
This chapter argues that this “global polity” has been realised today (see Neumann and 
Sending 2010; Corry 2010), albeit implicitly as a form of governmentality. It is both 
subjectified and objectified within the concept of global climate change and the 
Anthropocene. Hence, when climate scientists now comment that “Climate change has 
become a new condition around which human life takes shape”, and through which all 
meaningful narratives can be re-evaluated (Hulme 2014, x), they are fulfilling the 
wishes of atomic scientists long since past, for a type of world order that orders 
individual conduct. 
 
Written concurrently with the inception of Bulletin in 1945, an American publication 
entitled One World or None first appeared on bookshelves in 1946. It was “written by a 
team of scientists which [included] many of the men who co-operated to produce the 
bomb which has fatally affected the destiny of mankind on our planet” (Davies 1947). 
The book hoped to awaken “mankind” from its doomed existence by publicizing “the 
ultimate, simple fatal fact: that the existence of man as a civilized, social being is at 
stake” (Davies 1947, vii). Humanity’s existence was now threatened like never before 
due to the invention of the atomic bomb, the destructive power of which was “sufficient 
to raze every town and city to the ground; sufficient to reduce civilization to dust and 
rubble” (1947, viii). A sense or rationality of powerlessness amongst scientists and 
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politicians took hold here: “In the presence of this new peril which menaces mankind, 
science, on the confessions of the scientists, is impotent. It reaches the end of its tether. 
Science has invented the means by which civilization can be completely destroyed” 
(1947, ix, emphasis original). The sovereign state, in other words, in its drive to succeed 
militarily, had sowed the seeds for its own destruction through the invention of nuclear 
technology and its concomitant annihilation. 
 
In 1946, the solution set forth to ameliorate fears of existential catastrophe from “atomic 
fire” were not of a global, but of a world nature: “The worldwide growth of science and 
technology is the main line of the rapid evolution of man”, wrote Compton, “…into a 
social being whose community is the world. . . . It is a part of our age-old quest to use 
the forces of nature for shaping the world according to our desire” (1947, xi).  
 
“Catastrophe”, therefore, lay ahead if traditional forms of national sovereignty and self-
defence were not socially adjusted and manipulated on a planetary basis. “What are the 
practical possibilities of international agreement that can make us safe in a world of 
atoms?” scholars and states asked (Compton 1947, xii). Theoretical physicist Robert 
Oppenheimer, the lead scientist of the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic 
bomb, claimed that despite the “rapid development” of atomic weapons being “made 
possible only by the extremities of the war and the great courage of the governments of 
the United States and Britain” (1947, 56), the state was now being made obsolete by the 
reality of nuclear war. “The release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too 
revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas. . . [demanding] radical and 
profound changes in the politics of the world” (Oppenheimer 1947, 53). The best 
possibility for agreement in this world of atoms, was thus a new world order or world 
state (see Cabrera 2015; Bartel 2015).  
 
Planetary totality was now recognised as being irreconcilable with state sovereignty. 
Ironically, Oppenheimer hoped that the example of international scientific collaboration 
and “fraternity” used to create the atom bomb would serve as an exemplar for states “to 
transcend the accidents of personal or national history”, illustrating that “in its 
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application to the problems of international relations there is novelty” (1947, 57). Other 
scholars agreed that, through the specter atomic catastrophe, “We stand at the gateway 
to a new world” (Laurence 1947, 226), because “atomic science is a potential source of 
great good” that conducts “the natural grouping of people” according to a “worldly 
authority” (Loewenstein 1947, 16). So, nations of the world, unite: the “re-education of 
those nations which have been in the past the greatest menace to world peace. . . 
[reveals] the solution of the entire problem—to create a united Europe” (Harper 1947, 
67). Even beyond Europe, calls for a “Union of the world . . . a universal State” 
abounded, in which “the nations of the world must cease to exist as independent States” 
through “the abolition of the sovereign State [and its] national army and national assets” 
(Leary 1947, 84). And in IR, even the LSE’s F.S. Northedge joined this chorus of voices 
clamouring for a new world order (Northedge 1971, 4). The point is, long preceding 
today’s calls for a planetary politics of the Anthropocene, to solve the threat of world 
atomic catastrophe in a Nature controlled or affected by “mankind”, it was common to 
hear that “people will have to drop the national attitude and will have to think in terms 
of internationalism, and live, not in terms of countries or continents, but in terms of one 
world.” (Bhargava 1947, 118, emphasis original).  
 
A dissenting voice from this chorus is worthy of note here. Writing in One World or 
None, journalist and political commentator Walter Lippman compared these world order 
discourses to the failure of collective security in the inter-war period. “For [international 
rules and inspection] agreements are not likely to be observed if men do not have reason 
to believe they will be enforced. The stakes are the life and death of national states and 
of masses of their inhabitants”, he wrote (1947, 134). Indeed, echoing today’s lament in 
IR and climate governance scholarship about the tragedy of enforcing emissions 
regulations in the global atmospheric commons (Harris 2013), Lippman stressed that no 
state would comply with atomic regulations and inspections without the absolute 
certainty that all other states complied in identical fashion (1947, 134). Interestingly, 
this certainty was as paradoxical as it was impossible, “Because the remedy is as bad as 
the disease: the peaceable nations have to be willing to wage total war in order to 
prevent total war” (1947, 136). Instead of conceiving of a world-spanning sovereign, 
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community, or order along lines of Wilsonian collective security, therefore, he outlined 
the impossibility of building a world-state from out of a political rationality always 
thinking in terms of sovereign states. The failure of collective security was “an 
admission on their part [states] that out of sovereign states alone a world order cannot be 
formed” (1947, 147). Instead, 
 
…the traditional and orthodox doctrine . . . [of] the theory of the 
absolute sovereign state that is subject to no higher law, and is itself the 
source of the highest law of its people, is an aberration and a heresy, 
which has flourished, though even then never without protest, during the 
closing decades of the nineteenth and the opening decades of the 
twentieth century. (Lippman 1947, 148) 
 
Lippman was arguing that sovereignty could be overcome through a shared rationality 
and conduct. Indeed, “the essential political principle is known by which our problem 
[nuclear catastrophe] can be solved. . . . The principle is to make individuals, not 
sovereign states, the objects of the international agreements; it is to have laws operate 
upon individuals” (1947, 137). He used the example of the Nuremburg tribunals and 
their prosecution of select German officials as war criminals (rather than grouping the 
people, volk, or nation as one), to argue that individuals could be subject to a world 
order rationality transcending the sovereign German state. Although preceding 
Foucault’s Collège de France lectures on governmentality by three decades, Lippman 
was here arguing that world government came not from sovereign or top-down forms of 
disciplinary power, but through the shaping of ideas and conduct operating upon persons 
at the individual and subjective level (1947, 149). Only through this subjective 
recognition of a “truth” deemed relevant to their current world situation, therefore, could 
a world state form from the bottom-up (1947, 149). “For when an idea that enlists men’s 
hopes is seen to be consistent with their acts, it evokes and organizes their energies”, he 
wrote. “It is not then an abstraction or an essence. It is a dynamic force in their conduct. 
There are the ideas that shake the world and change it” (1947, 149, emphasis added).  
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Lippman’s unique claim regarding the shaping of individual and subjective (world) 
conduct was quickly overshadowed by more topical arguments embracing postwar 
sentiment. Familiar here are Albert Einstein’s calls for a supranational organisation 
replete with military powers (Einstein, 1947), and by The Federation of American 
(Atomic) Scientists, who likewise stressed that “The problem is a world problem. There 
can be no merely national solutions . . . nations must collaborate for the development of 
the new force [nuclear power]” (1947, 157).  
 
From out of this declaration, the Federation of Atomic Scientists continued to mediate 
between theoretical nuclear physics and the politics of world order, in the pages of 
Bulletin. This chapter will now trace how physics, the climate, and politics intersected in 
its pages, detailing how the political drive towards a world state or world order 
transformed over time, in the minds of physicists, politicians, and social scientists alike: 
from an atomic world state, into a global climatic change wrought by a nuclear winter. 
Readers should keep in mind that, although the explicit claims of Einstein ring through 
Bulletin’s pages, Lippman’s call for a subjective world rationality of some kind is seen 
to slowly crystalise in the background. 
  
The Bulletin: From an Atmosphere of Opinion to a Climate of Change 
 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was founded in 1945 by atomic physicists and 
scientists that worked on the Manhattan Project, yet “could not remain aloof of the 
consequences of their work” (Bulletin 2016, online). It condenses scientific and policy 
analyses into “language that is accessible to high government leaders and everyday 
citizens alike, with the rather ambitious goal of saving humanity from itself.” (Mecklin 
2015, 10). Today, it considers itself as “bridg[ing] the technology divide between 
scientific research, foreign policy and public engagement” with the goal of influencing 
public policy to “protect our planet and its inhabitants” (Bulletin 2016, online).  
 
At its outset, this chapter noted how global climate change recently displaced nuclear 
war as the direst global threat facing the planet today. It will now argue that this 
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contemporary and naturalised understanding of climate change emerged only very 
recently; not alongside, but through the concept of nuclear war. The text of Bulletin, 
therefore, serves as an excellent archive through which to trace the ‘permanent 
correlative’ of physics and politics once described by Foucault (2008. See chapter two), 
as nuclear physics is translated into rationalities of nuclear war and climatic change.  
 
The Bulletin’s first issue on 10 December, 1945, is ripe with familiar narratives 
concerning the “continuous dread of sudden annihilation” of the human species. “This 
catastrophe [nuclear war] will be inevitable if we do not succeed in banishing war from 
the world”, and so all states and “big nations are aware that an agreement on atomic 
power controls must be reached if our civilization is to survive” (Bulletin 1945, 1). The 
only form of “climate” mentioned at this period of atomic angst, however, was not 
atmospheric nor geophysical, but psychological or mental: peace could only be secured 
by “keeping our own unrealistic fears . . . in rigid control”, and “strengthening the world 
climate of opinion which already condemns these aggressive acts [of war]” (Bateson 
1946, 11). The ‘climate’ as a geophysical concept was not used, but instead, referred to 
the psychological atmosphere of the time: the genuine concern towards understanding 
the mentalities underpinning arms races in contrasting states, so that “detailed studies of 
the specific psychology of the people and leaders of all the nations concerned” could be 
“disseminated to the thinking and planning people all over the world. . . . [and] at a more 
popular level so that the peoples may be a force” powerful enough to affect state policy 
(Bateson 1946, 11). The climate was discerned as a mental proclivity for nuclear war. 
 
This type of climate, as a frame of mind or “mental state”, continues to be used in the 
Bulletin throughout the decade. For instance, to “change the climate in the research 
laboratories” and “the American climate of opinion on the subject of free enterprise” 
(Cohen 1948, 10, 11); the effect of McCarthy-esque loyalty tests on the American 
“mental climate” (O’Brian 1948, 172); the “present climate of enmity and suspicion 
between the United States and the Soviet Union” (Bulletin 1948, 129); and the need for 
the “creation of a climate favourable for public action”, since “Our hope must rest with 
the peoples”, not the politicians (Marks 1948, 274).  
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Throughout the 1940s, although the potential to unleash “apocalyptic” annihilation 
remained bound to states, the scientists and politicians in Bulletin sought to alleviate 
catastrophe by proposing a reorientation of political sovereignty along familiar lines: by 
linking the bottom-up aspirations of citizens, to a top-down authority in the form of 
world government. It even went as far as trumpeting and displaying a “Preliminary Draft 
of a World Constitution” for a universal-federal world republic, a supposed “milestone 
on the road to a democratic federation of the people of the world”  (Committee to Frame 
a World Constitution 1948, 145). This belief in a unity of “mankind” and the potential 
for world-citizens to pledge sovereign allegiance to a universal or federal world 
government, mirrored the belief that mankind also had its finger on the new nuclear 
trigger. Ultimately, through the state, humans could choose their fate, whether that was 
world-unity or existential annihilation. Unity went hand-in-hand with catastrophe, but it 
also created newfound notions of planetary control: “It would appear that in the long 
history of geologic life development”, wrote Mather, preceding today’s discourses of the 
Anthropocene, that “man is the first creature possessing the ability to determine his own 
destiny” (Mather 1950, 208). Hence, the current moment “and the decisions made in 
these years may well shape the course of human history for many generations to come.”  
 
The calls for a world government by establishing a shared world “psychological 
climate” remained steadfast throughout the 1950s, as the nuclear bipolar rivalry between 
the USA and the USSR intensified (Rabinowicz 1954, 319). Technological, scientific, 
and political agency remained firmly within the hands of policymakers, however. As 
Hans J. Morgenthau commented in Bulletin in 1954, the only climate to change 
remained within “the minds of men”, rather than anything pertaining to the geophysical 
or planetary atmosphere. “Finally, atomic war is no longer, as was traditional war, an 
instrument of rational policy,” he lamented. “[R]ather it is a means of universal 
destruction and, as such, a last resort of desperation” (1954, 325). In 1958, Bulletin’s 
issue on the International Geophysical Year (IGY) asserted that the causes or 
mechanisms driving climatic changes witnessed in geological records remained 
unknown to scientists. Despite weather being the “most important” of IGY phenomena 
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being examined, “it has never been possible to study the circulation of the Earth’s 
atmosphere with an adequate amount of data”, so the impact of radiation and heat in the 
atmosphere, with “regard to climate change, are still unanswered questions” (Sullivan 
1958, 72). The only ‘global climate’ at this point, therefore, remained the mental climate 
of opinion surrounding planetary atomic annihilation.  
 
An interesting shift occurs in the 1960s when scientists and policymakers begin to 
combine the human agency and psychology underlying “mental climates” of nuclear 
war, with the climate as a geophysical system. Now, questions arise over whether 
nuclear war could alter the world’s (physical) climate. “Have atomic bombs changed the 
weather?” Landsberg asks, in an article questioning the possibility of using weather and 
climatic control to suit “mankind” (Landsberg 1961, 370). “Now that man has moved, 
over millennia, from his tropical habitat to all parts of the globe, it would be a good 
thing if the entire global climate could be made comfortable and pleasant” (1961, 370). 
And yet, he is quick to dispel how “many people think man has already changed the 
earth’s climate”, highlighting that, out of the previous climatic changes ascribed to 
human influence (i.e. as punishment from the displeasure of one’s gods, cannonade fire 
during the US civil war and World War I, and nuclear explosions), “None of these 
imputed relations can stand up to objective calculations and statistical tests” (1961, 371). 
So, “sweeping global climate changes”, as wrought by the agency of man, therefore, 
“appear to be some distance in the future” (1961, 371).  
 
Oddly enough from today’s presentist/finalist standpoint, Landsberg’s argument is 
reiterated and reinforced by someone whom today’s typical narratives of climate change 
credit as one of its discoverers: physicist Hans E. Suess. Today, Suess is most famous 
for rekindling the CO2 theory of greenhouse warning, writing a landmark paper with 
Roger Revelle in 1957 that claimed increasing anthropogenic carbon emissions meant 
that “human beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment of a kind 
that could not have happened in the past nor be recreated in the future” (Revell and 
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Suess 1957, 19).1 This famous line is still echoed in climate governance treaties today. 
However, in Bulletin Suess likewise notes the potential role that carbon dioxide could 
play in climatic change, but also states that “A comparison of CO2 analyses in air done 
in the 19th century with those of today is inconclusive because the older analyses are not 
sufficiently accurate” (1961, 374). He even highlights that “It seems improbable that the 
small increase in atmospheric CO2 which can be assumed to have occurred since 
artificial coal combustion began has affected the climate of the earth in any appreciable 
way.” Again, contrary to the established linear narratives of global climate change 
histories common in IR and the social sciences today, it was clear that even Suess, as 
recently as the 1960s, remained unsure of how Earth’s climate actually changed. There 
are also no catastrophic overtones, nor mentions of national unity or world sovereignty, 
in his 1961 Bulletin contribution. 
 
This is an important moment, however. In 1961, Suess highlights what may be 
considered an essential and central, yet now implicit and overlooked, turning point of 
conceptualising the climate as a global phenomenon. He asks: how is it possible, if “one 
might expect significant effects for the coming centuries, if combustion of fossil fuels 
continues to increase exponentially”, to detect any changes scientifically on such a vast 
planetary scale? Indeed, theories of climatic change due to increased CO2 emissions had 
been developed as early as 1861 by Tyndall, and backed up by Arrhenius (1896), 
Chamberlin (1897), and Guy Callendar (1939). However, and again contrary to today’s 
IR narratives, none of these CO2 theories of climate change had yet taken hold. Why?  
 
Even well into the 1970s, climate science was never focused upon the effects of organic 
carbon or CO2 on the Earth, let alone over timespans of decades or centuries. From its 
outset, climate science was focused on inorganic fields of glacial ice that covered 
swathes of the Earth on scales of millennia, pertaining to geologic time (Kunzig and 
                                                        
1 Notably, both authors shared a past of atomic militarism. Hans Suess was an Austrian nuclear physicist 
that had worked on nuclear power projects for the Germans during World War II, whilst Roger Revelle 
had learned to study the movement of atmospheric radiocarbon whilst commanding a scientific mission 
for the US Navy during the atomic bomb tests at conducted at Bikini Atoll in 1946. Ironically, it was this 
new radiocarbon produced in atomic bombs, C-14, that was later proposed and used by Revelle and Suess 
to outline and trace the atmospheric fluid dynamics of what would become known today as the ‘global’ 
climate. 
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Broecker, 2009). In 1824, Joseph Fourier was actually writing about “the temperature of 
space” and only very generally mentioned, in personal reflections, how “the effects of 
human industry and all the accidental changes of the earth’s surface, modify the 
temperatures of each climate” (Fourier 1824, quoted in Fleming 1998, 61) As Fleming 
asserts, “it would be a mistake, however, to consider either [Tyndall or Arrhenius] as 
direct forerunners or prophets of contemporary climate concerns”, since each made their 
comments on CO2 and climate change incidentally whilst working on other projects 
(1998, 65). Rather than carbon dioxide, both were seeking answers to the dominant 
geological problematique of the day: the cause of glacial incursions and retreats causing 
ice ages. They pursued this problem by working out tedious statistical calculations, by-
hand. Indeed, Arrhenius’s 1904 book Worlds in the Making describing the “hot-house 
theory” of the atmosphere due to anthropogenic CO2 emissions, but this book was never 
widely read. Arrhenius did not have “any great concern for increasing levels of CO2 
caused by the burning of fossil fuels, and instead he was attempting to explain how 
“temperature changes at high latitudes could account for the onset of ice ages and 
interglacials” (Fleming 1998, 82).  
 
By 1910, ‘most scientists thought Arrhenius’s hot-house theory “was altogether wrong” 
(Weart 2003, 4). Decades later, even T.C. Chamberlin reneged on his own “CO2 theory 
of glaciation”, which fell out of academic favour and discussion prior to World War I. 
As he wrote in 1913, “the number who accept the CO2 theory is less now than a few 
years ago. . . . I greatly regret that I was among the victims of Arrhenius’ error” 
(Chamberlin 1913, quoted in Fleming 1998, 90). Returning to Suess in 1961, this 
explains why even the world’s leading climate scientists writing in Bulletin in the 1960s 
were not yet convinced of the ‘CO2 theory’ of climatic change.  
 
Rather than sample inconclusive pockets of interglacial air, Suess’s solution to this 
climatic conundrum was to fuse the existential terror of planetary nuclear annihilation, 
with the geophysical world climate. “Bomb radiocarbon” (C14 or C-14) was suddenly 
set forth as a bridge between the two worlds of the planetary, and CO2: 
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Because of the introduction of artificial C14 into the atmosphere since 
1954 by the testing of atomic bombs, radiocarbon measurements on 
modern material have now to be interpreted in a different manner. The 
bomb-produced C14 in the atmosphere could be used as an isotopic 
tracer to find out the rate of CO2 uptake by the oceans.  
(Suess 1961, 375) 
 
On paper, this had the effect of showing that CO2 was not being absorbed and dissolved 
into the ocean at rates that those dismissing anthropogenic interference had argued. 
Instead, carbon was being spit back out of the ocean again (Kunzig and Broecker 2009, 
89). Crucially though, this suspicion arose only by reconsidering the atmospheric 
particulates of nuclear fire. C-14 had now opened this contingent and unexpected 
possibility for revealing the physics of the climate: to use an anthropogenic and atomic 
form of radioactive carbon to discover and trace the predictability of natural, planetary, 
atmospheric processes.  
 
Noted previously but briefly in Bulletin by Libby (1948), Suess now discovered that 
“measurements of natural radioactive carbon (C14) can give information on the CO2 
exchange and the rate of absorption into the oceans”, thereby commenting on carbon 
emissions from humanity’s burning of fossil fuels in a way never before possible (1961, 
375). Without knowing it at the time, the byproducts of nuclear war had opened both the 
physical and conceptual foundation for concerns over planetary-wide atmospheric 
change. The means to discover climatic change were now outlined through human-made 
radiocarbon C-14, and its relationship to carbon dioxide. By tracing the effects of 
nuclear bomb particulates through GCMs, therefore, one could now trace particulate 
flows through what scientists began to call a ‘global’ atmosphere, or global climate.  
 
Despite Suess linking the tracing of nuclear radiocarbon C-14 to what would eventually 
become known as the Earth’s carbon cycle, the underlying rationality concerning 
climate change in Bulletin remained consistent into the 1970s. The climate discussed in 
its pages remained one of opinion. In 1969, despite a variety of explanations ranging 
from the Sun’s radiation, to the Earth’s rotation, to atmospheric composition, 
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“Nevertheless they [climate scientists] cannot account for the climatic transformations 
that have occurred so frequently in the polar latitudes,” noted Borisov. “Consequently 
the search for the answers continues” (1969, 44). The linking of nuclear warfare to the 
climate was still strongly felt, however. Notions of a “global climate machine” were 
becoming commonplace, despite scientists disagreeing how this machine actually 
worked. “The basic causes of these variations in the global climate machine are as yet 
unknown”, wrote Fletcher (1970, 43). “Many suggestions have been offered, but we 
must learn much more about how the machine works before basic causes can be reliably 
evaluated” (1970, 43). Interestingly, despite the nuclear threat remaining and 
intensifying, calls for world government and the dissolution of sovereignty had 
drastically subsided since their peak in the 1940s. They were replaced now by 
discourses of international cooperation, emphasising that “management of climatic 
resources is a problem shared by all nations” (Fletcher 1970, 47). At this point, an 
implicit connection between the planetary scope of nuclear fallout, and its potential to 
trace CO2 processes in the oceans and atmosphere, had allowed a lexical transition from 
‘world order’ to a concept of ‘global climate’ now subtly entering Bulletin.1 
 
Despite IR scholars today asserting the globality of climate change and the 
Anthropocene through analogies with the Apollo missions and photographs of the whole 
Earth (van Munster and Sylvest 2016), humans were landing on the moon in 1969 long 
before Bulletin, and the public writ large, were seriously discussing if CO2 from fossil 
fuel emissions could cause a ‘global warming’. Rather, a new question concerning 
‘global’ atmospheric change did arise at this point in time. It comprised a vigorous 
debate amongst climatologists and politicians in the media questioning whether 
increased CO2 emissions could lead to a global warming, or if the increase of pollutants 
                                                        
1 It is important to note that many international environmental problems were emerging and gaining 
political traction at this time, due to a confluence of events such as the IGY in 1958, the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (2002 [1964]), the crash of the Torrey Canyon oil tanker, concerns over 
resource depletion and overpopulation, and the onset of increased technological and economic 
interdependence indicative of early stages of globalisation. The point here is that, even well into the 
1980s, climate change was absent from these discussions and debates. In IR, for example, Richard H. 
Falk’s This Endangered Planet (1972) remains a key text documenting the spirit of these times. However 
– and in accordance with the argument set out here – there is no mention of climate change in Falk’s 494 
page book, because the concept of ‘global climate change’ was not yet publicly or academically known or 
relevant.   
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and aerosols due to postwar industrialisation could lead to a planetary cooling. “Our 
understanding of the forces that move the major climate systems of the earth is even 
more primitive”, wrote Young (1977, 274), as he observed that trends of planetary 
warming stalled in the 1970s and trended downwards. This did indeed lead many 
climatologists and scientists to prophesise a coming ice age and a climatic change of 
global cooling (Calder 1974; Ponte 1976; Bryson and Murray 1977). And it was at this 
time that the news media discovered the attention-grabbing power of sensationalist 
(catastrophic) environmentalism. 
 
In 1975, a headline in the New York Times by Bulletin contributor Walter Sullivan read 
that “Scientists Ponder Why World’s Climate Is Changing; a Major Cooling Widely 
Considered to Be Inevitable” (1975, 88). Sullivan wrote that “Hints that it may have 
already begun are evident”, and potentially caused by solar variations, atmospheric 
pollutants, and a widespread acknowledgement that the Earth’s own geological cycle 
was due for another cyclical ice age (1975). Notably, Sullivan’s article reflects a new 
but divisive split between types of global climate change: one caused by an increase in 
CO2 that warms the planet, or another caused by pollutants and aerosols that create a 
global cooling. Despite noting the 4% rise in CO2 concentrations between 1958 and 
1972, “That, however, was a period of global cooling—not the reverse, as one would 
expect from a greenhouse effect.” Hence, “a steady rise in atmospheric turbidity—the 
extent to which particles overhead dim the brightness of the sun . . . [caused] by human 
activity over the last 120 years has contributed more to atmospheric dust than volcanic 
eruptions” (Sullivan 1975, 92). Indeed, even in 1975, not just the cause, but also the 
direction of a climatic change was deemed unknowable: “The Academy of Sciences 
report notes that any assessment of climate trends is crippled by a lack of knowledge: 
‘not only are the basic scientific questions largely unanswered, but in many cases we do 
not yet know enough to pose the key questions’” (Sullivan 1975, 92). 
 
Global cooling was not, as it is commonly used today by conservative organisations 
such as the Heartland Institute, a tool of climate change denialists nor propagandists that 
is intended to mislead (Elasser and Dunlap 2013, 764). It is worth noting that even some 
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well-intentioned climatologists did claim that particulates and dust would outweigh CO2 
in shaping the planet’s climate, by reflecting the sun’s energy away from Earth to cool 
it: “An equation for the relationship between dust and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
and surface temperature in the Northern Hemisphere . . . indicates that dust accounts for 
perhaps 90 percent of the temperature variation, while carbon dioxide accounts for only 
about 3 percent.” (Bryson and Murray 1977, 152). Indeed, even Stephen H. Schneider, 
known today as one of the world’s best climate scientists hazarding a disastrous future 
of CO2 warming, was writing in 1976 that cooling was a possibility: “climatic theory is 
still too primitive to prove with much certainty whether the relatively small increases in 
CO2 and aerosols up to 1975” caused any discernible climatic change. Hence, he wrote, 
recent cooling trends could signal a sign of greater temperature decreases to come 
(Schneider 1976, 10). 
 
The intensity of this ‘warming v. cooling debate’ is discounted and even denied by some 
scholars and climatologists today as a “myth” (Peterson et al. 2008). However, this 
chapter finds that, despite what is indeed incorrect science from today’s presentist 
standpoint, in the context of the 1970s notions of ‘global cooling’ had an important and 
significant effect upon public and scientific discourse. In the early 1980s, the global 
cooling theory was quickly dismissed by digital advances in climatology, courtesy of 
more advanced GCM simulations and digital computers with smaller and finer grids for 
‘parameterizations’ of detail (IPCC 2013. See chapter 4). Crucially though, what 
emerged from ‘global cooling’ was a concept of a changing global climatic object that 
was separate from its previous conceptual foundations that were anchored firmly to the 
state, nuclear war, and the radionuclide C-14 atoms generated from bombs and used to 
trace atmospheric patterns.  
 
Arguing for global cooling due to “manmade dust”, Bryson and Murray declared that 
“During the twentieth century we have come to recognize that humans must be added to 
the list of forces that can change climates throughout the world” (1977, 152). In this 
sense, once this version of global cooling emerged in the early 1970s as a non-nuclear 
concept, ‘global climatic change’ became up for conceptual grabs, since it was no longer 
 92 
the state, war, and discourses of sovereignty as the sole agent or driver of global and 
climatic annihilation (i.e. as evinced in the world order discourses noted above). Now, 
the rationality of instrumental choice and psychological control plaguing previous 
nuclear and statist considerations and calls for world orders and world states, also 
wavers: “There is more to our lives and to the course of nations than climatic change. . . 
But our environments do set limits. . . We cannot expect to control the forces that affect 
climate”, Bryson and Murray lamented. By understanding anthropogenic global cooling, 
humans can “realize the limitations that the earth” places on human numbers and actions 
(1977, 155-156). The Bulletin’s response to the global cooling debate was slight, with 
Hall (1975, 16) arguing – whilst citing Bryson’s studies on global cooling – that 
“anthropogenic dust” and carbon dioxide could affect the biosphere and reduce global 
agricultural production. But now, regardless of whether Earth was cooling or warming, 
its fate was not simply determined by states, nuclear bomb fallout, and radiocarbon. The 
climate was being impacted by the actions of (Western, industrial) humanity, using 
something as simple as aerosol spray-cans and refrigerators, which amounted to a new 
form of unintended planetary agency into atmospheric dynamics. 
 
This separation of climate change from radioactive carbon in the global cooling debate 
fostered two important transitions in the way that statist political rationalities perceived 
climate change. First, as the debate died down in the early 1980s, there was a return of 
the state as the agentic actor responsible for global welfare. Writing in 1981, Friedman 
and Schware (1981, 56) note that climate action regarding CO2 emissions depends on 
“future decision-makers, . . . to see that our information about the climate system, as it 
affects socio-economic activities, is applied most appropriately.” They admit that major 
unsolved problems concerning the computing power of GCMs to parameterize 
precipitation, evaporation, and oceans, prevent conclusion declarations regarding global 
warming; yet, they stress that despite this “nations can even act unilaterally to minimize 
the effects of significant, and at present unpredictable, global changes.” In other words, 
this was not the urgent bottom-up appeal to individuals made in the 1940s; here, states 
regained their prestige as world actors, and calls for one world dissipated amongst the 
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public and policymakers, whilst remaining strong amongst disarmament advocates (see 
Schell 1982).  
 
Secondly, and most importantly, the portent of global catastrophic change and nuclear 
holocaust re-enters Bulletin very prominently. Now, however, it is no longer a fallout 
from nuclear weapons that is discussed, but the global climate that provides the ultimate 
basis, scope, object, and foundation for the prospects of a future annihilation in a 
nuclear winter. Indeed, in 1979, we see “global cooling” re-enter political discourse in a 
powerful new way. Not, however, attached to aerosol particulate pollution nor to ice 
ages. Now, it is because “Ground-burst nuclear explosions throw great quantities of 
gravel and debris into the atmosphere . . . for years” – including debris and suspended 
particulate matter that blocks the radiative energy and sunlight needed to warm the 
Earth’s surface – that nuclear war “can lead to global cooling” (Kendall 1979, 36). The 
objective here was to fear the global climate itself. 
 
An unfamiliar connection between nuclear war and global catastrophe as starvation, also 
appears. “As a result [of nuclear winter] the possibility of climatic changes of a very 
dramatic nature can by no means be ruled out. . . . Climatic alteration would directly 
affect the growing of food in virtually every nation on earth” (Kendall 1979, 36; 
Schneider 1976). So, the specter of nuclear catastrophe now becomes synonymous with 
global climate change – as cooling – but in a new way. It is driven or led by a form of 
Earthly transformation that now appropriates previous nuclear discourses, so as to 
“precipitate a climatic catastrophe—a nuclear winter” (Weissbourd 1984, 8). Now, it is 
the climate itself that is affecting or fomenting the apocalypse; nuclear fire becomes the 
progenitor and servant of its larger and more engrossing nuclear winter.  
 
It is important to note that this is certainly not to say that theories debating global 
climate change caused by CO2 and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were unknown or 
not being discussed at this time. Articles as early as 1981 in prominent American 
journals such as Foreign Affairs very presciently pinpoint and discuss the dangers of a 
global warming from the burning of fossil fuels (see Kellogg and Schware 1981). 
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However, the important question that arises here is why, despite this link and portent of 
CO2 and atmospheric global warming that we consider so obvious today, did climate 
change did not rise to prominence or command public attention until the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s? Even Bulletin frequently joined the chorus of scholars and 
politicians debating over nuclear winter, claiming that “even a relatively small nuclear 
exchange might result in the extinction of the human species due to a factor earlier 
studies neglected to consider—the dense clouds of soil particles and the smoke from 
fires that would be generated by nuclear explosions” (Weissbourd 1984, 8).  
 
Through the concept of nuclear winter, widespread fears of a truly catastrophic global 
climate change now became entrenched in public consciousness in the 1980s for the first 
time. Yet it was not CO2 or global warming, but the cooling of a nuclear winter that 
underlay public concern. As Sagan’s 1983 Foreign Affairs article states in its title, this 
was simply a combination of “Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe” (1983). The 
transition was made clear in the scientific community:  
 
Many meteorological investigations have been devoted to atmospheric 
transport and deposition of radioactive material from nuclear bomb 
testing. Very few studies have, however, been performed on the 
possible changes which would take place in the physics, chemistry and 
meteorology of the atmosphere as a consequence of a large nuclear war. 
(Crutzen et al. 1984, 323).1  
 
Nuclear winter was not taken lightly by policymakers nor the public. It attracted enough 
attention to elicit scientific publications (see Ehrlich et al. 1983; Crutzen et al. 1984; 
Sagan 1985), debates in political science journals (Sagan 1983; Martin 1988), 
Hollywood films such as The Day After (1983), and TV documentaries such as In 
Search of: The Coming Ice Age (1977), which was narrated by Leonard Nimoy. Each of 
these spawned prolonged media attention, concern, and debate. Commenting on the 
                                                        
1 In IR and the social sciences today, atmospheric geochemist Paul J. Crutzen is associated with 
inaugurating the Anthropocene epoch (see Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). However, as this 
chapter illustrates, Crutzen’s greatest achievement was perhaps not in developing the Anthropocene, but 
in the concept underlying both it and climate change as we know them today: nuclear winter (Crutzen and 
Birks 1982; Crutzen et al. 1984). 
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documentary film The 8th Day in 1985, the New York Times cautioned its readers that if 
a nuclear war occurred, even in the form of “a pre-emptive strike . . . the climatic 
changes would be devastating” (Corry 1985). Indeed, Bulletin authors concurred: a 
nuclear winter resulting from “a major nuclear war would threaten the entire world – not 
just the nations directly involved” (Malone 1985, 55). 
 
On 20 November 1983, ABC News hosted a debate on nuclear winter on its popular 
program Viewpoint (1983), which included former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
astronomer and author Carl Sagan, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 
author and political commentator William F. Buckley Jr., Lieutenant and General Brent 
Scowcroft, and philosopher and theologian, Elie Wisel. Their discussion even opened 
with an interview with then Secretary of State to President Ronald Regan, George 
Schultz (Viewpoint 1983). These distinguished panelists were assembled due to the 
enormous public response to the film The Day After (1983), a dramatic dystopian 
portrayal of the world after a nuclear war in which survivors faced a global climatic 
change in the form of nuclear winter. “The movie . . . became, in a sense, much more 
than a movie” claimed Koppell to his audience and the panelists as the debate began. “It 
became a national event” (Viewpoint 1983). This event was powerful enough to spur the 
US Senate and House to hold hearings on the threat of nuclear winter in 1984 and 1985, 
with the US congress even going as far as authorising the Defense Department to 
conduct “‘a detailed review and assessment’ of scientific findings on nuclear winter”. 
As noted by Robock in 1989, this influx of funds dedicated to studying the climatic 
effects of nuclear holocaust “was virtually the only source of funding for university 
scientists . . . [creating] important spinoffs, expanding the ability to use climate models 
to investigate other problems” – such as, after the Cold War ended, the atmospheric 
workings of climate change (Robock 1989, 35; Edwards 2012).  
 
Throughout the 1980s, there remains – from today’s presentist/finalist vantage point –  a 
strange overlap and entwining of nuclear and climatic discourses in Bulletin and 
elsewhere (see Masco 2010; 2016). For example, between 1987-1988 the UN compiled 
a report blending the two concepts together, in a “Study on the Climatic and Other 
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Global Effects of a Nuclear War” (Bergstrom et al., 1988). This report emphasised the 
familiar catastrophic narratives concerning nuclear war and its effects upon the globe, 
but now placed not nuclear winter, but simply “global climate change” at the forefront 
of the discussion. The report was initiated “Following the recognition by a number of 
scientists in 1982 that a major nuclear war might have grave climatic effects with global 
implications”. Echoing the apocalyptic overtones present in the ‘atomic fire’ discourses 
since the 1940s, and reminiscent of Revelle and Suess’s 1957 piece on CO2 emissions, 
the report highlights that  
 
the planet on which we live exists in a fragile balance. For the first time 
in the history of the human race, humanity is now taking actions that, 
within the time-span of a single generation, are affecting the global 
environment in fundamental ways. . . The future implications of global 
warming and ozone depletion are just being fully recognized. 
(Bergstrom et al 1989: vi)  
 
As Smith once wrote, “a discipline’s silences are often its most significant feature. 
Silences are the loudest voices” (1995, 2). What emerges from this 1989 UN report is 
not that it isolates CO2 or ozone depletion as its central focus of planetary threat, but that 
it is now silent about the importance of fallout and radiocarbon C-14.1 In their stead are 
now concerns about organic carbon in the form of particulates released into the 
atmosphere as smoke and soot, through the incineration of forests and vegetation in 
nuclear fires. Despite further studies indicating that a nuclear winter would indeed occur 
in the event of a nuclear exchange, ‘climate change’ now slowly transitioned away from 
nuclear winter, and into the concept of a warming due to carbonic global climate change 
from other forms of organic carbon: namely, CO2.   
 
Writing shortly after this report in Bulletin in 1992, noted historian of science Spencer 
Weart combined nuclear war and atomic catastrophe with climate change in an article 
appropriately titled “From the Nuclear Frying Pan into the Global Fire” (1992). Weart 
                                                        
1 There are two small mentions of carbon-14 on page 43 of the report, although they do not feature in the 
main body of the report, nor in its recommendations. 
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credited the recent global awareness of environmental threats – such as global warming 
and the greenhouse effect, which were now gaining prominent public attention from the 
first UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference held at the 
Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 (see chapter 5) – as gaining momentum from the earlier 
public discourses surrounding nuclear war. “It was nuclear energy above all that 
changed ideas about humanity’s role as an agent of catastrophic change”, he noted 
(1992, 19). Atomic and nuclear scientists, as well as the Bulletin itself, were also given 
due: “These scientists (including those who founded the Bulletin) were the first to 
spread fears of total global disaster” (1992, 19). By 1992, we read how “The idea of 
global catastrophe as punishment for corruption had emerged again” (Weart 1992, 27). 
It now assumed the form of a catastrophic global warming – but this time, without any 
atomic fires or nuclear scaffolding needed to support it anymore. Climate change was 
now carbonic. 
 
Notably, although correctly highlighting that global climate change depended on nuclear 
technologies and advanced GCM computer modeling, Weart maintained that nuclear 
and climatic catastrophe were fundamentally different ontological objects. Although 
Weart opens his 1992 Bulletin article by noting the irony of the year 1896, in which 
Swedish geochemist Svante Arrehenius’s theory of CO2-induced planetary warming was 
made concurrently with the French physicist Henri Becquerel’s discovery of 
radioactivity, the article ends with a staunchly presentist claim: “Looking farther back, 
to the years since 1896,” Weart writes, “if climate science had received even a tenth of 
the support that nuclear science received, our situation today would be different” (1992, 
27). As this chapter has argued above, however, this is clearly not the case. Climate 
science, and the concept of a catastrophic global warming that Weart embraces from 
today’s present conceptual perspective, emerged directly – and contingently, at multiple 
points –  from the ongoing study and technological exploration of nuclear war and its 
planetary effects.  
 
Climate change and science simply would not ‘be’ this way at all, if not for nuclear 
science, radiocarbon fallout of C-14, and nuclear winter. Hence, from the micro-politics 
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and atmospheric dynamics of the radioactive carbon atom, upwards to the planetary 
scope of apocalyptic annihilation, the scientific, political, and public awareness of 
climate change was not merely coterminous or parallel with nuclear war – it emerged 
directly from it.  
 
Twenty years later in 2012, Paul Edwards retreads Weart’s argument in Bulletin. In a 
similar fashion, he gives recognition to the important role of nuclear technologies and 
the computerised monitoring of radioactive bomb fallout, carbon-14, and even nuclear 
winter, as helping to awaken scientists and climatologists to global atmospheric 
processes now embraced in GCM climate models. And similar to Weart, Edwards notes 
that “Along with the discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole in 1985, nuclear winter 
brought the prospect of massive human-caused damage to the planetary atmosphere out 
of the realm of distant speculation and into the close-at-hand fears of the US public” 
(2012, 36). He also notes that nuclear weapons and climate models are “entangled”, and 
that knowledge of each has been co-produced. “Today, the laboratories built to create 
the most fearsome arsenal in history are doing what they can to prevent another 
catastrophe—this one caused not by behemoth governments at war, but by billions of 
ordinary people living ordinary lives within an energy economy that we must now 
reinvent” (2012, 37). Yet, like Weart, Edwards’ history separates the globality of 
nuclear and climate catastrophes as being explicitly different and distinct ontological 
objects, when the globality of the latter emerged through and from the former. 
 
The Ghost of Lippman: Global Conduct, Global Concept  
 
In Edward’s 2012 Bulletin article, he comments on the state, its citizens, and global 
catastrophe, claiming that today’s climatic disaster is caused “by billions of ordinary 
people living ordinary lives” (2012, 37). This brings us to an important and notable 
inversion from the discourses of global catastrophe proffered in One World or None.  
 
In 1946, Lippman’s was advocating for a form of world law that undercut national 
sovereignty by operating on the level of individual conduct and subjectivity. Today, 
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unlike the Bulletin’s tendency in the 1940s-60s to emphasise individual political action, 
there is indeed a return of the state as the primary, if not sole, actor on the international 
stage. Yet, what has happened to the individual or subject? Here, Lippman’s comments 
are worth repeating:   
 
“For when an idea that enlists men’s hopes is seen to be consistent with 
their acts, it evokes and organizes their energies. It is not then an 
abstraction or an essence. It is a dynamic force in their conduct. There 
are the ideas that shake the world and change it.” (1946, 149) 
 
Catastrophe was to be avoided, according to Lippman, by circumventing the security 
dilemmas plaguing collective security after World War II through a psychological and 
subjective “world state”. Formal institutions were to be avoided. Instead, “the advance 
towards a wider and greater order of peace among men depends upon the same 
fundamental idea.” Yet this idea operated not internationally, nor through states and 
their institutions, but globally by permeating and overriding national conceptions of 
sovereignty and working from below; through each subject, and then beyond them as 
individuals to a collective, through a shared form of conduct. This global “idea that 
shakes the world and changes it” does not mean international nor world unity, nor that 
all states and peoples “will become suddenly unanimous and incandescent with 
enthusiasm to found the world state” (Lippmann 1946, 130). Instead, Lippman’s point is 
that a shared subjective idea will yield shared rationalities and actions, thereby raising 
the possibility – again, from the bottom-up, subjectively, and conceptually – of changing 
the potential for global catastrophe through a conceptual rather than (inter)national, 
unity. 
 
What this chapter argues is that through the technological globalisation of the concept of 
anthropogenic global climate change, a form of global conduct – i.e. order, in the 
psychological or subjective sense described by Lippman – has been established at a 
subjective level. “Order”, in this sense, is certainly not a form of order resembling an 
official world state or international organisation, but a pattern of conceptual activity (see 
Bull 1977). Order, here, is the implicit conceptual sharing of the idea of a global climate 
 100 
that steers or governs the conduct of individuals, regardless of their nationality or state. 
As noted in chapter two, this “exercise of power [as] a ‘conduct of conducts’ and a 
management of possibilities” is indeed a form of governmentality (Foucault 2002, 341). 
And in the emergence of the global problematique of climate change from out of the 
complexity of nuclear technologies and physics, a new correlation of physics with 
government emerges – “a new type of global circulation in [world] governmental 
practice . . . this appearance of a new form of global rationality, of a new calculation on 
the scale of the world” (Foucault 2008, 56). It is a global governmentality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This ‘calculation’ on the scale of the world began with nuclear technologies and fallout, 
but is now made through GCM technologies. As the practice of bringing this global 
climate into being, GCMs are the subject of the next chapter. With the end of the Cold 
War in the early 1990s, and the concomitant decline of fears of nuclear exchange, 
nuclear laboratories had to justify their continued existence by working on a new threat: 
“their many powerful supercomputers, their expertise in numerical modeling of fluid 
dynamics, and their skills in managing very large data sets” thus translated towards 
climate modeling (Edwards 2012). As this chapter illustrates, this move from nuclear to 
climate science and modeling was no coincidence: the global climate is not carbonic, but 
nuclear at its conceptual root. Global climate change is a direct product and descendent 
of global nuclear war. Tracing carbon and CO2 today is thus an echo of tracing 
radionuclide fallout and atomic bomb particulates from mushroom clouds.  
 
With the nuclear roots of our contemporary climatic problematique now identified, it is 
to a greater examination of how it is manifested and practiced technologically, that this 
project examines in the next chapter. 
 101 
Chapter 4 – GCMs: Practicing Climatic Globality1 
 
 
Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that 
nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live. 
                     (Arendt 1998, 8) 
 
Nothing short of action which affects every individual on this planet will forestall global catastrophe. 
(Tolba, M. Executive Director, UN Environment Programme. Quoted in Miller 2004, 46) 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses the central practice underlying the problematique of climatic 
globality identified in chapter 3: computerised simulation models known as General 
Circulation Models (GCMs). It interprets how this practice shapes our everyday thought. 
 
For climate scientists and modellers, GCMs are considered as the primary practice 
bringing the climate into being (Heymann 2010a). There is no such thing as a global 
climate without GCMs first modelling and constructing it as an object (Edwards 2010; 
Hulme 2009). As such, GCMs shape human thought and conduct through their 
simulations by producing the specific concept of a ‘global climate’ that becomes taken 
for granted by states and their citizens alike. Concepts thereby “provide analysts with an 
understanding of what is ‘out there’ and in doing so help to grasp relevant phenomena 
by naming and giving meaning to its features” (Berenskoetter 2017, 152). However, 
what has not been explored in terms of climatic globality is whether or not the specific 
concept of ‘global climate’ that is produced by a GCM is actually coextensive with, or 
amenable to, the other types of concepts and practices to which it is unquestioningly 
attached in IR.  
 
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter appeared previously in Hamilton, S. (2016). Action, Technology, and the 
Homogenisation of Place: Why Climate Change is Antithetical to Political Action. Globalizations, 13(1), 
pp. 62-77.  
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For instance, take the important concept of political action. It has become commonplace 
to hear that “serious action on climate change must start immediately to avoid grave 
risks, and [this] urgency for action increases . . . with each year of delay” (Dessler and 
Parson 2010, xii). Or, as former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon so aptly phrased it, 
“The heat is on. We must act” (as quoted in Harvey, 2013). Yet, as noted in chapter 1, 
we have seen only collective action failures in response to climate change. Calls for a 
global reduction in CO2 emissions have resulted in steady annual increases, and the 
more that GCMs and climate scientists call for “action” against looming global climatic 
catastrophe, the less action seems to be taken. Indeed, “there remain few problems that 
are as politically intractable” (Hulme 2014, p. x). Why this increasing political inaction, 
even when, “If inaction continues, the science tells us that the risks are huge—
eventually the future of humanity and all of life as we know it are at stake” (Dryzek et 
al. 2013, 39)? 
 
This chapter argues that the conditions for substantive or meaningful political action are 
contradictory to the concept of the ‘global climate’ that is produced by a GCM. It 
demonstrates this by comparing the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of 
GCM technologies with that of human social and political action. It finds that our 
concept of political action requires speech, debate, and a plurality of human actors to 
engage one another in social and unpredictable ways as public citizens (see Arendt 
1998) – evincing “the freedom to act with plural others to bring something new [and 
unprecedented and unpredictable] into the world” (Owens 2009, 37). With political 
action defined as such, then the technological and mathematised concepts of Nature, 
climate, and world that are produced through GCMs are difficult to reconcile with the 
unpredictability needed for human action. In other words, the metaphysical 
underpinnings of the concepts of global climate, and political action, do not mesh 
together at a subjective or implicit level.  
 
Interpreting the philosophical constitution of the concept of climatic globality also 
avoids adopting and repeating well-tread and presentist assumptions that IR and global 
governance discourses are now familiar with. These usually include a list of game-
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theoretic or economistic collective action problems (see Held et al. 2011; Helm and 
Hepburn, 2009; Stern, 2007), the identification of statist greed as a “cancer of 
Westphalia” seeking zero-sum gains (Harris 2013), and multinational corporations 
obeying the market dictates of a neoliberal capitalism (Klein 2014). This chapter does 
not intend to discredit or disagree with these narratives, but it does argue that a deeper or 
more fundamental rationality facilitating these failures is at work: a technological 
metaphysics that brackets the unpredictability of human possibility within the 
calculative grids of a GCM.  
 
This chapter now begins by elaborating more upon GCMs, focusing primarily on the 
physics and computational operations that grant them their explanatory power. It then 
reviews notions of social and political action as defined by Hannah Arendt, and 
contrasts them with Heidegger’s concept of technological enframing. Then, by analysing 
how GCMs underpin the “infrastructural globalism” of sociotechnical systems 
standardising our common discourses of climate globality (Edwards 2010, 25), the 
chapter turns to the international authority and gatekeeper on the science of climate 
change: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The chapter concludes 
that the GCMs embraced and disseminated in venues such as the IPCC do indeed 
dispense a new type of “global cognitive framework” or global conceptual orthodoxy 
(Urry 2011), but that this framework it is one dependent upon what this thesis has 
identified as a subjectivist relationality. 
 
GCMs: Placing the World in a Numerical Box 
 
Generally speaking, climate models are not windows or mirrors into reality or Nature. 
They are analogues or approximations of the behavior of Nature, based upon 
mathematical hypotheses, projections, and a selection of specific variables and processes 
selected for analysis. Since it is impossible to conduct an actual experiment with the 
entire global climate, insights into its behavior can only be provided by experimenting 
with “digital climates”, or representations of Nature. By adjusting levels of different 
climatic inputs and timescales (e.g. CO2, methane, etc.), and their interrelations and 
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conditions on these computers, a CGM allows for the “extrapolating [of] past and future 
states into the future.” A model is deemed “good”, if its digital representations of 
Earth’s natural processes – its output – match with observations of Earths and climates 
past. If a model matches with the past, therefore, there is a high probability its future 
projections will also be accurate (Gramelsberger and Feichter 2011, 2). In short, climate 
models grant insights into the future of the Earth’s processes, and hence of global 
climate change, because they “allow experimental methods to be applied to phenomena 
which cannot be studied using traditional laboratory techniques” (Edwards 1999, 461).  
 
According to the latest Working Group I report of the IPCC (2014), GCMs are the gold 
standard for understanding climate and Earth system changes today. “Climate models 
are the primary tools available for investigating the response of the climate system to 
various forcings [i.e. inputs affecting the climate, such as radiation, CO2, etc.] for 
making climate predictions on seasonal to decadal time scales and for making 
projections of future climate over the coming century and beyond” (Flato et al. 2013, 
746). According to the IPCC, GCMs are tasked with quantifying and mathematising the 
fundamental physical laws of Nature and the processes of the Earth system. This 
involves many steps, but can be summarised thusly: (1) “Expressing the system’s 
physical laws in mathematical terms”; (2) “Building and implementing these 
mathematical expressions on a computer”, requiring numerical methods for “discretized 
mathematical expressions, usually implemented on some form of grid such as latitude-
longitude-height”; and finally, (3) “Building and implementing conceptual models” 
called “parameterizations” for smaller sub-grid-scale processes such as humidity, cloud 
formation and movement, and biogeochemical processes in vegetation, because these 
processes remain too complex to be quantified and resolved by the discretized model 
equations (Flato et al. 2013, 749). 
 
As Edwards has described GCMs (2010 142), they reunified the three main strands of 
meteorology that remained separate prior to World War II due to a lack of statistical and 
computational power: forecasting, dynamical-theoretical meteorology, and empirical-
statistical climatology. As noted in chapter 3’s tracing of nuclear climates in Bulletin, 
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replacing the tediousness of hand-made calculations, the digital computations of GCMs 
became powerful enough to combine these three meteorological strands into a single 
research program. This transformed climatology “from a statistical science oriented 
toward the particularity of regional climates into a theoretical science focused more on 
the global scale.” GCMs, in other words, not only make the climate, but they also grant 
it globality. They are what make it possible to calculate the immense complexity of 
planetary-wide atmospheric phenomena. So, how do GCMs actually manage this task? 
 
The answer is through incredibly complex simulations of atmospheric fluid dynamics 
that are processed through supercomputers. The laws of physics dictate that the Earth 
must remain in a thermal equilibrium, despite being bathed “in a constant flood of solar 
energy” (Edwards 2010, 143). This means that climate modeling must begin with an 
“energy budget” detailing the relationship between incoming solar radiation and 
outgoing Earth radiation. Although many such models have been attempted, GCMs have 
succeeded in simulating not just radiative and heat exchange, but circulations and 
processes of the atmosphere that result from factors such as planetary rotation, 
gravitation, humidity, etc. (Edwards 2010).  
 
There are two basic components to a GCM. First, its “dynamical core” simulates large-
scale atmospheric and planetary movements using the primitive equations of fluid 
motion; second, its “model physics” must represent other atmospheric processes that are 
actually too small or complex to be modeled directly in the dynamical core. Hence, this 
latter function must “parameterize” these smaller processes and variables, which include 
the heat and moisture transfers of cloud formation and movement, or heat transfers 
between oceans, land, atmosphere, for example – as “sub-grid scale processes” 
(Edwards 2010, 146). As noted in chapter three, the first generation of GCMs began 
with a Cartesian grid-like structure, which continues today. Vertical and horizontal grid 
boxes (i.e. rectangles), approximately 100km x 500km in size, cover the entire planet’s 
atmosphere. Then, rates of energy transfer occurring within each grid box, are calculated 
with varying inputs, timescales, etc.  
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In general, as generations of GCMs are coded and re-coded, and as mathematical 
complexities and access to supercomputers, data retention capabilities, and processing 
speeds increases, GCM simulations get faster to run whilst increasing their accuracy. 
These grid boxes get smaller and more precise as increased computer power makes grid 
resolution better (i.e. the grid boxes get smaller and smaller). Since the 1990s, not 
simply atmospheric, but other Earth processes and systems are able to be included in 
GCMs. For example, the atmosphere and ocean were combined into atmosphere-ocean 
general circulation models that are now standard in the IPCC (AOGCMs), and more 
recently, biogeochemical Earth systems (i.e. Earth system models, ESMs) and Integrated 
Assessment Models (IAMs) that include socioeconomic processes, are employed (see 
Edwards 1996 for more on the difference between ESMs and IAMs). These latter ESM 
and IAM models are used in studies of the Anthropocene, most recently underpinning 
the popular ‘planetary boundaries model’, which is explored (and critiqued) in chapter 6. 
 
It is difficult to exaggerate not only the mathematical and physical complexity of these 
models, but also the rarity and the expense of the giant supercomputers required to 
operate them. Today, the dollar cost of a GCM stretches well into the millions. “No 
fields other than nuclear weapons research and high-energy physics have ever demanded 
so much calculating capacity” (Edwards 2010, 170). This has resulted in forms of 
scientific nationalism over the possession of these supercomputers, and a jealous 
oversight over the specific codes and formulas used and exchanged between different 
modeling groups and laboratories over decades. “Because of their complexity and 
expense,” notes Edwards (1999, 445), “the total number of atmospheric GCMs is not 
large—probably around 50 worldwide”, which results in each GCM actually sharing a 
“common heritage”. As each group borrows models and codes from one another, quirks 
and mistakes of past models are passed down and developed within newer versions. As 
Edwards, the world’s expert on the history and development of GCMs describes it, 
“Several modellers [sic] told me that substantial segments of the computer code in 
modern GCMs remain unchanged from the original models of the 1960s” (1999, 445). 
Indeed, there is a global epistemic and “transepistemic” community of climate scientists 
that now exists based upon modeling, replete with their own social norms and protocols 
 107 
regarding model types, maths, physics, parameterization standards, model goals, etc., 
practiced within each model and group (Hulme 2010; Knorr-Cetina 1982). Yet the 
concept produced and shared by this epistemic community, the global climate, moves 
far beyond modelers and scientists into the minds and actions of “policymakers and 
other agents and institutions with compelling interests in global change issues” 
(Edwards 1996, 150). 
 
The point here is that even in the realm of digital supercomputers producing the global 
climate and Earth system models – which disciplines such as IR take for granted as 
‘scientific’ – there are social, historical, and subjective human dynamics in constant 
operation in the background. Aside from their mathematical fluid dynamics, GCMs 
cannot be reduced to objective equations of Nature and climate. Where there are people 
and practices, there, lurks politics. For instance, even selecting and calculating the sub-
grid processes of parameterizations generates not only computational “data-friction” 
(i.e. disagreements or discrepancies between models), but personal and emotional 
vendettas between scientists and groups attached to their own model calculations and 
justifications for their parameterization selections (Sundberg 2007). These even become 
politicised in some cases, such as competing groups debating over whether model 
complexities such as “flux adjustment”, a computational discrepancy that arises when 
grids of the atmosphere are coupled with the ocean, causing the “flux” of a drifting 
climate (Shackley et al. 1999), should be highlighted in policy recommendations.  
 
However, this chapter does not aim to delve into the exact physical science of GCMs, 
nor the intricacies of their historical development through the state-funded militarism 
driving Cold War atmospheric sciences (see Hamblin 2013; Howe 2014; Fleming 2010). 
The science and history underlying international GCM developments and the rise of its 
global epistemic community of modellers, is so vast that it now occupies its own sub-
discipline within geography and climatology (for a comprehensive overview, see 
Edwards 2010; 2011; 2012; Dahan Dalmedico 2001; Heymann 2010b. For a 
comprehensive account written by climate scientists, see the edited volume by Randall 
2000). With such a large historical scope, this project is wary of launching into detailed 
 108 
mathematical descriptions of atmospheric fluid dynamics (see Vallis 2006; Flato et al. 
2013) or the history of the physics and rival supercomputer codes and groups fueling 
GCM development (see Donner et al. 2011; Lynch 2008). Instead, this chapter aims to 
elaborate an unexplored component of GCMs as they relate to globality and subjective 
conduct in our present moment: how the knowledge and concepts shaped by this 
computational practice governs the possibilities for political action.       
 
But What of Nukes? What of Ozone? 
 
Prior to exploring the link between the practice of GCMs, metaphysics, and political 
action, two potential issues regarding the argument set forth below must be briefly 
addressed. The first issue concerns the disappearance of discourses of GCMs and 
nuclear winter (see chapter 2); the second issue concerns the famous action taken to 
remedy the ‘Ozone hole’ that was taken by states through the 1987 Montreal protocol. If 
political actions were undertaken concerning these global crises, how does that affect 
the genealogical inquiry of this thesis, and the argument set forth in this chapter?  
 
First, if GCMs likewise brought nuclear winter into conceptual being in the early 1980s 
(Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Robock 1984), then is nuclear catastrophe 
plagued by the same ‘lack of action’ as climate change? The answer is no, because the 
threat of nuclear winter is quite different. First, contrary to common belief, this threat 
has not subsided. In fact, it has intensified, but has been displaced in the public and 
political spotlight by its conceptual descendant: climate change (see Robock 2010).  
 
Second, unlike global climate change, nuclear war is indeed more experiential or able to 
be comprehended without GCM models (i.e. we have seen videos of nuclear explosions; 
we have seen images of mushroom clouds; and most importantly, we know of the 
devastation, photos, videos, and have heard the devastating accounts from the survivors 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the atom bomb detonations in 1945). Finally, whilst 
nuclear war was also attributed to state agency, climate change is made the 
responsibility of every single human individual. For instance, every breath exhaled 
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emits CO2, thereby contributing to the ‘globality’ of climate change in ways not possible 
with nuclear winter. 
 
Following from this, the ‘hole’ discovered in the Earth’s ozone layer over Antarctica is 
also very different from the issue of global climatic change. First, and experientially, the 
ozone hole could be sensed directly by a human self: magazines and TV images carried 
visualisations, maps, and messages directly to the public, whilst the “immediate threat of 
increased skin cancers and other damage to people and biological systems shocked 
officials” and publics alike (Weart 2003, 153). Secondly, the average citizen “grasped 
the link between ozone loss and both Styrofoam and aerosol cans, causing a 50 percent 
drop in their sales even before legislation was enacted” (Ungar 2000, 303). It thus 
appeared to the average citizen that the ozone issue was easy to solve, and did not 
impact their own lifestyle substantially. Climate change, however, is not only considered 
to be more complex and multifaceted, but unlike the ozone hole, it cannot be tied to 
concrete events, locales, or metaphors that a public could rally around as a (w)hole 
(Ungar 2000). Finally, and importantly, the “state-firm relations” were entirely different 
in the case of ozone. As Falkner notes, the global chemical industry made the Montreal 
Protocol a success because it was easy and advantageous for corporations emitting 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to switch to other chemical compounds in their 
manufacturing processes. The producers of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) “entered 
into a global race to capture the emerging market for ODS technologies and products” 
(2005, 105), resolving the ozone issue in ways amenable to both logics of capital, and 
state-firm relations.  
 
With nuclear winter and the ozone hole revealed to be of a different political and 
conceptual nature than global climatic change, this chapter will now move on to analyse 
the conceptual interaction of ‘climate’ and ‘action’  
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The Action, Technology, and Metaphysics of GCMs 
 
At first, the technical and digital forms of knowledge manifested through the practice of 
GCMs might appear to be outside of the scope of a genealogy. However, “the bestowing 
of authority on these scientific practices [GCMs] is the outcome of cultural processes, 
not of scientific research” (Heymann 2010a, 196). GCMs are authoritative social 
practices because they crystalise and disseminate a shared and specific concept of a 
global climate. This concept is shared across polities, and indeed, across cultures. Each 
time the concept of a ‘global climate’ is conjured, the knowledge disseminated from this 
practice is used. GCMs, in other words, create and sustain the climate within “systems 
of action insofar as they are inhabited by thought” (Foucault 2000c, 201).  
 
GCMs accomplish this conceptual monopoly in two ways. First, they delimit and orient 
the boundaries and range of possible ‘thought’ concerning global climate change. 
Second, they steer the range of possible ‘actions’ – the “speaking, doing, or behaving” 
of knowing subjects – that are constituted upon this climatic thought. Here, for Foucault, 
action is defined as “the play of true and false, the acceptance and refusal of rules, the 
relation to oneself and others” (Foucault 2000c, 201). What GCMs produce, therefore, is 
not the climate, but a conceptual model of the climate. It is a way of thinking, that may 
or may not facilitate certain forms of action.  
 
It is this conceptual model and way of thinking that becomes known and naturalised in 
public, academic, and IR discourses as our knowledge of global climate change. And it 
is this model, and the concept of climate it produces, that comes to be known and 
discussed as the climatic globality analysed in this thesis, and throughout academic and 
public discourses alike. Following Bartelson and his own account of the social 
construction of globality (2010, 220), because “the sociopolitical world is accessible to 
knowledge and intervention only by means of concepts”, it is in analysing the social 
effect of this concept of climate from GCMs – rather than just its science, history, or 
epistemic communities –that new insights into its political conduct are granted. Hence, 
in order to respond to Szersynski and Urry’s claim that “the social is central and pretty 
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well invisible” in IR’s analyses of science and climate change (2010, 3, emphasis 
original), this chapter now analyses how the practice of GCMs frames the subjective 
potential for action. 
 
An early attempt to examine the social effects of GCMs and the globality of climate 
science and knowledge was made by former climate scientist (now turned critical social 
scientist) Mike Hulme. He describes GCMs as producing “global kinds of knowledge 
[that] claim to offer the view from everywhere” (2010, 559). This knowledge asserts 
itself to be true and universal, regardless of time and place, because it is grounded in the 
complex physics and mathematics of GCMs. Here, for Hulme, the epistemology of 
climate becomes global because the science underlying it is, by definition, globally 
valid. Hence the obvious danger is that this global knowledge becomes hegemonic and 
imperial, erasing or obfuscating local or indigenous forms of knowledge derived from 
culture, traditions, language, myths, etc. The danger of the GCM is that it paves over 
local ways of knowing the world, with a homogenising and Westernised concept of 
climate. What is fostered is thereby “a consensual global knowledge which erases 
difference and allows the most powerful to determine what is ‘known’” (Hulme 2010, 
563. Also see Hulme 2009; Dahan 2010).  
 
However, this interpretation borders on a subtle form of anti-universalism that has 
become fashionable in ecological and Anthropocene discourses in recent years (see 
Bruno Latour’s similar argument in Salter and Walters 2015). Declaring this concept to 
be hegemonic simply because it is scientific, embodies the applicationism this thesis 
aims to avoid. Without delving into how this concept of climate is produced in the 
practice of GCMs, and thus how it structures thought, Hulme’s account also risks 
succumbing to the same forms of scientism highlighted in IR by Jackson (2010). In a 
somewhat circular way, climate science is assumed to be hegemonic, simply because it 
is scientific, and vice-versa. But what about the other side of the coin, or what underpins 
this science, and its ‘view from everywhere’?  
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Although sympathetic to debates concerning the partiality or “situatedness” of 
knowledge and epistemology (see Nightengale, 2003), one must adopt a different tact 
when considering the conceptual underpinning of this science: its metaphyscial and 
technological nature (see chapter 2). Interpreting the metaphysical grounds of 
technologies such as GCM simulations thus allows us to examine what this practice 
does to knowledge, subjectivity, and conduct, prior to the hegemonic effects claimed by 
Hulme.  
 
We may begin by asking how this concept is materialised in a social and political world 
though human thought and conduct, in celebrated ideals and concepts such as ‘global 
mean temperature’. Indeed, a global treaty firmly entrenching limits to the global mean 
temperature by limiting the CO2 emissions of states was a primary goal of the COP21 
conference noted in chapter 1. Hulme lambastes this concept as “psychologically sterile” 
because no one actually experiences the global average temperature in their everyday or 
specific locality. Indeed, the “most commonly cited figure in climate change debates—
change in the average global temperature—has no correlate in anyone’s actual living 
conditions” (Edwards 2001, 33).  
 
Yet, what Hulme ignores here is how the social and inter-subjective function and 
construction of ‘global mean temperature’ is not dependent upon its materiality or 
concrete reality. Rather, here it helps to remember what Foucault advised when studying 
or thinking of the social and political effects of “power”. Like the concept of global 
mean temperature,  
 
there is no such entity as power, . . . global, massive, or diffused; 
concentrated or distributed. Power exists only as exercised by some on 
others, only when it is put into action, even though, of course, it is 
inscribed in a field of sparse available possibilities underpinned by 
permanent structures. (Foucault 2002a, 340). 
 
What matters when considering power is not its materiality, nor the reality of the 
physical structures through which it collects or flows, nor even the psychological 
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constructs it engrains within objects or institutions. Instead, Foucault’s point is that 
power – like global mean temperature, or the concept of the climate itself – must be 
approached by asking what, and how, it affects the subjectivities and relations of 
(inter)acting humans. The key is to gauge action, the “acting upon one or more acting 
subjects by virtue of their being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions” 
(2002a, 341). In other words, one way to grasp the social impact of the globality of 
GCMs is to interpret their effect as practices upon individual and collective forms of 
action. In other words, do not look for the materiality of a global mean temperature out 
there in the world; interpret how this concept inscribes itself into forms of action, or in 
the case of climate change, inaction. 
 
In order to detect how GCMs shape concepts of climatic globality through (in)action, we 
must first define what ‘action’ is. As noted in chapter 2, it is here where Arendt’s 
philosophy acts as a bridge between Heidegger’s technological metaphysics, and the 
formation of subjectivity and conduct along Foucauldian lines. Arendt, in other words, 
is a philosopher of the social, technology, and of action, par excellence. By studying the 
changing historical manifestations of action, Arendt was thus able to read into how the 
implicit relations of technology to subjectivity structured explicit human sociopolitical 
understandings of the world (Yaqoob 2014). 
 
Arendt’s understanding of technology and action cannot be isolated from her positing of 
a “human condition” comprised of a tripartite division of labour, work, and action 
(1998; 2006). There is no such thing as a universal human nature within this framework. 
Rather, there is only the endlessly transforming social and historical orientation of these 
three components of the human being, that “condition” its thought, world, and 
subjectivity. Through this social conditioning, the nature of the vita activa or active life 
lived amongst other humans, is likewise established. Just as humans alter and hence 
condition their world, so they are in turn conditioned by it (1998, 9).  
 
Whilst human labour takes care of the eternal recurrence of our biological life cycles 
and its processes (e.g. hunger, sexual desire, etc.), it is work, or the fabrication, 
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construction, and transformation of the raw materials of Nature, that constructs a human 
world: the buildings, dwellings, statues, monuments, temples, etc., around which a 
human social and cultural public meets, interacts, and engages in politics. It is the 
fabrication of this world that distills a contiguous sense of human time and memory 
across a culture and its peoples over generations. In this world, plural human interaction 
and dialogue takes place, making it possible for a political, and not simply a natural or 
animalistic relation and experience, to appear. Thus, it is in only in this shared world 
that action can occur. 
 
To act is to embrace the unpredictability of human inter-action from one’s unique place 
in this shared world: a direct engagement and discourse with others, which begins “to 
set something in motion . . . [so that] something new is started which cannot be expected 
from whatever may have happened before” (1998, 177). Hence, political action, “the 
only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or 
matter”, by “correspond[ing] to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, 
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (1998, 7), is intimately tied to each 
person having their own distinct place through which to engage their world and each 
other: “because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever 
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt 1998, 8).  
 
Political action – the starting of something new and unpredictable whilst working and 
debating with other plural agents in a shared world – thereby manifests such unique 
historical events as the founding of a state, the initiation of a revolution, or the creation 
and implementation of a new political constitution. Its essence mirrors what Arendt calls 
natality: “the new beginning inherent in birth . . . because the newcomer possesses the 
capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting” (1998, 9).  
 
What is important to note here is how the unpredictable process, end, and effect of 
action cannot be predetermined or predicted at the outset or origin of a political 
engagement. One cannot, therefore, experiment with action. “The fact that man is 
capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to 
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perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man 
is unique, so that with each birth [of a child, a state, or even a conversation in a political 
space,] something uniquely new comes into the world” (1998, 178). Human reality and 
its history are thus disclosed through this ongoing dialogue between acting humans and 
the making of unexpected events in a shared world. It is this world, created through 
work but made political through speech and debate, where mere ‘objective things’ found 
in a space of appearance can bind humans together in ways hitherto unthought nor even 
experienced prior to this worldly action (1998, 182). A pen and paper, for example, can 
be far mightier than a sword, if they produce a constitution that brings a new state or 
form of politics into the world. 
 
This brings us to the topic of in-action concerning climate change. If its looming threat 
of catastrophe signals that clear and urgent political action must now be undertaken to 
avert disaster, then why has this Arendtian ideal of political action proven to be so 
absent or ineffective? If the IPCC has clearly “confirmed that humans are destroying the 
earth’s climate”, revealing that “Twenty-five years of human effort to protect the 
climate have failed even to slow that destruction down” (Brecher 2015, 1), why has no 
action been effective in ameliorating this crisis? 
 
The answer to this question lies in the concept of ‘global climate’ that is produced by 
GCMs. As complex computer simulations of Nature, recall that the essence of GCMs is 
also what Heidegger describes as the essence of modern Western subjectivist 
metaphysics, “the setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature”, yet only to 
further some other task or goal (1977a, 15): ‘enframing’ (Ge-stell). Enframing is the 
implicit and technological manner in which subjectivity reveals Being as comprised of 
extensible objects to be measured and related to the subject. It occurs through the 
“gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, 
to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve [i.e. as calculable, 
orderable, and as objective]” (1977a, p. 20). Enframing describes the way that we as 
subjects relate to objects in our world, and its essence is made tangible or crystalised in 
complex digital technologies such as GCMs. Here, as in any digital technology, objects 
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must be translated into digital codes that can be understood or discretely ‘encoded’ by 
the computer. By “cutting up the world in this manner”, every referent “is transformed 
from the continuous flow of our everyday reality into a grid of numbers that can be 
stored as a representation of reality which can then be manipulated by algorithms” 
(Berry 2011, 2). To be placed inside the numerical grid of the GCM, Nature and Being 
must first be enframed. 
 
Following from Arendt’s notion of the ‘human condition’ above, if the essence of 
climate change is conditioned in, through, and by the digitised atmospheric fluid 
dynamics of GCMs, then we are presented with two immediate discrepancies between 
these concepts. They arise because of the mathematical essence of the concept of 
climate in a GCM’s form of metaphysical enframing, and the way human beings must 
think and enact this ‘enframed’ concept in a human and political world. Readers should 
also keep in mind the arguments set forth here as this thesis advances, as they remain in 
the background of each chapter’s arguments, and come to the fore once again in chapter 
8 regarding the use of ‘quantum entanglement’ in security discourses. 
 
First, let us examine the conversion of this concept into human speech and dialogue, 
which is required for public deliberation and discourse to lead to action. For Arendt, 
speech is what makes a human political. But, “the sciences today have been forced to 
adopt a ‘language’ of mathematical symbols which, . . . now contain statements that in 
no way can be translated back into speech” (1998, 4). We can make sense of a concept, 
and convey knowledge about it to others, when it can be spoken and thought about 
between human subjects. However, the catch here is that speaking of ‘climate change 
action’ cannot be political in this sense. The concept of ‘climate’ itself is an 
agglomeration of computerised mathematical symbols that cannot be rendered thinkable 
without being translated and then communicated through experts, such as the IPCC. 
“[P]eople remain utterly dependent on experts for evaluating the global circulation 
models on which the whole game is predicated”, notes Ungar (2000, 297). “As Stephen 
Schneider put it, climate change mainly exists in the silicon chips of supercomputers.” 
As such, GCMs model a concept that can (a) never be experienced, but results only from 
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computational synthesis, and (b) is never directly felt or known through human senses, 
even by the academics and publics tasked with knowing and acting upon it. Global 
climate change is thus experientially vacuous, despite its increasingly urgent political 
implications. 
 
In other words, the concept of ‘climate’ is actually an analogue of the GCM model itself. 
GCMs actually model the data, codes, and inputs from other models, and thus study 
themselves, rather than any actual ‘real’ climate – for there is no real climate, other than 
what is now produced by the GCM model. To even think and speak of climate change 
today, therefore, is now to model it, albeit implicitly, within our own thought and 
discourse. And as this section has argued, at its conceptual root, this is a mental or 
subjective analogue model that is a model of a GCM’s climate, that is so complex in its 
basic formulation and calculation that it can never be fully conveyed to a human being’s 
understanding or speech.  
 
Second, the capacity for natality or unpredictability that is required for something new 
and unexpected to emerge in action, is also dissolved in this concept of climatic 
globality. As noted above, the codes and algorithms of GCM supercomputers depend 
upon the rigour of complex physics and mathematics. “Modern physics is the herald of 
enframing”, wrote Heidegger (1977a, 22). “For already in physics the challenging 
gathering-together holds sway . . . It is challenged forth by the rule of Enframing, which 
demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve” (1977a 22, 23). Presciently, 
Heidegger notes that causality in physics will become a “reporting challenged forth—of 
standing reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence” (1977a, 
23). In other words, humanity’s grasp of Nature will rendered as a sequence of orderable 
relations between objects and a subject(ivity). Indeed, although Heidegger and Arendt 
were writing before ‘climate change’ became a tangible political concept or debate, both 
do note quantum physics as becoming illustrative of humanity’s tacit subjectivism (see 
chapter 8).  
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The point here is that Arendt concurred with Heidegger, noting that, as concepts are 
projected mathematically as “general laws of behavior . . . endlessly reproducible 
repetitions of the same model” (Arendt 1998, 8), then the fundamental grounds for 
human action dissolves into grid-like patterns of “normalization” (1998, 40). 
Normalisation, from Foucault, to Arendt, to Heidegger, is fundamentally contradictory 
to unique and unpredictable action. This raises the question of whether the GCM’s 
concept of climate facilitates normalisation. “The [GCM] models help us create a public 
space,” claims Edwards (2001, 54), “including shared knowledge, shared values, and 
access to common tools and data, for consensus building on global change issues.” 
Indeed, the formation of this ‘public’ will be explored below through the case of the 
IPCC. For now, however, it is clear that any public space or so-called ‘world’ in which 
climate action must occur, is one constructed primarily through GCM technologies. A 
public’s knowledge of climate remains one bounded and delimited by GCMs. Hence, 
the unpredictability of natality that is manifested in human speech and politics cannot 
occur if there is no human speech, but only the digitised computations underlying this 
mental model of Nature (i.e. climate). In other words, this is a public with an implicit 
conceptual model of a climate operating as akin to a Cartesian grid, when ‘action’ 
requires a transversal movement; something akin to “a ‘polygon’ or, rather, 
‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and 
can never properly be taken as finite” (Foucault 2002d, 227). Therefore, the production 
of mathematical concepts through GCM practices – if they now form the grounds for 
politics, culture, and everyday thought that many now claim (Hulme, 2014) – thereby 
appears antithetical to the form of human speech, subjectivity, and interactive conduct 
that is required for effective or meaningful political action to occur. 
 
For example, let us recall that the largest component of climate modelling is 
“parameterization” – i.e. subsuming and ‘tuning’ endless sub-scale grid processes such 
as clouds, vegetation, and even human social and political interaction, under 
coefficients and algorithms of larger-scale grid processes (Edwards 2001, 57). Here, 
GCMs produce concepts of climate in which human action is already pre-packaged, 
quantified, and bounded within the model as calculative variable or mode of ordering. 
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Indeed, recent Earth System Models (ESMs) and Integrated Assessment Models (ISMs) 
treat humanity as follows: “due to lack of quantitative understanding of the social 
system most models reduce the social system to economic modelling assuming rational 
decision making” (Verburg et al. 2016, 331). In other words, in the most advanced 
models and supercomputers we possess, the ‘human’ condition within the GCM – and 
the vita activa – is always already that of the enframed and rational ‘economic man’. 
For Villa, this “metaphysical rationality” sublimates action “by the rational securing of 
first principles and the positing of ends in accordance with these principles” (1996, 160-
161). 
 
If political action emerges from the confluence of unique individuals and their 
particular and distinct place in a world, and if the enframing underlying the physics of 
GCMs demarcates and delimits uniform and homogenous metaphysical boundaries of 
thought – expressed in predictable, mathematical, and predetermined modes of 
calculative thinking – then human action and GCM knowledge are implicitly 
antithetical. Any potential for unpredictable action will be squashed before it can begin, 
if thought is pre-ordered, and regulated within a GCM simulation’s “solidarity of 
procedure and attitude with respect to the objectification of whatever is” (Heidegger, 
1977b, 126). Once nature has become enframed and revealed only as a “report” of itself, 
“that is identifiable through calculation . . . , [and] orderable as a system of information” 
(Heidegger 1977a, 23), then any distinct and unique spaces of appearance, places, and 
things, will thus become concealed by the uniformity of mathematical calculation.  
 
What remains to be explored is how the practice of GCMs and its enframed concept of 
climatic globality might be shared amongst states and citizens more generally. Hence, 
this chapter concludes by turning more directly to modes of international relations and 
climate governance that disseminate this form of knowledge and conduct throughout 
societies and nation-states of the world: the IPCC. If the IPCC is indeed “one of the 
most striking globally networked entities in the modern world, [which] increasingly 
insists upon the certainty of climate science and of global warming,” (Urry 2011, 24, 
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emphasis original), then how might the distribution and adoption of GCMs and their 
concept of ‘climate change’ frame globality for states and the their citizens? 
 
 
The IPCC: GCMs and Calculating a Global Epistemology  
 
The IPCC was officially formed in 1988 under the auspices of the UN Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), in response to a 
growing international awareness and concern over a possible global warming. Today, it 
is the international benchmark for the science and governance of climate change. It 
establishes how states and citizens can enact policies to adapt to its effects, and what 
mitigation efforts should be pursued in the future so as to soften these effects.  
 
According to Hajer (2009, 16), the function and purpose of the IPCC is historically 
unique and sui generis in global politics. It is “a remarkable achievement”, “the most 
complex ‘science for policy’ vehicle to be created to date, not only bringing together the 
academic disciplines needed to understand global warming, but speaking and reporting 
to the 113 governments that were [originally] involved in the UN climate-change 
initiative”. Today, this stands at 195 countries, and comprises thousands of scientists 
from around the world. As stated by its former IPCC Chair Rajendra Pachauri, the IPCC 
is “that [which] makes it possible for policymakers to accept the science in a very 
simple way. As a result, therefore, . . . [it] provides a roadmap on the basis of which 
policymakers can take action, and deal with the challenge of climate change” (Pachauri, 
2014). Indeed, the IPCC is frequently referred to as the global mapmaker, whilst 
policymakers (and citizens) are to ‘navigate’ global and local action through the map the 
IPCC draws. 
 
IR textbooks are replete with descriptions of the IPCC as a new and unparalleled type of 
international institution. For example, general IR accounts view it as “a new way of 
conducting detailed communications between core science and government 
policymakers” (Manning 2011, 32), whilst more critical scholars view it as a “hybrid 
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science-policy assembly that has played an enourmously powerful role of ‘ontological 
kind-making’ around climate change . . . a powerful oligopticon . . . and its scale of 
worldwide mobilization of scientific expertise for politics is unprecedented in history” 
(Blok 2014, 51).  
 
Rather than provide a general overview of its history (see Bolin 2010), review its role as 
an international governance institution and norm producer (see Miller 2007), or critique 
its function as a disciplinary pan- or ‘olig-opticon’, the remainder of this chapter focuses 
on the spread of concepts and knowledge emanating from the IPCC. In other words, the 
issue here is how the IPCC disseminates a concept of climate change to states that may 
have “globalized the atmosphere by constructing a discourse” framing climate change 
and globality (Miller 2004, 47). The question is whether or not the metaphysically-
enframed concept of climate noted outlined – a concept that is both subjectivist, and 
antithetical to political action – is spread by the IPCC. 
 
The credibility of the science of the IPCC is established through global research 
networks, premised upon shared methodologies and strategies aimed at producing 
coeval or synchronous forms of data. It is a coextensive and global utilization of GCMs 
that ensures that “it is models, rather than data, that are global. . . . The dynamics of the 
earth’s atmosphere could not be understood without them—at least not at a level of 
detail that would confer the ability to make long-term projections” (Edwards 2001, 60). 
If each of the 195 participating countries – and their scientists – had different notions of 
what the climate was, or what GCMs were modeling (and how), then not only would the 
IPCC break down, but the concept of ‘global climate change’ itself would fracture as 
well (see chapter 5). Hence, the IPCC’s globally uniform methodology as a conceptual 
Trojan horse.  
 
At first glance, this corresponds with Hulme’s account of the universalising and 
homogenising tendencies of climatic knowledge. Norms such as global mean 
temperature decreed by institutions such as the IPCC establish a fulcrum around which 
each state must conduct itself, and its citizens. This could open the way “for 
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managerialism on a planetary scale” (Hulme 2010, 559, 561). However, what this 
chapter has also argued is that we must be careful when declaring pro- or anti-
universalist stances concerning climate change and global knowledge. Concepts of 
globality must be analysed by considering their subjective formation, or how they affect 
human thought from the bottom-up when they are enacted. Declaring science to be 
managerial still risks embracing a top-down framework that ignores the potential for 
human action and creativity to emerge in unknown or unpredictable ways. For example, 
Arendt argues that natality itself – the possibility for action – is a shared condition of 
humanity. Therefore, if we are to proclaim that the “universality of the human race in 
nature doesn’t work. Something else has to be done before we talk about the common 
world again. . . . we have to do some new work which looks – I agree, provisionally – as 
divisive” (Latour, quoted in Salter and Walters 2016, 544), we risk substituting for the 
framework of science or politics, an equally structural framework of particularism or 
ecologism.    
 
Therefore, the point of this chapter is not to engage in a war of frameworks, but to 
conceptualise what thinking of the concept of ‘the climate’ does on a metaphysical and 
subjective scale, as an enframed object in relation to a subject. IR has made some brief 
inroads in this direction. For example, Paterson and Stripple (2010) have traced how 
climate change produces a governmentality of an individual’s own “carbon conduct” as 
their personal “My Space” in which subjects practice low-carbon diets, manage their 
carbon footprint, calculate their daily emissions, and organise their everyday micro-
practices around CO2 emissions. This approach illustrates the making of individual 
subjectivities responsible for their own practices, yet in direct relation to the ‘global’ 
threat of climate change delimited by the IPCC.  
 
On an international level, Mahony and Hulme have traced the spread and dissemination 
of specific climate models to argue that their use in developing countries is tied to a 
“global praxis” in which citizens, scientists, and publics, oriented their own behavior 
around IPCC-approved models. This has fostered an “an epistemic harmonisation by 
which the networks of climate science and politics, with their attendant practices, 
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discourses and expectations, are extended and strengthened in global space” (Mahony 
and Hulme 2012, 207). In sum, even though it is local knowledge that is the input and 
output of these models, they ultimately operate and facilitate the “epistemic landscape” 
of the IPCC, “ever-present as a legitimating, custodial and aspirational force” (2012, 
208). There is indeed a complex interplay of particularism and universalism at work. 
GCMs, therefore, not only function as a model of climatic globality, but as a practice of 
how humans can think, interact, and model themselves in relation to Nature and their 
social surroundings (Andersen and Neumann 2013).  
 
Conclusion     
 
This chapter has analysed the practice underpinning the problematique of climate 
change and the Anthropocene today: GCM simulations. It explored how GCMs 
construct the globality of climate, and how the concept of climate they produce is 
enacted politically in international arenas such as the IPCC.  
 
Rather than approach failures and inactions surrounding climate change by questioning 
economic or sociopolitical institutions, it instead applied the concept of ‘action’ to the 
concept of ‘climate’ emerging from GCMs. This revealed how, on a metaphysical level, 
the enframed notion of a calculative global climate is antithetical to the fluidity and 
unpredictability required for human political action. These two concepts do not mix.  
 
Therefore, general and critical perspectives in IR and the social sciences fail to grasp the 
depoliticising nature of GCMs because they have not yet considered this conceptual and 
metaphysical foundation. Instead, they tend to assert or substitute new and top-down 
frameworks of anti-universalism for science, or vice-versa. As argued in this chapter, 
however, anti-universalism also risks replacing one form of technological enframing for 
another.  
 
This chapter has also responded to calls that IR has been absent in climate change 
discourses, despite the fact that “the argument of the science itself is that human 
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practices are utterly central to this particular global risk” (Szerszynski and Urry 2010, 
3). In doing so, it has also pointed towards questions that Heymann put towards social 
scientists:  
 
 
“We may have to ask how the physical scales of global climate 
modeling relate to the social scales of local human action and 
interaction. Identical modeling methodology is disseminated and used 
all over the world, while varying alternative knowledge traditions lose 
authority. How did climate modeling succeed in creating something like 
a unified world picture of climate?”  (Heymann 2010a, 196). 
 
 
This chapter and this thesis project answers this question by highlighting how this 
‘world picture’ is not an experiential object, nor a universalising type of managerialism. 
Rather, it is a technological and metaphysical form of subjectivity. It is channeled and 
crystalised in technologies and practices such as GCMs. Rephrasing the statement of 
Pachauri and the IPCC: when considering how GCMs draw their conceptual map of 
climate change, the forms of conduct they construct leads ultimately inwards to 
subjectivity not outwards to the Earth or upwards to the atmosphere. This fostering of a 
calculating human subject is then able to relate itself to the concept of a climate, as an 
object to be measured.  
 
In calculating this global object, it is a subjective picture of the world that is drawn. 
Acting meaningfully and effectively within this world, therefore, becomes always 
circumscribed by the boundaries of this world picture before any action can begin. 
Placing climatic globality within this predictable grid thereby undercuts the political 
action required to move beyond its limits in unpredictable ways.
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Chapter 5 – A Rationality of Powerlessness:  
Why the Global Climate Has Always Been Broken1 
 
 
In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement. . . . [and] of how and why 
at certain moments that regime undergoes a global modification. 
(Foucault 2002c, 114) 
 
 
What we are doing now is killing this [climate governance] process. The signal we are giving the outside 
world when millions are watching will be: ‘We failed. The UN system failed’. 
Delegate at UNFCCC Climate Negotiations, Copenhagen Denmark, 2009 (quoted in Dimitrov 2010, 21) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter interprets the rationality underlying the practice of GCMs and the 
problematique of climatic globality in IR and climate governance. It argues that our 
everyday concepts of climate change and the Anthropocene are rendered thinkable 
through what it identifies as ‘a rationality of powerlessness’. This rationality is a way of 
thinking in which the global climate is conceptualised as something always already 
damaged and broken, resulting from failures of international governance to steward the 
Earth. In other words, from its emergence in international relations in the late-1980s 
until today, the global climate has only and always been conceived in social science 
disciplines such as IR as something congenitally broken, that humanity is powerless to 
fix. This raises the question of whether it is possible to reconceive climatic globality in 
new ways, or to govern it ‘successfully’, when its conceptual core is composed of failure 
itself. 
 
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter have been published in Hamilton, S. (2015). The Global Climate Has Always 
Been Broken: Failures of Climate Governance as Global Governmentality. Caucasus International, 5(2)., 
pp. 141-161. 
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This argument is made by problematising international conferences and events that have 
become elemental to mainstream discourses of climate governance in IR today: the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration, the 1979 World Climate Conference, the 1988 Toronto 
Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, and the Villach-Bellagio Workshops that led 
to the formation of the IPCC in 1988. It is indeed common to read that each of these 
conferences or events was of crucial significance to a steady and consistent rise of 
climate regimes and norms into the international policy arena (see Brenton 1994; Vogler 
1996; Rowlands and Greene 1992). In other words, it is assumed that each conference 
was a stepping-stone towards a greater awareness of global climate change and 
humanity’s impact on Earth’s natural systems.  
 
However, focusing upon the primary texts of these conferences through a genealogical 
lens, this chapter reveals a very different historical trajectory concerning how the ‘global 
climate’ came into being and became a topic of (international) conversation. Rather than 
concerns about safeguarding Nature or guarding against climate change, these 
conferences expressed fears and insecurities concerning humanity’s scientific ability to 
control Nature as a harnessed resource. What was once a secure and sovereign climatic 
object located within each state’s borders, slowly became a shared source of 
international political insecurity in the late-1980s. This was coupled with the dawning 
realisation amongst policymakers that technology would not prove to be the panacea 
they had hoped for, as it would not be able to solve emerging international crises of 
climate, agriculture, nor environmental depletion, as had previously been assumed. 
Indeed, the World Commission on Environment and Development’s Our Common 
Future illustrates this trend (see WCED 1987).  
 
Yet, never was the object of ‘climate’ first understood as a normal, robust, natural, or 
undamaged global referent. Rather, from what was previously a concept of the sovereign 
climate of each state, the globality of a new climatic object emerged only when states 
integrated and coordinated GCMs globally, in venues such as the IPCC, through the 
emergent rationality of powerlessness identified here. A global climate could only be 
formed once an agreed-upon and uniform methodology could be shared amongst states, 
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now able to monitor and track this climatic object’s newfound global scope, and its 
concomitant failure or malfunction. From its outset, therefore, the global climate 
emerged in international relations and climate governance as something always already 
broken. It thereby came to embody the rationality of powerlessness and insecurity that 
helped to crystalise it, as states realised they could no longer exploit Nature as an 
infinite resource, but were now helpless to movements of Earth’s geophysical processes 
and cycles. 
 
This chapter begins by reviewing arguments that institutions and regimes of 
international climate governance have failed. It then analyses primary texts from the 
international conferences noted above, paying close attention to subtle transformations 
in their underlying rationality, whilst indicating obvious inconsistencies with IR’s taken 
for granted historical narratives. The chapter then concludes by interpreting how this 
rationality of powerlessness was disseminated internationally through the IPCC.  
 
Climatic Globality: Failure, High Politics, Ontology  
 
This section analyses two common threads that tie discourses of climatic globality 
together today. First, the increasingly urgent failure(s) of international climate 
governance, and its resultant ascension into canons of ‘high politics’ in IR. Second, the 
notion that the climate is inherently (and ontologically) global in nature and scope.1 
 
A rationality is a mode or style of thought. It renders concepts and certain aspects of 
reality thinkable and operable in social and material practices, and forms of calculation 
or technology (Miller and Rose 2008, 16). In the case of IR, we may ask: what is the 
rationality underlying global climate change and its international governance today? As 
                                                        
1 Although theories and histories of climate governance in IR are frequently framed in a neoliberal 
discussion of ‘regimes’ (e.g. the rules, norms, and procedures inscribed in the IPCC or UNFCCC), or a 
more inclusive ‘bottom-up’ consideration of other non-nation-state actors (NNSAs) upon governance 
processes, these theories will not be considered in depth here (for a detailed critical overview, see Orereke 
et al. 2009; Paterson 1996). Rather, in its genealogical approach this chapter takes the referents of ‘failure’ 
and globality, and passes these through the grid of international conferences as practices, so as to interpret 
what emerges.  
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noted in chapters 1 and 4, discourses of climate politics are saturated by lamentations 
over governance failures, political inaction, and the inevitability of pending catastrophes 
(see Aradau and van Munster 2011). “Put simply,” notes Paul Harris (2013, 2), from the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and its attempt to regulate carbon emissions, to the Copenhagen 
Accord of 2009, “with too few exceptions, the politics of climate change, despite being 
increasingly energetic, has failed.” Or, to take another common plaint: “The failure to 
generate a sound and effective framework for managing global climate change is one of 
the most serious indications of the challenges facing the international order” (Held and 
Hervey 2011, 96; Held et al. 2011, 5). Indeed, in IR, there exists a shared way of 
thinking about climate politics as an endemic failure; an impossibly daunting task. In 
other words, at “the level of global governance there has so far been a failure to generate 
a sound and effective international framework for managing global climate change” 
(Held et al. 2011, 7). Although its historical emergence will be traced below, this 
rationality can be identified here as a rationality of powerlessness. In it, always does the 
climate appear broken or damaged; always does governance seem to fail; and always, 
therefore, do we as human subjects feel powerless in relation to it. 
 
This powerlessness raises the question of when and how failures of governance first 
emerged, and hence, how they can be fixed in the future. Although ripe with talk of 
failure, literature in IR today typically frames the development of climate politics and 
governance as one of a steady linear progression and development. Generally put, the 
‘climate change issue’ developed from a disinterested or secondary type of ‘low politics’ 
in a world occupied with Cold War power politics, into a ‘high politics’ equal in respect 
and stature today to security, war, or diplomacy (Dalby 2014). Whilst environmental 
politics was first popularised with Rachel Carson’s 1964 publication of Silent Spring 
(see Carson 2002), the climate problem took longer to emerge, and is typically framed 
as a recent occurrence, hitting “the international political agenda in 1988” (Paterson 
1996). As mentioned in chapter 3, for example, even Richard Falk’s landmark book The 
Endangered Planet (1972) contained not a single reference to climate change in all of its 
494 pages. 
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Yet in the 1990s, with the recent establishment of the IPCC, a multitude of international 
conferences such as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and agreements signed by states 
regarding CO2 and chlorofluorocarbon emission limits through the UNFCCC, it 
appeared to IR scholars that, finally, “the momentum had built up sufficiently to lead to 
international negotiations [and] an international convention on the subject” of climate 
(Paterson 1996, 61). It appeared as though a new awareness of this problem and a drive 
to fix it was indeed fueling a new and global reach.  
 
Looking back, much like today, climate change is framed throughout the 1990s as an 
issue gaining importance and prominence in IR and the social sciences, always verging 
on high politics. Also writing in 1996, Vogler (1996, 1) noted how the “recent spate of 
interest” in climate politics was a direct reaction to political events such as the end of the 
Cold War (1996, 9), and he identified common events such as the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol’s ‘Ozone Diplomacy’, a greater attention to biodiversity issues, and the 
emergence of climate change governance in the 1980s and at specific UN summits such 
as the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, as evidence that climate had now become a “high 
politics” issue. Even today, no IR account is ever complete without noting the testimony 
of NASA scientist James Hansen to the US Senate in 1988: it was “time to stop waffling 
so much and say the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here’” 
(Hansen, quoted in Brenton 1994, 166). For IR scholars, “This statement attracted 
widespread attention and illuminated the importance of the issue” (Rowlands 1992, 30). 
At this time, Vogler also highlights a voice typically omitted from IR literature today: 
the “Most prescient” voice regarding climate change, he noted, “was John von 
Neumann, the co-founder of game theory” (1996, 2. See chapter three for von 
Neumann’s role in monitoring nuclear fallout and creating the GCM). Vogler quotes 
von Neumann’s prophetic claim made in 1955, the year prior to his death, that “human 
intervention would deeply affect the atmosphere’s general circulation . . . All this will 
merge each nation’s affairs with those of every other, more thoroughly than the threat of 
nuclear war or any other war may have already done” (von Neumann, quoted in Vogler 
1996, 4). Yet, von Neumann was a physicist, not a diplomat nor a politician. Hence, 
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even into the 1980s, climate change had not yet become an international nor a global 
issue. 
 
What was it that allowed climate change to ascend to the realm of high politics in the 
1990s, answering the call von Neumann made back in 1955? It is indeed generally 
accepted that the concept went from being a “technical specialism peripheral to [IR’s] 
interests” in the 1970s and 1980s, to embracing a “paradigmatic shift” between the 1972 
Stockholm Conference and Rio’s 1992 Earth Summit. “Simply stated, it involved the 
shift to a global rather than a purely localised or transboundary phenomena” (Vogler 
1996, 5). Vogler, for example, notes the shift to globality in the 1990s, but does not 
provide a reason for how it could have emerged. He asserts that “the projected climate 
change associated with the enhanced ‘greenhouse effect’ [has] a truly global scope” and 
therefore it fosters “extraordinary interconnection between the issues involved . . . from 
even a cursory examination.” With the 1990 release of the first IPCC report on the 
science of global warming, and the 1992 Earth Summit and creation of the UNFCCC 
following shortly thereafter, it seemed that global climate change was a problem now 
well on its way to being resolved. “It was, therefore, no longer possible to pigeonhole 
environmental issues in International Relations as a narrow technical specialism” 
(Vogler 1996, 7, emphasis original).  
 
Today, this buoyant mood has shifted drastically. After noted failures of climate 
governance in such events as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen, 
and the recent COP21 in Paris (see chapter one), we might assume that this optimism 
towards climate change ascending into the realm of high politics, had waned. For 
instance, as Brecher writes (2015, 59), climate protection and its politics have clearly 
failed: “What went wrong? Why has the world’s obvious long-term common interest 
been so hard to realize?”  Rather than optimism, however, today it is precisely this 
notion of failure and insecurity that fuels increasing calls for the ascension of climate 
change into high politics. Its existence as a global problem that so clearly transcends the 
borders of sovereign states, and threatens international relations with systemic collapse, 
has elicits claims that “climate change has ascended to the realm of high politics” 
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(Carter 2013, 177; Dalby 2014). Indeed, even the self-declaredly critical manifesto of 
planet politics adopts this rationality of climatic failure as indicative of its increasingly 
deserved prominence in IR: “Now that ecological catastrophe is unquestionably the 
gravest security challenge to face this planet, why has IR failed to take on a new, 
corresponding vocation?”, the authors ask (Burke et al. 2015). “We contend that 
International Relations has failed because the planet does not match and cannot clearly 
be seen by its institutional and disciplinary frameworks” (2015, 501).     
 
In short, the more effort and attention that has been given to the governance of the 
climate, the more these efforts have failed, and the more damaged the climate becomes, 
thereby demanding even more effort and attention. At first, this appears to be a 
repetitious cycle or a vicious circle, that should easily be resolved by better and more 
effective governance. However – and as will be explored below – what if the concept of 
this broken global climate is something that, at its foundational and conceptual core, 
cannot be fixed? Will this make our current governance strategies and policies a 
Sisyphean endeavour? 
 
With its notions of ‘failure’ and demands for climate politics to ascend into high politics 
now outlined, this section now moves on to its second section: from the epistemology of 
climate governance, to its ontology. This concerns what the global climatic object in 
need of governance actually ‘is’.  
 
Even in critical IR, the mainstream histories of climate governance outlined above are 
generally taken for granted. They simply assume that the climate is a universally and 
naturally ‘global’ object. For example, governmentality scholars such as Methmann 
(2013) similarly assert that “climate politics takes place in a genuinely global polity”, 
because it is “first and foremost visualized as a global problem . . . which constructs 
global warming as an inherently global field of visibility” (2013, 77). He cites the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), an emissions reduction scheme that was included in 
the failed Kyoto Protocol, as a “perfect example of a genuinely global governmentality” 
because   “sovereignty and governmentality” can be “situated in a liberal economy of 
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power, governing ‘at a distance’”(Methmann 2013, 71).1 Due to the inherent planetary 
scope of this object, he therefore asserts, “If there has been such a thing as a 
governmentality of climate protection, it has been a global governmentality” (2013, 77).  
 
This assumption of the climate as inherently ‘global’ is endemic to IR’s literature. In a 
similar fashion, Luke argues that a “green governmentality” must inherently be global, 
because “the time-space compression of postmodern living has brought the bio-power of 
the entire planet, not merely that of human beings, under the strategic ambit of state 
power” (Luke 1999, 122). Oels (2005, 198) similarly argues that “planetary 
management on the basis of biopower grounds itself in the natural sciences to model the 
complex workings of the biosphere”, thereby obscuring local action by working through 
the natural globality of the atmosphere. Again, what ties these examples together is 
twofold: first, the notion that the climate is and has always been, global; and secondly, 
that the concepts used to examine the successes or failures of climate governance must 
be epistemologically and ontologically distinct from this sense of globality. It is taken 
for granted that the climate is both damaged and global, and thus that it can be governed 
so as to be fixed. 
 
A Rationality of Powerlessness: How our Global Climate emerged as Broken  
 
This chapter will now problematise these axiomatic assumptions concerning the 
universality of globality and failure in climate governance. In genealogical fashion, it 
aims to “pass these universals through the grid” of international conferences as practices 
(Foucault 2008, 3).  
 
As chapters three and four of this thesis illustrated through the development of nuclear 
discourses and the practice of GCM simulations, it was not simply climate governance, 
                                                        
1 Notably, Methmann does highlight here how the failure of the CDM does not imply the failure of 
governmentality itself, because “the failure of CDM allows carbon governmentality to fulfill its actual 
function”: orienting conduct. However, Methmann still succumbs to two fallacies here: First, that of 
liberal applicationism, as outlined in chapter 2. Second – and most importantly for this chapter – he makes 
the ontological and epistemological assumption that liberal markets and their entrenchment through CDM 
failure, remain ontologically and epistemologically separate from the globality of the climate as a 
‘natural’ global object. 
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but the climate itself that became global in the 1980s. Indeed, the very first international 
conference on climate change, ‘The First World Climate Conference’, was held by the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) only as recently as February, 1979.  
 
When looking at primary texts rather than recent and secondary historical accounts, it 
becomes evident that even as recently as 1941, the concept of a ‘global climate’ was 
limited only to small scientific and military communities. Notions of climatic globality 
were virtually nonexistent within larger overall discourses of states and regimes of 
international governance. Outside of the scientific community of climate modellers, 
each state considered their sovereign climate as a resource at their own disposal. For 
instance, take the US Department of Agriculture in 1941: “The distinction between 
climate and weather is more or less artificial, since the climate of a place is merely a 
build-up all the weather from day to day and the weather is merely a day-by-day break 
down of the climate” (Hambidge 1941, 4; Miller 2004). The U.S. Weather Bureau 
likewise considered the climate as a sovereign “natural resource . . . part of the natural 
endowment of a country”, and hence it was “axiomatic” that “the outdoor climate cannot 
be changed, except on the smallest scale . . . [and in] contrast to mineral resources, 
climate is inexhaustible” (Landsberg 1946, 293).  
 
In 1966, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) stressed that, despite possible 
alterations in CO2 levels creating regional climatic changes, in the past these only “had 
locally catastrophic effects, [and] they did not stop the steady evolution of civilization” 
(NRC 1966). Statist ontologies of climate, therefore, were previously considered as 
localized, regional, and bounded objects, akin to other natural resources, and thus 
primed for economic exploitation within each state’s sovereign borders. 1  Yet, the 
question concerning this chapter is not how nation-states came to think of the climate as 
a resource, but how this sovereign resource became linked-up and conjoined to a global 
(atmospheric) object of governance.  
                                                        
1 This chapter will not aim to repeat the history of local and regional ontologies of climate and the state, 
which have been covered in detailed analyses of US archival sources by historians of science and climate. 
See Fleming 1998; Weart, 2003; Stevens, 1999; Miller, 2004; Hamblin 2013. Rather than rehasing these 
secondary accounts, this chapter examines genealogically how the concept of climatic globality developed 
through the primary texts of international conferences. 
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We begin by analysing the text of what is now considered to be the foundational 
moment for climate governance today: the 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE), in Stockholm. This is touted as one “of the biggest 
international environmental events that have ever taken place”, and thus, according to 
IR’s conventional wisdom, “provides an excellent snapshot of the state of global 
environmental attitudes at the time it took place” (Brenton 1994, 12, 13; Rowlands 
1995, 70). Today, it is indeed common to read that “In terms of formal international 
politics, the first UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held at 
Stockholm in 1972 was a landmark . . . the starting point” for the activity of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and for climate politics writ large (Vogler 
1996, 4-5). It also catalysed and “recommended more climate change research” than 
anything before it (Boehmer-Christiansen 1996, 179).  
 
However, upon inspecting the actual texts of this event, the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference’s final “Declaration” of “26 Principles” reveals absolutely no mention of 
climate change (see UNCHE 1972a; 1972b). Instead of safeguarding Nature or 
protecting the planet, the 26 Principles of the 1972 Declaration instead focus explicitly 
on “the human environment”, aiming to make the world aware that “a stage has been 
reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has 
acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an 
unprecedented scale.” The focus is more on protecting humanity, than Nature.  
 
Hence, because “Of all things in the world, people are the most precious”, it is the 
capacity of the Earth to provide resources for the benefit of “all mankind”, that is the 
overarching concern of the 1972 Conference. As one section declares: “The Conference 
[is] launching a new liberation movement to free men from the threat of their thralldom 
to environmental perils of their own making” (UNCHE 1972b, 34). Its goal, therefore, 
was not as IR scholars frame it today – i.e. to assert how “Global environmental 
protection has been on the international political agenda since the 1972 UN Conference 
on the Human Environment” (Biermann et al. 2012, 51; Brenton 1994, 44-46). Quite to 
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the contrary, the intent of the 1972 conference was also to conquer and control Nature, 
not to steward it.  
 
Climate change is indeed mentioned in the 1972 Stockholm conference, however.1 It 
appears in the conference’s ‘Recommendation 79’, a section on pollutants. Yet this 
small mention merely advocated further study of “the causes of climatic changes [and] 
whether these causes are natural or the result of man’s activities” (UNCHE 1972a, 12). 
It did not refer to a global climate, nor did it caution policymakers about anthropogenic 
climate change. Instead, it referred to the many local and regional “climatic zones” 
(1972a, 20-21) that should facilitate cooperation between nations sharing similar, but 
ultimately disparate, climates (1972a, 26).  
 
Instead of protecting the planet, therefore, the dominant style of thought or rationality 
underlying the 1972 Stockholm Declaration was one of securing “mankind’s” 
technological control and use of the “resources” of Nature at “his” disposal. This was 
not stewardship, but a rationality of control over Nature. It is therefore ironic that the 
magazine of the UN itself, The UN Chronicle, today proudly proclaims that at the 1972 
Stockholm Conference, “the Declaration raised the issue of climate change for the first 
time, warning Governments to be mindful of activities that could lead to climate change 
and evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects” (Jackson 2007, online). 
Upon analysing the actual 1972 Declaration and its 26 principles, however, nothing 
resembling this common contemporary narrative is found.  
 
Although there were smatterings of scientific gatherings in the 1970s, no official 
international conference between state leaders or officials on the topic of climate change 
took place until the 1979 First World Climate Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. 
Again, we read contemporary IR texts lauding this conference as the first international 
governance event to warn of the increasing concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere, 
claiming it represented “a slight hardening of the scientific view [that] gave rise to 
                                                        
1 In other words, although discussion the mention of global climate change was primarily limited to 
technical papers between scientists, it did make a small mention here. See SCEP’s (1970) ‘Man’s Impact 
on the Global Environment’, for the views of the scientific and climate modeling community at this time. 
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further rounds of international scientific work” (Brenton 1994, 165). However, although 
climate change is now indeed an issue of the 1979 conference, and although the 
atmospheric science of climate is framed as global (White 1979, 6), its political 
conceptualisation is still not regarded as being global in scope, nor is it even primarily 
considered as anthropogenic or human-induced (WMO 1979). Instead, the Conference 
continues the well-established practice of treating state climates primarily as many 
disparate, local, regional, and inter-national spaces: “All countries of the world are 
vulnerable to climatic variations, . . . The climates of the countries of the world are 
interdependent”, the Declaration reads at its outset (WMO 1979, 3). 
 
As highlighted in the keynote speech by Conference Chairman Robert M. White, who 
was on the Climate Research Board of the US National Academy of Sciences, the 
impetus of the conference was still not to safeguard the Earth, nor to prevent pending 
climatic catastrophe. Instead, and following from the rationality of control undergirding 
1972 Stockholm Declaration, the goal of the 1979 conference was to learn how to better 
harness national and regional climates as resources for economic development and 
exploitation. “We must therefore begin to think of climate itself as a resource to be 
allocated wisely”, White stressed in his keynote speech (1979, 5), “contribut[ing] to a 
bright future for mankind by national and international actions to provide for the wide 
use of climatic resources to improve the economic and environmental welfare of people 
everywhere” (1979, 2). At this point, therefore, regional or national climate change 
remained the political norm for state and international politics. Globality was still 
relegated to the scientific realm.  
 
Although CO2 concentrations and dangers of a “greenhouse effect” were indeed 
discussed by White and others (for example, see Fedorov 1979, 15), the majority of the 
1979 Conference and its proceedings focused primarily on economic productivity, food 
supply and population levels, and recommendations for states to use and exploit their 
own sovereign climate for a more effective economic development within their own 
borders.  
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Tasked with summarising the overall report, one of the final chapters – entitled ‘Climate 
and Economic Activity’ (d’Arge 1979) – even began by suggesting the possibility of, 
and benefits of, a “global cooling effect” rather than a warming (1979, 652-653). 
D’Arge then highlighted how knowledge of any global cooling or warming remained 
inconclusive: “direct scientific evidence of global climatic change induced by emission 
of CO2, NOx, and other by-products of industrial activities is not yet obtainable” (1979, 
654); that global cooling would be “costly to society” but “global heating may be 
economically beneficial or harmful” (1979, 654, emphasis original); and notably, that 
this “extreme uncertainty” and “indecision on actual climatic changes induced by man” 
should lead the first conclusion on “global public policy” to be: “No large-scale controls 
affecting human society should be considered for at least 10 years. There is just not 
enough evidence yet” (d’Arge 1979, 655). Indeed, although CO2 warming is contrasted 
alongside a possible NOx cooling, d’Arge concludes that “If his [Nordhaus’s] estimates 
are correct, then carbon dioxide can be viewed as a relatively manageable potential 
pollutant where immediate controls need not be considered” (1979, 680). What is 
immediately notable about the 1979 World Climate Conference, therefore, is that it is 
hardly the clear-cut beacon or initiation of anthropogenic CO2 warming and active 
climate stewardship, that narratives in IR readily take for granted today.      
 
A subtle but pronounced shift in thinking between the 1972 and 1979 Conferences may 
also be detected. By 1979, although the economic and regional focus on sovereign 
climates remained, the political rationality underpinning this focus was no longer the 
retention and promotion of humanity’s control over Nature. Instead, it now transformed 
into an increasing awareness, and fear, that despite rapid advances in technology, 
humanity’s control over Nature was illusory. A newfound appreciation that “not only is 
humanity vulnerable to variations in climate, but climate is also vulnerable to the acts of 
humanity. . . . It is a vulnerability that can only increase because the underlying causes 
will intensify, not diminish”, is palpable in its texts (White 1979,3).  
 
This emergent sense of uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability, is present 
throughout the proceedings of the 1979 Conference. “What is new,” White stressed in 
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his keynote, “is the realization that vulnerability of human society to climatic events has 
not disappeared with technological development” (1979, 3). And alongside this 
realisation, the notion of transnational “man-induced climatic changes” enters 
international governance as a “new world condition” of climate vulnerability. Presaging 
the Anthropocene, it is hazarded and heralded for the coming millennium as “the ending 
of one era in the relation of humanity to the planet and the beginning of another” (1979, 
4). Now, the interconnectedness of nations to their own climate, and to the “world 
climate”, is crucial: “The importance of climate, recognized in these Conferences, 
suggests that the time is at hand to view world affairs through a climatic prism” (1979, 
5). And it is a prism of climatic globality imbricated with humanity’s vulnerability and 
insecurity in the face of an unpredictable Nature; what is identified here as a rationality 
of powerlessness. 
 
As this rationality of powerlessness emerges, it is important to note that it is not excised 
from, nor does it transform, some neutral or scientific discourse that had previously 
established a fully-functioning, normal, or healthy world climate. Rather, it emerges 
from its outset through a rationality framed at its root by vulnerability, fear, uncertainty, 
and within the portent and prospects of the failure of human society to develop and to 
sustain the agricultural and economic resources required for its survival. From this style 
of thinking grows the fledgling notion that there is something larger in scope than the 
parceled, individual, sovereign economic climates previously commonplace and 
commonsensical within states and discourses of international governance prior to 1979.1 
Now, states – and not only climate modellers and atmospheric physicists in the scientific 
community (see SCEP 1970) – must consider the ramifications of ‘world climate 
change’, and the new process of seeing the world through a climatic prism.  
 
As these notions of a ‘global’ climate governance take hold in the 1980s, the rationality 
of powerlessness (and the concomitant fear of a nuclear winter discussed in chapter 3) 
                                                        
1 It should be noted that 1979 was also a watershed year for ‘global’ events that would have intersected 
with the First World Climate Conference, such as the so-called ‘second oil and energy crisis’ in the US 
resulting from the Iranian revolution reducing exports of oil; the election of Margaret Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom; the Three Mile Island nuclear accident on 28 March 1979.  
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shape its background, and become normalised. For instance, the opening statement of 
the summary of the 1988 Toronto Conference, the ‘World Conference on The Changing 
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ (WMO and UN 1988) harkens back to 
the Revelle and Suess paper on radionuclide tracing and CO2 uptake in the oceans (see 
chapter 3), but it now couples their conclusions with this new feeling of powerlessness: 
“Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment 
whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war”, the new 
opening statement reads. “These changes represent a major threat to international 
security and are already having harmful consequences over many parts of the globe” 
(WMO and UNEP 1988, 292). The comparison between conferences in 1972, 1979, and 
1988, thus exchange human control over Nature, for a climatic globality in dire need of 
repair. States must now “take specific actions to reduce the impending crisis  . . . No 
country can tackle this problem in isolation” (1988, 292). And here, the paradox with 
which we in IR are familiar with today, crystallizes: “the more we become aware of the 
level of the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change, the less we seem capable of 
acting to prevent it” (Held et al. 2011, 1).  
 
Methodological Unity makes Climatic Globality 
 
Naturally, these past references to ‘sovereign climates’ and using a state’s ‘climate as a 
resource’ sound strange and foreign to us today. They are easily omitted from present 
literature as irrelevant, outdated, or eccentric. Yet, to analyze and interpret such empirics 
and texts is the point of connecting genealogy to (global) governmentality: to trace how 
our modern and tacit political rationalities, which conduct our conduct at the subjective 
level, first emerged into being. It is thus important here – as this chapter outlines the 
rationality underpinning climatic globality – to remember that in 1979, the First World 
Climate Conference was “considered as the most profound and comprehensive review 
of climate and of climate change in relation to mankind yet published” (Foreword 1979, 
viii). It was, in other words, what diplomats and scientists concerned about global 
climate governance were thinking at the time.  
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Despite this cutting-edge comprehensiveness, however, this “profound” 1979 
Conference admitted that its findings concerning climate change were not yet global in 
scope. Why? “At present,” the Conference concludes, “new applications [and] 
methodology is largely being developed on an ad hoc limited national ‘needs’ basis. 
This leads to redundance and the development of products that do not necessarily make 
use of the best methodology” (1979, 23). The problem was that each state was using its 
own distinct concepts, methodologies, and knowledges, to delineate what each bounded 
sovereign climate ‘was’. This led to incommensurable ontologies and epistemologies of 
this object at the international level; what Edwards (2010) called the “data friction” of 
GCMs.  
 
This problem was well known to climate modellers, who wrote in 1970’s SCEP 
‘Assessment and Recommendation for Action’ that “the development of new methods 
for gathering and compiling global economic and statistical information” must be 
accompanied by “uniform data-collection standards to ensure, for example, that 
industrial data collection across the world will be of comparable precision and focus” 
(SCEP 1970, 7). Scientists were aware, long before states, that a truly ‘global’ climate 
required a global methodology and model data. However, scientists had to wait for a 
moment when international relations would be amenable to this requirement. Integrating 
and coordinating this much data was an extremely complex affair, demanding the 
oversight of an international institution of some kind.  
 
It was in the mid-1980s that states realised that in order to govern a global climatic 
object, they all required the shared knowledge of a climate that was commensurable 
across borders. In other words, to possess a shared ontology of a global climate, they 
required shared GCM technologies to foster a shared epistemology. Indeed, 
“Programmes must be set up to assist [states] to participate fully in the World Climate 
Programme through training and the transfer of appropriate methodologies”, declared 
the 1979 conference, requiring “an inter-disciplinary effort of unprecedented scope at 
the national and international levels” (WMO 1979, 6).  
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The 1987 Villach-Bellagio workshops are touted as the moment when the demand for a 
uniform science of climate change spurred politicians into action (Brenton 1994, 165). 
The text of the 1987 workshop introduces new aspects of ‘political’ discourse into what 
was previously the scientific realm of GCMs. In certain sections, it even adopts the 
disciplinary jargon of (American) political science: regional climate change is warned to 
be, “not a zero-sum game. Unless action is taken, it could be a negative sum game of 
highly uncertain proportions” (Jaeger 1988, 35). The report does stress, however, that 
unnecessary burdens are placed on separate international GCM communities. “Much of 
the scientific research that is required because of remaining uncertainties about climatic 
change will be organized nationally and carried out at individual institutions”, resulting 
in data friction, and thus demanding: 
 
a considerable increase in global monitoring activities and the further 
development of climate models to improve our understanding of and to 
reduce uncertainties about the extent of regional and global climatic 
changes and their impacts on the environment and major socio-
economic sectors. (Jaeger 1988, 39-40, emphasis added)  
 
This was a recognition that moving regional governance to global governance, 
therefore, required uniform GCMs.  
 
This “international effort” at methodological homogenization was finally established in 
1988 in the IPCC (see Miller 2004. Also, see chapter 4), allowing the previously 
disparate regional and sovereign understandings of climate to adopt and share the global 
concept first trumpeted to states at the 1979 World Climate Conference. As Edwards 
writes (2010, 8), the  “scientific expertise, technological systems, political influence, 
economic interests, mass media, and cultural reception” of global climate change, finally 
became concretized in 1988 in the “global knowledge infrastructure” of the IPCC.  
 
What this chapter illustrates, however, is the rationality underpinning this moment: the 
concept of a global climate congealed into being within the shared GCMs of the IPCC, 
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but not as a neutral or objective scientific fact. It emerged as a global object only 
conceptualised as broken, and in need of governance to stave off congenital failure. 
 
With the IPCC’s formation, we find in its first Overview Report of 1990 the agreement 
that its “measures . . . require a high degree of international co-operation with due 
respect for national sovereignty of states”, and yet “the convention should recognize 
climate change as a common concern of mankind and, at a minimum, contain general 
principles and obligations” to gain adherence of the largest possible number of states 
(IPCC 1990a, 60). Here, when compared with 1972, there remains none of the explicit 
claims and desires for ‘mankind’ to control and exploit regional climates for agricultural 
and resource gains. Rather, its science must shape “the appropriate strategy for response 
and action regarding the issue of climate change. . . . what is potentially the greatest 
global environmental challenge facing mankind” (Houghton 1990, vi). This not only 
concretizes the rationality of powerlessness undergirding the concept of global climate, 
but makes this same concept dependent upon ongoing internationalism and 
collaboration: “climate change would affect, either directly or indirectly, almost every 
sector of society, [and so a] broad global understanding of the issue will facilitate the 
adoption and implementation of such response options . . . [meaning that] Further efforts 
to achieve such global understanding are urgently needed” (IPCC 1990a, 60).  
 
Today, this planetary normalization of a global climate and its governance operates 
through standards easily detectable by governmentality’s toolkit (see the volume by 
Bulkeley and Stripple 2014): for many scholars, these include a standardizing global 
average temperature; the policing, regulating, economization, and calculating of carbon 
at individual, state, and global scales; and the marketization of the climate itself, as 
Methmann (2013) and Oels (2005) have described above. As Oels astutely observed, 
“the IPCC may thus be understood as the administrative space created by governments 
where they expanded their biopolitical mission of using and optimizing the forces and 
capacities of ‘life’ to the entire ‘planet’” (2005, 198).  
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What this chapter has illustrated is how the rationality underpinning these arguments, 
and the IPCC’s politics and discourse of global climate change, has disseminated this 
concept. Its mode of thought depends on powerlessness, vulnerability, failure, and an 
implicit understanding that a pristine Nature has been broken by humanity. The concept 
of global climate change was made by failure.  
 
Today, this rationality underpins not only climate change, but the Anthropocene as well. 
We are told, in a manner reminiscent of the 1979 First Climate Conference, that there is 
a “reversal” of the relationship between climate and humanity. This time around, 
however, it is not Nature dominating humanity anymore. Now, “The Anthropocene 
means that the deterministic arguments about climate shaping human destiny are no 
longer relevant to the geopolitics of the twenty first century” (Dalby 2013, 45). “In the 
Anthropocene, some neutral, pre-given planetary nature is no longer available as a 
fiction of the real. We fucked it up” (Wark 2015, 169). Although the explicit discourse 
has indeed changed, globality in the Anthropocene thereby remains underpinned by the 
concept of climatic globality that emerged as broken, through a humanity powerless to 
repair it. The transition of climatic globality from climate change, to its incorporation 
into the Anthropocene, will be made in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has continued the genealogical analysis of climatic globality undertaken in 
this thesis. Grounded upon a nuclear problematique, and the practice of GCM 
simulations, it detailed how the late-1980s saw the formation of the IPCC, and the 
emergence of a ‘global climate’ within institutions and discourses of governance. The 
chapter argued that this concept of a global climate was rendered thinkable through a 
new and implicit rationality of powerlessness. This is a way of thinking and cognising 
the global climate only as a congenital problem, needing to be fixed and overcome. This 
also raised the Sisyphean question of whether it is possible to fix, heal, or correct the 
damage done to a concept that, at its core, is always already broken. The common claim 
that “Climate change is a global issue that requires global response. . . . [It] is a classic 
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global commons problem” (Xinyuan 2010, 622-623), is found, therefore, to be 
supported by the same failures it aims to avoid.  
 
When IR’s histories mention the testimony of James Hansen to the US senate in 1988, 
two relevant facts of his testimony are typically omitted. First, Hansen was not simply a 
NASA scientist, but he was a climate modeller. Second, President Bush’s response to 
Hansen is overlooked, but it is particularly apposite for the argument of this chapter: 
“Those who think we're powerless to do anything about the ‘greenhouse effect’ are 
forgetting about the ‘White House effect’” Bush proudly proclaimed. “'In my first year 
in office, I will convene a global conference on the environment at the White House . . . 
We will talk about global warming . . . And we will act” (NYT 1989). Yet, as this 
chapter has argued, the concept of the ‘greenhouse effect’ was itself comprised of 
powerlessness. When it comes to the globality of climate change, therefore, every 
explicit failure –from levels of the self, to regimes of global governance and COP21 – 
justifies its continued existence and elaboration, whilst also demanding and eliciting 
further conducts and behaviors oriented by this shared concept. It is therefore a global 
government, steering thought and subjectivity by, and through, failure. 
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Chapter 6 – The Anthropocene’s Emergence:  
A Global Biopolitics of Carbon1 
 
“…disturbing the climate inevitably means disturbing all components of the Earth system.”  
(C. Hamilton 2015, 34) 
 
“Take away our ability to shape the environment, and human civilization becomes meaningless. A degree 
of control over the environment is what distinguishes civilizations from hunter-gatherer societies, and we 
clearly cannot afford to let it go”. 
(Friedrichs 2013, 172) 
 
 
 
After the concept of anthropogenic global climate change entered the geopolitical arena 
in the late 1980s, its spread spurred a transformation in both the natural and the social 
sciences. This thesis has thus far interpreted the conceptual preparation of, and 
foundation for, this transformation in our current understanding of globality: its 
underlying nuclear problematique (chapter 3); its practice of conceptualising Nature 
through computer simulations (chapter 4); and the rationality of powerlessness and 
congenital failure rendering it thinkable (chapter 5). This chapter explores the concept 
that recently emerged from the overlapping of this problem, practice, and rationality of 
climatic globality: the Anthropocene. 
 
At the turn of the millennium, climate science and policy had “turned the physics of the 
atmosphere and ocean into a multifaceted picture of the Earth system” (Feichter and 
Gramelsberger 2011, 8). The concept of global climate change had reframed the world 
as a single nexus or locale for integrated and interwoven human activity. From this new 
picture, the notion that “Earth as a whole is responsive to this planet-scaled social 
system” gained new resonance and appeal (Clark 2016, 129). Or, as phrased in 
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter appeared in Hamilton, S. (2016). The measure of all things? The Anthropocene 
as a global biopolitics of carbon. European Journal of International Relations (online: DOI: 
10.1177/1354066116683831)., pp. 1-25. 
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discourses of IR, in the 1990s climate change became “a production problem in the 
making of a new world” (Dalby 2013, 38), a world where “humanity is literally making 
its future, not protecting a given context” or background of sovereign state systems, 
unaffected by global or transnational problems (2013, 46). In the year 2000, rather than 
only climate change, humanity was thus making all of Nature itself.  
 
Scientists and physicists sounded the alarm. They proclaimed that “‘business-as-usual’ 
cannot continue. We are passing into a new phase of human experience and entering a 
new world that will be qualitatively and quantitatively different from the one we have 
known” (Steffen et al. 2011, 756). Indeed, “humanity has become a geophysical force 
on par with the earth-shattering asteroids and planet-cloaking volcanoes that defined 
past eras” (Vince 2014, 5). “Earth is now a human planet.”  
 
Today, therefore, it is common to read that IR must rethink its foundational categories 
and definitions, reconceptualising how the political, the social, the ecological, and the 
international, constitutes this “relatively recent” social fact of an entwined human-
planetary globality (van Munster and Sylvest 2016, 4). Scholars now declare that, “At its 
most basic, this means that our fundamental image of the world must be revolutionised. 
Our existence is neither international nor global, but planetary” (Burke et al. 2016, 504). 
This supposed transformation into a new world of human mastery is captured by a 
slogan now common in IR and the social sciences: “Welcome to the Anthropocene!” 
(Dalby 2013b, 5; Economist 2011). 
 
First outlined by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer in 2000 
(Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002), the Anthropocene has since fostered 
boisterous debates amongst natural and social scientists alike (see Galaz 2015). The 
concept describes a geologic epoch that is so transformed by humanity’s impact on the 
Earth’s natural systems that it is stratigraphically distinct from the previous 11,700 years 
of its stable Holocene precursor. This means that humanity has forever etched itself in 
stone and ice within sediments of the Earth (Barry and Maslin 2016). However, this 
chapter aims to problematize the common claim that, in this Anthropocene epoch, the 
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human species is a geophysical force so masterful that it can ‘make’ Nature and “choose 
the future of our planet” (Vince, 2014). Instead, it argues that the Anthropocene is not a 
human-made epoch at all. Interpreting the Anthropocene genealogically, it emerges 
from the past problematiques, practices, and rationalities of climate change to constitute 
a new and global form of biopolitics. It governs humans implicitly through the 
calculation and politicization of the essence of all life: the carbon atom.  
 
Declarations that humanity ‘makes’ Nature in the Anthropocene, therefore, illustrate an 
anthropocentric subjectivism that goes to the heart of this thesis. Upon inspection, 
claims that humanity has become a “force of nature” or the most integral component of 
the Earth system – “the reality that human action and Earth dynamics have converged 
and can no longer be seen as belonging to distinct incommensurable domains” (C. 
Hamilton et al. 2015, 3) – are here problematised. It is argued that they delimit and 
structure thought so as to privilege the human subject over all else, by conceptualizing 
and inserting carbon – the essence of all life, and the human – at every spatial and 
temporal scale, ranging from the atomic to the global, and from the transitory human 
lifespan and world, to Nature’s geologic epochs. Ultimately, in the subjectivism of the 
Anthropocene, Nature is humanized and becomes mortal. Seeing carbon everywhere, 
the human also projects and sees itself. 
 
What emerges from this anthropocentric gaze is an implicit political rationality. As 
outlined in chapter two, it is a new form of global governmentality. It moves beyond the 
scope of liberal or statist modes of governmentality, by coupling the carbon atom and 
the human self to the physics of ESS models and computer simulations. This new 
physics thus correlates with what this chapter calls ‘relationality’, or a technological 
metaphysics in which all beings and referents are cognized through an endless and 
ongoing carbonic relation to anthropos, the human being. Hence the ‘illusion’ in the 
Anthropocene that, as Heidegger presciently phrased it (1977a, 27), ‘It seems as though 
man everywhere and always encounters only himself.’ Indeed, claims that “We are the 
first to knowingly reshape the living earth’s biology and chemistry. We have become the 
masters of our planet and integral to the destiny of life on Earth” (Vince 2014, 7) do not 
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illustrate actual planetary stewardship, nor humility. Rather, they belie a subjectivist 
relationality, grounded upon a biopolitics of carbon. As the Anthropocene emerged in 
2000 as the apex of previous climatic globalities, it simultaneously positioned the 
human subject as the maker and measure of all things. 
 
This argument will be made in three steps. First, this chapter will review how the 
Anthropocene is used in IR, outlining the new forms of Earth system governance and 
planetary politics presently being theorised in response to it. Although scholars differ 
greatly in their recommendations, the Anthropocene itself is generally taken for granted 
as the anticipated, inevitable, or future-reality of international and global politics. A 
thorough or sustained critique of this concept is thus warranted.  
 
Secondly, this chapter explores how these discourses claim to ‘make’ Nature in the 
Anthropocene, using the philosophies of Arendt and Foucault. Interpreting the 
technologies and physics of the Anthropocene using Arendt’s tripartite ‘human 
condition’ and Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, reveals how new forms of thought and 
conduct grounded upon the carbon atom have emerged in Anthropocene discourses.  
 
Third, it explores how the incorporation of carbon within GCMs in fields of nuclear and 
climate science ultimately facilitated today’s rise of today’s Earth system science (ESS) 
and the Anthropocene. Integrating these steps, this chapter concludes by linking the 
philosophical foundations of Arendtian and Foucauldian biopolitics, with the planetary 
and technological metaphysics of Heidegger. Doing so reveals the Anthropocene as a 
global biopolitics of carbon, in which the human self is always already projected and 
related to every thinkable referent, at every scale and temporality. This is the new 
metaphysic or rationality of ‘subjectivist relationality’ that shapes our everyday and 
present thought. The remaining chapters of this thesis will explore this subjectivist 
relationality, through the topics of temporality (chapter 7), and the connection of 
security to concepts of entanglement (chapter 8).  
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Welcome Home, Anthropos? 
 
Declared from the echelons of the natural sciences, recent human interference with the 
Earth’s systems has interrupted the operation of geophysical processes and cycles. This 
has created an unprecedented uncertainty concerning the capacity of the Earth to sustain 
humanity’s encroachment (Biermann 2007). Hence, the Anthropocene, our new human-
made epoch, ends the Holocene epoch of the preceding 10-12 millennia. It is a massive 
and complex concept aimed at highlighting humanity’s deleterious impacts upon the 
Earth’s natural systems. It is generally understood in three ways: First, as a new 
stratigraphic interval in Earth’s geological history (i.e. geologists in the distant future 
will be able to discern planetary-wide changes captured in volumes of rock, ice, or 
sediment that are attributable to the human species alone); second, as a shift of the entire 
Earth system from its stable Holocene state of the past 11,700 years – within which 
humanity has flourished – into a new and unstable Anthropocene state of uncertainty; 
and third, as a “threshold marking a sharp change in the relationship of humans to the 
natural world” (C. Hamilton et al. 2015, 3).  
 
The concept of the Anthropocene thus upsets the classical (meta)theoretical assumptions 
of IR and its billiard-ball models of states and international systems. No longer 
assuming a stable environment as its background context, it encourages IR scholars to 
question how statist ontologies and their concomitant Western and Enlightenment 
epistemological binaries of human/nature, inside/outside, and subject/object, operate 
within a transforming Earth system (see Fagan 2016; Harrington 2016). IR, therefore, 
must either reorient its focus on national and international institutions towards a form of 
planetary stewardship and Earth system governance (Biermann 2012), or it must aim at 
a radical new form of planet politics. “Geopolitics can now no longer take the context of 
the human drama for granted; transformations are afoot that are of humanity’s own 
making” (Burke et al. 2016, 510). 
 
Despite being silent in the 2000s, IR is now taking the Anthropocene’s transnational 
scope and dire warnings of global catastrophic transformations in Earth systems, very 
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seriously. “Given the recent and uneven intellectual history of environmental IR,” notes 
Harrington (2016, 486), “the emergence of the Anthropocene concept is a watershed 
moment for IR scholars”. Why? Its emergence is assumed to end the old, traditional 
‘world’ of international relations in which Nature was the stable, everyday background 
context for state-centric international and security problematiques of Cold War power 
politics (see Deudney 1990). In the Anthropocene, the logics and ontologies of states are 
transcended by a planetary-wide crisis operating at unprecedented spatial, temporal and 
even existential scales. In response, novel patchworks of global (environmental) 
governance are already altering the ‘structural geography’ of international relations 
(Pattberg and Widenberg 2015).  
 
Through the Anthropocene’s (supposed) disruption of the “ontological dualism between 
human and nature that drags with it so much environmental damage” (Harrington 2016, 
488), scholars generally agree that IR must evolve, although they differ on how and in 
what direction. On the one hand, some advocate managing or governing the planet as a 
whole through an interdisciplinary or holistic type of collaboration and change research, 
with “engaged analysts” working and flowing between the natural and social sciences 
(Castree 2014; Pattberg and Widenberg 2015; Biermann 2012, 2014). These 
perspectives embrace computerized models and metrics of the natural sciences to 
converse with, combine, or reform governance institutions in ways suited to the 
Anthropocene’s globalised topology.  
 
On the other hand, many IR scholars suspect that these planetary governance institutions 
act as Trojan Horses for the same statist/dualist binaries that corrupted the environment 
in the old-fashioned realpolitik style of IR. They retain and exacerbate the same 
human/Nature and ontological and epistemological divides that IR must now transcend 
(Lövbrand et al. 2016). For this group, “International Relations, as both a system of 
knowledge and institutional practice, is undone by the reality of the planet”, because the 
Anthropocene “forces an ontological shift: human activity and nature are so bound 
together that they are existentially indistinguishable,” making a singular “social nature” 
(Burke et al. 2016, 501, 510). To put it bluntly, “IR is a malevolent ghost of the 
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planetary real” (2016, 512). A third group of scholars remains hesitant to take sides. 
Although acknowledging its dangers, Fagan notes that the Anthropocene promotes 
understandings of security and the environment that are always already co-constitutive 
and entangled. This causes human/culture binaries to be present and enacted through 
any discussion of the environment and/or security, thereby removing the critical 
potential of analyses invoking environmental security to think differently (Fagan 2016).  
 
Yet, all of this IR scholarship shares the same basic assumption that the concept of ‘the 
Anthropocene’ is, in some form or another, an impending reality; a scientific fact, and 
an inevitable future for IR and the planet. It is thus assumed as the new and self-evident 
background condition that humanity and international politics will soon, and must, 
engage. Literature either focuses on the potential effects or transformations engendered 
by the Anthropocene upon politics and subjectivity in the present, or it theorizes new 
forms of international, global, or planetary politics demanded by the Anthropocene in 
the future. Quite uniformly, however, concepts borrowed from the theoretical physics 
and modelling simulations comprising the Anthropocene – such as GCMs, and the 
‘planetary boundaries’ model (Rockström et al. 2009. See below) – are used and 
celebrated without questioning how these concepts and their implicit boundaries emerge 
in the Earth system sciences (ESS), and thus how they may subsequently orient the 
thought and conduct of IR theorists when they are imported and invoked without 
question. 
 
For instance, Biermann (2014, 34) notes how “The core idea of the concept of earth 
system boundaries is quantification and (increasing) precision”. He asserts, therefore, 
that “While the concept of earth system boundaries is normatively neutral, its 
implementation is not” (2014, 34). Likewise, even the self-proclaimed “manifesto” of 
Planet Politics dedicates a large section towards praising the advantages of using ESS 
over IR. Through ESS, “We have moved past debating the truth of global climate 
change and its prevention to having to think about how we are going to live in the world 
we have created” (Burke et al. 2016, 505). However, as this chapter argues, embracing 
quantified scientific boundaries as the basis for concepts that are rendered thinkable only 
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through GCMs and ESS models, is not a neutral practice. Rather, quantification allows 
us to think and imagine some things, but it brackets the possibility of thinking others. 
When IR scholars unquestioningly adopt and incorporate these ESS concepts into their 
work and thought, what is not amenable to its style of mathematical projection and 
calculation is subtly concealed or bracketed (also, see chapters four and five).  
 
Without being able to sense and construct a political and public world, and instead being 
entirely reliant upon ESS concepts rendered thinkable only through supercomputers, a 
mathematised and calculatory rendering of objective reality results. With only 
theoretical physics delimiting this new ‘world’ for IR, there is no option but for the 
Cartesian self – i.e. the ‘I’ as the locus of self-certainty – to assume centrality. It “puts 
man back once more—and now even more forcefully—into the prison of his own mind, 
into the limitations of the patterns he himself created” (Arendt 1998, 288). How does 
this process of subjectification occur? It is now to what underpins both ESS and 
planetary boundaries in the Anthropocene – carbon and climate change – that this 
chapter turns. 
 
From Climate Change to the ‘Making’ of Nature  
 
Whether it is the planetary boundaries model, the natural or social sciences, studies of 
global change, or IR, “Climate change gets prominent mention in the literature of the 
Anthropocene” (Burke et al. 2016, 511). In common parlance, it is the leading 
representative, the driving force, the “most comprehensive token of this entanglement” 
of natural and social processes visible today (Hastrup 2013, 1). In other words, it is rare 
to read about the Anthropocene without it being situated in discourses of global climatic 
change. As noted in chapter 5, it was this notion of a failing or broken climate that 
prepared the conceptual grounds for the Anthropocene we know today. “The idea of 
global climate being nudged into an alternative state by human impacts [were] extended 
beyond climate to encompass the Earth system in its entirety” (Clark 2016, 132). 
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As noted in chapter 3, prior to inventing the Anthropocene in 2000, Paul J. Crutzen was 
an atmospheric scientist that pioneered the popular concept of global climatic nuclear 
winter (Crutzen and Birks 1982). Indeed, he later defined the Anthropocene from its 
outset as emerging on similar climatic terms, through a globality of catastrophe made 
traceable through GCMs and carbon: “Because of these anthropogenic emissions of 
carbon dioxide” starting from the industrial revolution, he wrote, the “global climate 
may depart significantly from natural behavior” (2002, 23).  
 
Likewise, another pioneer in Anthropocene studies, Will Steffen, celebrated that the 
Anthropocene emerged from decades of research in the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme (IGBP) and partner programmes of the World Climate Research 
Programme (WCRP), the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global 
Environmental Change (IHDP), and an international programme engaging biodiversity 
science called DIVERSITAS, by asserting its climatic roots: “The origins of the concept 
[global change] are largely derived from the careful and consistent measurement of 
atmospheric CO2 concentration at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii”, because 
these observations “first demonstrated beyond a doubt that human activities can have 
direct global-scale consequences for the environment” (Steffen et al. 2004, 4). Here, the 
rationalities and technologies that brought global climate change into being – 
subjectively, socially, scientifically, and politically – formed the basis for studies of 
Earth systems, global change, and the Anthropocene, that IR embraces today. After the 
year 2000, it became commonsensical that disturbing the climate meant disturbing the 
Earth system. “By the same logic, awareness of the need to prevent anthropogenic 
activity from pushing climate into a danger zone of potentially abrupt climate change 
was shortly extrapolated to the other major components of the Earth system” (Clark 
2016, 132).  
 
Importantly, it should be noted that the Anthropocene is not solely climatic nor limited 
to carbon dioxide (Steffen et al. 2004, 7). It now encompasses ecological and 
biogeophysical cycles of nitrogen, phosphorus, water, agriculture, urbanization, and so 
on. The point, however, is that even seventeen years after the invention of the 
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Anthropocene by Crutzen, it remains fixated to, and grounded upon, global climatic 
change. We know of the Anthropocene primarily “from scientific labours in fields such 
as climate science” (Wark 2015, 120; Clark 2016). Yet, the concept’s multidisciplinary 
appeal now stems from a broad and inclusive scope that has assimilated climatic 
globality, and moved beyond it into a broader Earth science and Global Change studies 
(Steffen et al. 2004). To think about the Anthropocene, therefore, is now “to think 
together Earth processes, life, human enterprise and time into a totalizing framework” 
(Hamilton et al. 2015, 2). If this is the case, then what is the best way to problematise 
and analyse the concept of the Anthropocene?  
 
With anthropogenic global climate change forming its discursive background, it remains 
commonplace to hear that the Anthropocene is now ‘made’ by humans as well. For 
instance, Wark notes how this human-made epoch results from selfish, neoliberal 
material consumption: “The Anthropocene is a series of metabolic rifts, where one 
molecule after another is extracted by labour and technique to make things for humans” 
(2015, xiv). However, there is another more common framing of human ‘making’ in the 
Anthropocene that is (philosophically) much more problematic, and is the focus of this 
chapter.  
 
As noted above, today the Anthropocene is framed in terms of normative responsibility 
and political and geophysical destiny. It is an epoch made by, and thus chosen or 
decided by, humanity. Acknowledging the Anthropocene as the new age of humanity is 
“precisely to make it clear that the planet’s ecosystems, and possibly its global climate 
too, have been in part a human artifact” (Dalby 2014, 5). Indeed, to take a recent and 
notable example from IR: 
 
…to call present circumstances the Anthropocene means to 
‘ontologically foreground’ the geophysical scale of human agency in the 
biosphere; . . . Nature is being dramatically reshaped by social actions 
so problems of democratic representation now take on even deeper 
importance: who decides how nature is to be remade, what the future 
human condition is to be?  
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(Burke et al. 2016, 512) 
 
Claims and comments like these are now common in literature across IR and the social 
and natural sciences. It has become normal to read that the Anthropocene designates 
humanity as makers and masters of Nature, and thus reconstitutes or recalibrates our 
very ‘human condition’ (Hamilton et al. 2015; Grove 2015). This begs important 
questions, however, that scholars embracing ‘the Anthropocene’ do not ask. What is it to 
‘make’ something? What does it mean to ‘make’ Nature, the climate, and/or the human 
condition, in the Anthropocene?  
 
Upon examination, the ease and frequency with which these claims are made perhaps 
reveals more about how the Anthropocene orients our own political subjectivity and 
rationality, than it does about Nature, the planet, or our modern geological epoch. 
Indeed, Clark has recently and astutely noted that “progressive thinking” around the 
Anthropocene and its supposed rupturing of subject/object and culture/Nature binaries 
makes “co-enactment or mutual entanglement the order of the day (Clark 2016, 134. See 
chapter 8). So, rather than take the normative implications of ‘making Nature’ at face 
value and proceed to examine the future ethical conundrums raised by the Anthropocene 
(see Zylinska 2014), the key becomes asking how these assumptions and claims are even 
possible.  
 
As Foucault phased it, this is to analyse how one governs themselves and others through 
the truths produced and concretised in particular problems, and made intelligible 
through practices such as the ESS (2002d, 230). In the case of the problem of the 
Anthropocene, therefore, this is accomplished not by debating the accuracy of the 
sciences behind it, nor by calling for a more noble form of politics. It is by examining 
the conceptual and philosophical foundations that make claims to ‘make Nature’ 
commonsensical and thinkable today.  
 
Philosophical foundations are important. They ground our thinking and Being in the 
world. Reflecting upon Nature and the human condition, Arendt established ‘making’ as 
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an integral component of human life, world, and Earth (1998). As discussed in chapter 
2, the human condition refers not to any universal or immutable human nature. “Men are 
conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into 
a condition of their existence” (Arendt 1998, 9). In this sense, at first, the world appears 
to be whatever humans ‘make’ of it. Yet, this worldly conditioning can never become, 
replace or determine Nature itself. The capability to condition or understand the totality 
of Nature lies always outside of human comprehension, because whatever ‘Nature’ is, it 
is always preceded by a pre-reflective and social worldly reality that conditions and 
gives formative rise and boundaries to every thought. Even with advancements in 
natural science, therefore, it is unlikely that “we, who can know, determine, and define 
the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able 
to do the same for ourselves—this would be like jumping over our own shadows” (1998, 
10, 298).  
 
Interestingly in the case of the Anthropocene, this means that our human world can 
never ‘condition’ us so absolutely that it becomes symbiotic with, makes, or 
overpowers, Nature. The human can make things from Nature, but cannot make Nature 
itself; humanity stands always apart. Why?  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the vita activa is what orients the elemental capacity of all 
humans to engage in labour, work, and action. It frames the innumerable patterns and 
combinations of human subjectivity and political possibility across human history. By 
tracing Western political thought from the ancient Greeks to modernity, Arendt stresses 
that homo faber (i.e. the human maker) is antithetical to the biological cycles and 
processes of Nature. ‘Making’ involves the construction of artifices from the materials 
of nature, so as to build a shared human world of artifacts where politics, culture, and 
action, may then occur. Thus, making always does ‘violence’ to Nature by removing its 
materials from the timeless and cyclical biological and geological processes of the 
Earth. This makes a world of finite things and artifacts that gives brief respite to mortal 
human lives amidst an otherwise infinite and immortal Nature. Imbedded “in a cosmos 
where everything is immortal except themselves”, it is only homo faber’s making of 
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artifacts that can “guarantee the permanence and durability without which a world 
would not be possible at all” (1998, 94). When compared to the circular and eternal 
recurrence of Nature, therefore, a world human-made is finite, and like human life, 
rectilinear. Humanity, and its artifacts, thus cannot be combined nor conflated with 
Nature. Ironically, the 1987 Brundtland Report, ‘Our Common Future’ – a precursor for 
the IPCC, UNFCCC, and global environmental politics writ large – was incidentally 
correct regarding this matter: “The Earth is one but the world is not”, it wrote (WCED 
1987, 27). The world is one of finitude and particularity, or, what humans can make 
from the Earth. 
 
When considering the Anthropocene, however, instead of homo faber using Nature to 
make a world, Nature itself becomes human-made. Again, citing Wark (2015, 169): 
“collective human labour is causing climate change . . . [and] In the Anthropocene, some 
neutral, pre-given planetary nature is no longer available as a fiction of the real. We 
fucked it up”. Or, as Dalby (2013a, 185) phrases it for IR (in a less incendiary tone): ‘the 
Anthropocene suggests very clearly that the future of the biosphere is an open question: 
what kind of nature gets produced is now the political question of our times’ (2013, 
185). Here, it appears at first that the Anthropocene fosters humility by asking what type 
of a planet, biosphere, Nature, or epoch, humanity is now ‘making’. However, the 
relationship between biological and natural cycles, and the constitution of human 
subjectivity through the vita activa, is here ignored or simply forgotten. Nature is no 
longer out of bounds for the human world, and this has important effects upon how we 
think of Nature – subjectively and objectively – in the Anthropocene today.  
 
As will be explored below, asserting that we as humans now make Nature, does not 
foster self-reflection, nor reconcile humanity with an Anthropocene ethics of 
entanglement. Instead, it belies and exemplifies an implicit celebration of the human 
subject as lord and master of Nature and the Earth.   
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Science, Rationality, and Biopower: A Biopolitics of Carbon 
 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality was outlined in chapter 2 as the ability to shape 
and delimit the forms of truth and knowledge constituting subjectivity. By orienting how 
the “conduct of conduct” is thought, the possibilities for action(s), are likewise 
determined.  
 
Whilst theorizing global (environmental) politics in IR, many scholars have also 
recently turned from governmentality to the analytics of biopolitics (Foucault 1990; 
2003; 2007; 2008). Taken literally, the Greek prefix bios implies that bio-politics is a 
politics of life. Since the late 1970’s, the use of Foucault’s concept of “a biopolitics of 
the human race” (2003, 243) has been used in a wide variety of disciplines and contexts, 
and is increasingly theorized in conflicting or even contradictory ways (Lemke 2011, 
xi). Rather than explore differing accounts of biopolitics made by theorists such as 
Agamben on thanatopolitics, or Hardt and Negri on biopotenza (for an overview, see 
Coleman and Grove 2009; Esposito 2008), this chapter elaborates and extends the 
globality of biopolitics as framed by Foucault, Arendt, and Heidegger.  
 
It is worth reviewing here that for Foucault, biopolitics emerged in the 15th and 16th 
centuries during the transformation of Western political reason identified in this thesis as 
the Cartesian Moment. It was a technology of power that redefined how humans lived in 
a polity. To instill order within a territory, human bodies were no longer placed under 
the sovereign power of a King as subjects, or under the legal and juridical power of 
canonical law. With the emergence of biopower, social order could be instilled through 
a “power that take[s] control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken 
control of life in general—with the body as one pole and the population as the other” 
(Foucault 2003, 253). Applying strategies of calculation – derived from the natural 
sciences and physics of the time – to a seemingly chaotic flux of human bodies, this 
population arithmetic or ‘statistics’ was found capable of measuring and describing 
patterns of life operating within the polity: birth and death rates, health and illness, and 
so on. This biopower disclosed norms and standards through which authorities and 
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individual subjects could then govern themselves and others without applying violence 
or direct force (Foucault 2003: 253, 243; 2002d).  
 
As noted in chapter 2, this practice of rendering biopower thinkable through statistical 
calculations became essential for biopolitics and governmentality analytics in IR today 
(Busse 2015). It is thus typical to read that biopolitics is “a form of politics entailing the 
administration of the processes of life of populations” (Dean 2010, 117), or that it 
“refers to the emergence of a specific political knowledge and new disciplines, such as 
statistics, demography, epidemiology, and biology” (Lemke 2011, 5). In sum, it is 
assumed in IR that the statistical and biopolitical discovery of the population allowed 
the concept of ‘society’ to emerge (Neumann and Sending 2010, 41, 12; see also Dalby 
2013a, 186).  
 
Chapter 2 also argued that biopolitics and governmentality remain framed through the 
same basic rationalities and concepts originally used by Foucault in his analysis of 
early-modern natural sciences. Although the theoretical physics and scientific processes 
undergirding global climate change and the Anthropocene have long since changed from 
Foucault’s analysis of the population arithmetic of the physiocrats, the correlation of 
these new ESS physics with conduct and rationality today, remains unexamined. If 
indeed physics is the permanent correlative of politics (Foucault 2008), then we must 
now inquire into how the Anthropocene is made thinkable through these sciences and 
the physics of ESS. It is in this bottom-up approach that new forms of governmentality 
or biopolitics may emerge from Anthropocene discourses.  
 
With this goal in mind, this chapter turns now to how the technological rationality 
underlying GCMs, ESS, and computer simulation models – the concepts and sciences 
which IR scholars have now taken for granted in ‘the Anthropocene’ – are assumed to 
‘make Nature’ and its new human world. 
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The Carbon Atom in IR: ‘Making’ the Golden Spike 
 
Carbon is the building block of every single organic molecule on earth. It is the atomic 
and biochemical foundation of all life (Lövbrand and Stripple 2006). “Its atom acts like 
a neatly symmetrical tetrahedron that can link up with other atoms in an almost infinite 
variety of forms”, releasing energy stored within carbon molecules through processes 
such as burning and metabolism (Young 1977, 65). With every breath that humans and 
animals exhale, we emit carbon dioxide from the molecular metabolism of our food. 
“Even the earth itself breathes out carbon dioxide; large amounts are emitted in every 
volcanic eruption” (Young 1977, 65). As carbon dioxide is returned to the atmosphere, 
and carbon is distributed and absorbed by the Earth’s oceans, biosphere, and geosphere 
in a global cycle, carbon atoms will “flit back and forth between plants, soil, air and 
water for approximately 100,000 years” before returning to rock or sediment (Boyle and 
Ardill 1989, 22).  
 
Like Nature and the human body, discourses of global climate change and the 
Anthropocene are also driven by carbon. When discussing the Anthropocene, “the CO2-
climate connection is now so well entrenched in public consciousness that it is often 
regarded as the single greatest environmental threat to the future well-being of 
humankind” (Raupach and Canadell 2010, 210). Carbon has become the representative, 
or “shortchange”, for all greenhouse gases (GHGs) now causing global climate change 
(Methmann and Stephann 2015). The point here is that carbon – the atom of all life – is 
absolutely central to humanity, climate change, and the Anthropocene’s recent 
emergence as a planetary phenomenon. In IR, “Climate politics is obsessed with carbon. 
. . . Climate politics is essentially carbon politics” (Methmann and Stephann 2015, 282). 
Likewise, climate science is essentially carbon science.  
 
There exists a growing literature on ways that carbon is brought into being today 
through climate governmentalities (Lövbrand and Stripple 2011; Stripple and Bulkeley 
2014), practices of calculation, ordering, and accounting (Lövbrand and Stripple 2006; 
Gupta et al. 2012; Dahan 2010), the shaping and conducting individual and collective 
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carbon subjectivities (Paterson and Stripple 2010; 2012; Rutland and Aylett 2008), 
territorialisation and governance through local, national, and trans-national mechanisms 
(Boyd 2010; Rice 2010; Methmann 2012), and even through imaginaries of planetary 
catastrophe (De Goede and Randalls 2009). Yet this chapter differs from these accounts 
by seeking the scientific and technological rationality underpinning them. In doing so, it 
avoids the applicationist tendencies of governmentality in IR to reduce every ‘thing’ to 
an outward manifestation of neoliberal conduct.  
 
For instance, although Methmann and Stephann (2016) highlight the importance of the 
carbon atom to whilst discussing a “carbon governmentality”, they do not question any 
of the ESS and GCM frameworks underpinning their use and engagement of carbon. Its 
incorporation into climate and Anthropocene discourses is once again treated as a self-
evident scientific fact.  
 
In brief, these authors assert that carbon is: first, a global phenomenon that is managed 
through the UNFCCC or IPCC through a “God’s eye perspective” akin to biopolitical 
management (2016, 286); second, that carbon’s “atomization” is clearly indicative of 
neoliberal governmentalities introducing market mechanisms to govern its global reach, 
through protocols such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol or carbon trading schemes (2016, 
287). In a similar vein, the recent Planet Politics manifesto also reifies the science of the 
ESS in order to critique IR: “Its analytical breadth and methodologies underpins much 
of climate science, and now issues a profound warning to global institutions – if they are 
in any mind to hear” (2016 Burke et al., 505). In short, according to these authors, 
without ESS the discipline of IR can no longer analyse nor respond to “the evolving 
planetary real” (2016, 505). Yet, what the ESS is, and how it brings carbon into being, is 
unexamined and assumed to be self-evident.      
 
Although the Anthropocene is comprised of much else besides carbon (Steffen et al. 
2004; also, see above), an entry point into the rationality underpinning carbon and ESS 
is visible in the recent debate over its formal stratigraphic boundary. This boundary 
marks the first noticeable changes recorded in the planet’s stratographic sections of rock 
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and ice, and it is commonly known as a “golden spike” or GSSP (Global Boundary 
Stratotype Section and Point).1 In short, the Golden Spike Debate revolves around two 
camps: on the one hand, scientists that believe the Golden Spike must represent a 
transformation in the overall operation of global and planetary systems (C. Hamilton 
2016). On the other hand, are scientists that believe the Golden Spike must represent a 
uniform and global GSSP signal that covers the entire Earth uniformly, like a thin layer 
or blanket (Lewis and Maslin 2015). However, both sides of this debate highlight the 
centrality of the carbon atom and nuclear discourses in the scientific and political 
imaginaries of the Anthropocene, and each potential GSSP marker. 
 
For instance, when Crutzen first set-forth the concept (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000) he 
labeled the combustion of fossil fuel CO2 emissions at the beginning of the Industrial 
revolution, and the global fallout of radioactive nuclides of carbon-14 from atomic 
bomb tests in New Mexico in 1945, as the leading contenders for the GSSP spike of the 
Anthropocene. He later added the ‘Great Acceleration’ of industry and population 
booms after the Second World War (Crutzen 2002). In an article bridging both sides of 
the debate, Zalasiewicz et al. (2011) also asserts that “The chemical perturbation of 
carbon is probably the most important [chemostratigraphic marker], because of its 
potentially far-reaching, long term, and cascading consequences for the whole Earth 
system” (2011, 1041). Even more recently, Lewis and Maslin (2015) have identified 
1610 and 1964 as two globally synchronous markers for the golden spike. The former, 
1610, represents “the collision of the Old and New World” which resulted in the death 
of over 61 million people and a global decline in atmospheric CO2 of 7-10 ppm (parts 
per million) through the homogenisation of Earth’s biota; the latter date, 1964, 
represents atmospheric radionuclide carbon-14 fallout from the global peak of nuclear 
weapons testing. Tellingly, both of these proposed spikes are highly (bio)political in 
nature, ranging from imperial conquests, colonialism and genocide, to nuclear war and 
planetary extinction. Yet, both are always understood through carbon as the primary 
medium and measure.  
                                                        
1 The recent ‘golden spike’ debate and its relation to political temporality and eschatology is covered in 
greater detail in chapter 7. 
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From atmospheric CO2 levels to the nuclear fallout of carbon-14, therefore, the 
Anthropocene depends upon how the carbon atom is appropriated into local and global 
cycles. “From a practical viewpoint, a globally identifiable level is provided by the 
global spread of radioactive isotopes from the atomic bomb tests of the 1950s, but this 
event is considerably later than the onset of increased levels of anthropogenic gases 
resulting from industrial processes [i.e.CO2]” (Zalasiewicz et al. 2011, 1050). If carbon 
is the atom of life, and biopolitics explores how life is harnessed by political 
rationalities, then there exists a link here between scientific representations of Nature, 
carbon, and a new form of global (bio)politics that should be explored by disciplines 
such as IR. 
 
How does IR engage this debate? It channels and embraces the Anthropocene through 
the new and growing discipline of ESS (see Biermann 2014, 2007, 2012; Galaz 2015; 
Lövbrand et al. 2009). ESS aims to capture “the past and the future evolution of our 
planet” by coupling highly technical mathematical models of the Earth’s various 
systems together into integrated assessment models (IAMs), in a multidisciplinary type 
of “socioeconomic/climate integration” (Dahan 2010, 283). The aim of ESS is to 
combine the agency and worldliness of humanity, with the biogeochemical processes of 
the Earth. Its goal is to form “a holistic super-discipline that tries to embrace all 
processes in nature and society as one interlinked system” (Lövbrand et al. 2009, 8). 
Basically, it does so by integrating all of the Earth’s ‘spheres’ – from the biosphere and 
the atmosphere, to the magnetosphere and the cryosphere – and then computes how they 
interact with human society. This integration is calculated by parameterizing the Earth’s 
planetary and socio-economic processes, translating them into bounded and measurable 
variables to be modelled and combined. This computerized data, acquired through 
atmospheric, oceanic, and land models, is coupled together to shed light on the 
integrated functioning of the Earth’s systems. Through it, the “potential synergies 
between bio-physical and socio-economic trends becomes startlingly apparent” (Steffen 
et al. 2004, 6). At the shared conceptual root of climatic and Anthropocene globalities, 
therefore, are computerised simulations of Nature.  
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Recently, scholars of all theoretical dispositions commonly incorporate the 
Anthropocene and ESS into their literature through the popular ‘planetary boundaries’ 
model set forth by Johann Rockström (2009). The goal of the planetary boundaries 
model is to reveal “a safe operating space for humanity with respect to the functioning 
of the Earth System”, and it is rare to see a publication mentioning the Anthropocene 
that lacks mention of it (Rockström et al. 2009, 31. In IR, see Dalby 2014; Harrington 
2016; Burke et al. 2016; Biermann 2014). This framework ‘dovetails’ with both the 
Anthropocene’s and IR’s recent concerns of a total human-induced shift in the Earth 
system by stressing “the same basic idea: . . . the boundaries of the earth system that 
need to be observed in order to maintain the potential for human development and well-
being” (Biermann 2014, 33). In general, the planetary boundaries model integrates 
human society into the operation and stewardship of nine critical Earth ecosystem 
cycles, systems, processes, and thresholds. They are parameterized into control 
variables, which are then measured as nine boundaries (i.e. climate change, ocean 
acidification, stratospheric ozone, phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, atmospheric aerosols, 
freshwater use, land use change, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollution). Approaching 
boundary thresholds thereby foments catastrophe, and a “move into an undesired state 
for humanity on planet Earth” (Rockström 2010, 72). 
 
The planetary boundaries model has been critiqued for failing to succeed in its attempts 
to be explicitly incorporated into state policy and ‘summaries’ for policymakers in 
venues such as the IPCC (Dryzek et al. 2013, 115-116); amongst scientists for its 
questionable use of data and selection of boundaries (see Galaz, 2015); and for its 
anthropocentric celebration of “the human enterprise” as a Euro- and Western-centric 
imperial type of civilisation (Crist 2013). Yet, despite these critiques, the model has 
made a tremendous impact upon scholarly and public consciousness. It has become 
integral to political applications of the concept of the Anthropocene. Indeed, “While 
scientific interventions rarely are directly translated into policy interventions they do, 
however, produce ideas, concepts and tools that may affect how political life is 
understood and enacted” (Lövbrand and Linnér 2015, 45). Whether it is a reformed 
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Earth system governance or a paradigm-shifting type of planet politics, therefore, the 
idea and concept of the Anthropocene is now understood in IR through these quantified 
planetary boundaries of ESS. It is “rightly advanced as ‘a new paradigm that integrates . 
. . human societies and the maintenance of the Earth system”, that IR needs to adopt 
(Burke et al. 2015, 506). If, following Foucault, this type of Earth science is correlated 
with dominant political rationalities emerging from them – i.e. if its physics remains 
correlated with political rationality – then we must ask how the ESS shapes thinking 
concerning life and Nature in implicit ways perhaps taken-for-granted today. 
 
If humanity chooses to remain within its planetary boundaries, it safeguards life: “we 
give ourselves a long-term safe operating space for human development on Earth . . . 
providing ample opportunities to support long-term social and economic development in 
the world” (Rockström 2010, 73). Scholars have long argued that any such global limits, 
boundaries, or norms automatically elicit Foucauldian notions of disciplinary power and 
normalization (see Foucault 1979). For instance, Lövbrand et al. (2009, 10) argue that 
ESS reflects an “Earth System governmentality” that projects a new “world picture” to 
govern humanity in the Anthropocene. Planetary boundaries are here conceived as 
“efforts to monitor and manage the Earth System . . . shar[ing] characteristics with 
Jeremy Bentham’s design in the 1780s of a prison (the Panopticon) that enforces the 
expectation of a singular ‘eye of power’” through a totalizing global gaze (Lövbrand et 
al. 2009, 11). As Rockström et al. state, these boundaries do indeed determine the 
Earth’s “rules of the game” and “as it were, define the ‘planetary playing field’ for the 
human enterprise” (2009, online). Applying panoptic disciplinary power and norms here 
to ESS boundaries is indeed tempting, as chapter 4’s discussion of GCMs in the IPCC 
argued. Again, bordering on a top-down form of anti-universalism, “Rather than the 
view from nowhere”, notes Hulme, these “global kinds of knowledge claim to offer the 
view from everywhere”, thereby fostering “managerialism on a planetary scale” (2010, 
559, 561).  
 
Yet, to glimpse at ESS and its projection of planetary boundaries ‘safeguarding’ 
humanity, this attribution of panoptic or disciplinary rationalities once again runs the 
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risk of a top-down applicationism. With declarations from ESS that the goal is planetary 
stewardship, management, and to conceive of all life as one integrated system delineated 
within carefully monitored ‘safe operating spaces’, it no wonder that IR scholars 
translate these planetary boundaries into extensions of human agency at the global scale: 
“to make it clear that the planet’s ecosystems, and possibly its global climate too, have 
been in fact a human artifact” (Dalby 2014, 5). Instead, understanding how ESS ‘makes’ 
Nature thinkable for us, as quantified artifacts and rigid planetary boundaries, becomes 
crucial: through mathematical and computerized simulation models.  
 
Like the scientific processes operating in the Natural Law in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
today, these simulation models are “a manifestation of our scientific knowledge (or lack 
thereof) and our technical capacity in terms of modern computational science” (Verburg 
et al. 2016, 311). Everything we know about the climate, global cycles, Earth systems, 
and hence the Anthropocene, we know only through these simulations computing 
unprecedented global scales and complexities.  
 
Further to this, the ESS and its planetary boundaries not only incorporate GCMs today, 
but developed directly from them as well. Not coincidentally, it was only beginning 
around 2000 that “the carbon cycle and its feedback on various environments, from the 
atmosphere to the ocean and to vegetation cover,” became a prominent component of 
coupled climate and biogeochemical models (Dahan 2010, 286). Here, Dahan (2010) 
has detailed how the international recognition of climate change in the 1990s fostered a 
“hybridization” of science and politics, leading to greater international pressures to both 
research, and to know, life at a global (climatic) levels. “In the 1990s, climate modeling 
underwent major transformations, increasingly linked to the emergence of the issue of 
climate change”, with the most prominent being “the acceleration of the so-called 
coupling activity and the integration within models of a growing number of 
environments” (2010, 283). From this, the climate system assimilated socio-economic 
spheres, along with the other ‘spheres’ of the Earth, into the Earth System. Hence, the 
simultaneous rise of discourses of the Anthropocene in 2000, and the incorporation of 
global carbon cycles into climate politics and regimes such as the Intergovernmental 
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Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) after 2000. Globalisation is here associated not simply 
with capital flows or neoliberalism, but with climate technologies and models 
combining so as to integrate society into the Earth system itself (Heymann 2010b, 593). 
Carbon is once again the medium here for life and politics. 
 
Indeed, prior to 2000, global carbon cycles were not a focus of the IPCC, nor climate 
change research. Yet after 2000, just as the Anthropocene was brought into being as a 
new human epoch, atoms of carbon were then able to be applied to these complex new 
couplings of global circulation models, which now had enough computational power to 
accurately link the Earth’s ‘spheres’ together. When these quantified projections of 
global carbon flows were then applied “to the living man, to man-as-living-being; 
ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species” (Foucault 2003, 242), then a new way of 
thinking and computing the physics of atmospheric fluid dynamics appears through 
Anthropocene discourses. What appears at first glance to be disciplinary power or a 
managerial panoptic gaze (see above), is actually buttressed and transcended by this 
coupling of global spheres and humanity together through, the tracing of atmospheric 
carbon. Not top-down, but also bottom-up, from the atomic scale. 
 
Contrary to Biermann’s claim that ESS and planetary boundaries are normatively 
neutral, therefore, here they bring Nature and life into thinkable being in very specific 
ways: as simultaneously atomic and global, through Earth System models, and through a 
coupling and fusion of socio-economic and climatic integration. This was the biological 
and organic version of carbon, as life, moving over the globe; equal in power to what 
had previously been considered as CO2 that was affecting the radiative forcing of the 
atmosphere. This new biological understanding of global carbon cycles has since caused 
“the processes of living matter and the question of carbon [to] have moved the goalposts 
and transformed the various debates” (Dahan 2010, 288). From the smallest of atomic 
scales to the most gigantic and complex of planetary processes, after 2000, humanity in 
the Anthropocene is homogenized and reconstituted as carbonic life – and with it, the 
entire Earth System is thus able to be placed in “a numerical box” (Dahan 2010, 291).  
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Through ESS and coupled GCMs, this is all blended together in a computerised form, 
calculating and quantifying itself alongside Earth and Nature “to the extent that they 
[humanity] form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes” 
(Foucault 2003, 242-3). This is a not a simple case of disciplinary or panoptic power, 
therefore. It is a new form of biopolitics, grounded not upon population or society, but 
upon the physics of calculating new thermodynamical and physical processes that 
capture life as mathematized, atomic, and global flows of carbon. 
 
Making Atoms: An Excess of Carbon and an Excess of Biopower 
 
As noted in chapter 3, the GCM models of today’s climate science were not originally 
developed to trace the carbon atom we are familiar with in climate or Anthropocene 
discourses. They were first developed after World War II to detect a special form of 
carbon that even Arendt declared was ‘made’ by humanity: radioactive isotopes of 
carbon, or the carbon-14 created in the fission process of atomic and nuclear bombs 
(Edwards 2010; 2012). This is an inorganic carbon of death. And yet, as Masco has 
illustrated (2010; 2016), tracking atomic fallout is what allowed the atmosphere and 
biosphere to emerge as a new type of global and ecological territory.  
 
As the so-called ‘Father’ of the atomic bomb, Robert Oppenheimer (1947, 55) wrote, 
“The interior of an exploding fission bomb is, so far as we know, a place without 
parallel elsewhere. . . In the crudest, simplest sense, it is quite true that in atomic 
weapons man has created novelty.” When it comes to carbon, the Anthropocene’s roots 
do not reside in its current assertions of making and mastering Nature so as to steward 
life. Rather, humanity’s real ‘making’ of Nature is on this atomic level, associated with 
the extinction of Earthly life from the most genocidal weaponry ever devised by 
humanity. “To our knowledge such things [the making of Nature] do not happen except 
in the atomic weapons we have made and used” (Oppenheimer 1946, 55). Tracing Earth 
systems to govern the Anthropocene, therefore, is an echo of tracing mushroom clouds.  
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According to a recent article in Science, the planetary and global spread of nuclear 
fallout from World War II and the nuclear bomb tests following it, are indeed “the most 
widespread and globally synchronous anthropogenic signal . . . [which] left a clear and 
global signature” upon the Earth. It disseminated radiocarbons identifiable for the next 
100,000 years across the sediment of the globe, marking the golden spike of the 
Anthropocene epoch (Waters et al., 2016: aad2622-5). Scientists now casually assert 
that “Like life, the Anthropocene is carbon-based”, although this carbon is actually 
inorganic, human-made, nuclear, and planetary in its scope (Raupach and Canadell 
2010, 211). Rather than a top-down or panoptic ESS, therefore, the rationality 
underpinning the science of the Anthropocene and planetary boundaries must include 
this “Bomb or ‘excess’ radiocarbon [which] provided the first highly effective way to 
trace the path of individual parcels of air at high altitudes” (Edwards 2010, 30). As ESS 
traces and integrates global cycles of organic, inorganic, and radionuclide carbon, it 
congeals into the integrated Earth systems of the Anthropocene as this ‘excess of 
carbon’. Carbon, quantified, as both life and death.  
 
With this thesis having traced the globality of climate change and the Anthropocene to 
nuclear discourses, GCMs, and the paradox of climatic knowledge as increasing 
inaction, then it should strike IR scholars that Foucault himself reflected on nuclear 
catastrophe, the atomic bomb, and radiocarbon fallout, as “a paradox” (2003, 253). 
Foucault’s paradox lies not in the fact that the atomic bomb can kill hundreds of 
millions of people, since “after all, that is traditional” or within the decision-making 
power of the sovereign. Instead, the biopolitical paradox of nuclear radiocarbon lies in 
the fact that “The power to manufacture and use the atom bomb represents the 
deployment of a sovereign power that kills, but it is also the power to kill life itself” 
(Foucault 2003, 253). Biopower is a power to utilize, steer, conduct, or safeguard life, 
but it is also the sovereign’s biopolitical right to kill at their own discretion. This new 
atomic power is thus an “extreme power” that suppresses, is antithetical to or “is in 
excess of biopower”. Atomic carbon is a re-making of life that, if let loose, eviscerates 
itself. It is an ‘entanglement’ of life and death. This paradox spurred Foucault to posit an 
“opposite extreme” comprised by excess carbon and atomic power, which presciently 
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reflects what we see before us in discourses of global climate change, the Anthropocene, 
and the planetary boundaries model of ESS: 
 
[It is] a biopower that is in excess of sovereign right. This excess of 
biopower appears when it becomes technologically and politically 
possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to 
create living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses 
that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive. This 
formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was just saying about 
atomic power, will put it beyond all human sovereignty.  
(Foucault 2003, 254) 
 
Foucault is not claiming that this ‘excess of biopower’ must be a virus on par with the 
mass death wrought by the atom bomb. Nor is he claiming that the state or its sovereign 
power will itself disappear, since “The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the 
mobile shape . . . [and] the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” 
(2008, 77). Instead, what this strange notion of an excess of biopower implies, is a 
power or form of life that overflows the technological and sovereign power and 
authority of the state, and even of atomic and human power, without (necessarily) 
destroying them nor being controlled by them. Contrary to the scientific processes 
delimited by Natural Law which led to the discovery of a predictable and cyclical 
biopower, this “excess of biopower” is different. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, 
nuclear physics (and the GCMs tracking the fallout of its bombs) could not be 
completed by hand, nor through numerical or statistical calculations. To be cognised and 
known, its processes required supercomputers to process and a rudimentary form of 
quantum science to theorize; both of which are far too complex and inconceivable to be 
grasped by the human mind and translated into speech, let alone be applied to politics. 
As a medium, they rely entirely on the application of physical and natural sciences such 
as ESS, and computerized simulations of Nature such as GCMs and IAMs, to enter 
thought as specific concepts. And so it is these concepts, as Foucault’s “excess of 
biopower”, or Edwards’ “excess of carbon”, that is now applied to international relations 
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today, as a carbon politics of the Anthropocene and its planetary boundaries (Dahan 
2010; Methmann and Stephan 2016).  
 
How can we grasp the physical processes that shape the boundaries of this new 
Anthropocene concept? Humanity claims to make Nature, and indeed, shares carbon as 
a substrate. This substrate is now rooted in the Anthropocene’s emergence in nuclear 
carbon, and its materialisation today through GCM supercomputers. This carbonic 
biopower thus reconstitutes the boundaries of the social, the political, the governmental, 
and the human world, from unprecedented spatiotemporal scales ranging from the 
atomic to the global. “All this is held together, though the matter of carbon. Carbon is 
the linchpin between the global and the local, between public and private, and between 
hierarchical, science-based management and the flexibility of markets” (Methmann and 
Stephann 2015, 288). This is a carbon that is both subjectifying and objectifying: the 
human being and all life is carbonic, and yet integrated into an incalculable globality of 
carbon flows, markets, cycles, and Earth systems. If biopolitics grasps at life, then this 
is, in other words, a global biopolitics of carbon.  
 
As Arendt predicted long ago when reflecting on nuclear weapons and atomic carbon, 
this technological rationality portrays a humanity and a biopower that will “no longer 
observe or take material from or imitate processes of nature but seem actually to act into 
it . . . to have carried irreversibility and human unpredictability into the natural realm” 
(1998, 235). Rather than protecting and repairing homo faber’s fabricated, human-made, 
rectilinear world of artifacts against an endless erosion from the eternal tides and cycles 
of Nature, “keeping them as far as possible outside the man-made world, [modern 
humans] have channeled these forces, along with their elementary power, into the world 
itself” (1998, 148-149). This is the world of the Anthropocene, where the human self 
reacts to this excess of incalculable scales and temporalities of carbon, by reflecting and 
turning inwards to itself. The carbonic subject is the only place where self-certainty 
remains, and it asserts that it retains some influence and control over Nature, by – for 
example – deciding what kind of life and planet to make as its master, steward, and its 
destiny (Dalby 2013a; 2013b). Hence, the Anthropocene epoch, the human age. 
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This chapter now moves on to describe how, through technological calculation and 
representation, this global biopolitics of carbon operates. Through the philosophy of 
Heidegger, it explores how carbonic biopolitical boundaries are delimited conceptually 
and spread globally, through a metaphysical and technological subjectivism. 
 
 The Carbon Subject(ivism) of the Anthropocene 
 
The carbon atom may be calculated, quantified, transferred, traced and even transformed 
in nuclear fusion or fission, but it cannot be created nor made by humankind. Rather, it 
moves only its form and location within the global carbon cycle. This is a natural 
process. “It is characteristic of all natural processes that they come into being without 
the help of man,” wrote Arendt, “and those things are natural which are not ‘made’ but 
grow by themselves into whatever they become” (1998, 150; Heidegger, 1977a, 10). 
This point bears repeating: Nature cannot be made by humans, only altered or 
transformed. To ‘make’ is to create an artifact from Nature by doing violence to it; and 
it then stands always against the eternal recurrence of Nature’s processes and cycles. 
This is the realm of homo faber.  
 
Yet, as noted above, scientists in the ESS (and now many IR scholars importing their 
concepts and frameworks) now confidently assert: “simply, the human enterprise is now 
a fully coupled, interacting component of the Earth System itself”. Natural processes are 
no longer outside of humanity’s reach. Sharing carbon as a substrate, all such processes, 
such as atmospheric and oceanic circulations, are made equal to “Prominent social 
processes [such as the] globalization of trade and finance and the rapid increase in 
communication, especially via the internet” (Steffen et al. 2011, 740; Steffen et al. 
2004).  
 
Sharing a conceptual and computerised cabonic physics, therefore, social and economic 
artifacts are made akin to natural processes, and vice-versa. As Lewis and Maslin have 
recently highlighted, the realisation of the Anthropocene has now reversed 500 years of 
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scientific discoveries  – from Copernicus decentering the Earth from the cosmos, to 
Darwin decentering the human species from the Great Chain of Being – each of which 
moved humans towards an increasing cosmological insignificance, with no special or 
God-like origin. Rather, if homo faber is Nature, and is also therefore able to ‘make’ 
Nature, then: 
 
In the 21st century, adopting the Anthropocene reverses this 
insignificance: humans are not passive observers of the Earth. Homo 
Sapiens are central because the future of the only place where life is 
known to exist is being determined by the actions of humans. In fact, we 
would argue that humanity has become a geological superpower. (Lewis 
and Maslin 2015b, 112) 
 
In the Anthropocene, as artifacts of humanity are blurred into processes of Nature, and 
as humans literally become the Earth, calls for “planetary stewardship” become calls to 
control and govern ourselves; scientifically, politically and socioeconomically. If 
humanity makes Nature and hence makes itself, then “The confrontation with the earth 
system, its fragility, its capricious grip on life”, writes Grove (2015, online), “will 
irreversibly change what it is to be human”.  
 
However, is this not a dangerous assumption that celebrates humanity rather than 
safeguards Nature? To assume that humanity is made into the Earth system, thereby 
makes Earth’s processes transitory and rectilinear. The Anthropocene, in other words, is 
thus made into a human artifact: a transitory, uncertain thing. “Homo faber is indeed a 
lord and master” in this sense, wrote Arendt, not only because he may destroy what 
artifacts he makes, “or has set himself up as the master of all nature, but because he is 
master of himself” (1998, 144). The point here is that Nature is subjectified, eliciting 
claims it has been mastered. Subjectification means self-certainty through control. Yet 
how does this subjectification occur?  
 
With carbon reaching from atomic to global scales, and the socio-economic and the 
political now made into geophysical processes of Nature, then scientific and 
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technological rationalities of the Anthropocene place the human subject at the Earth’s 
Archimedean point. “For whatever we do today in physics . . . we always handle nature 
from a point in the universe outside the earth”, although remaining, implicitly, still 
bound to it through the human condition (Arendt 1998, 262). Hence, Arendt’s fondness 
of quoting Franz Kafka when discussing how modern theoretical and atomic physics 
relates to human subjectivity and politics today: through Cartesian doubt and its 
metaphysics, humanity discovered this new rationality by moving “the Archimedean 
point into man himself, to choose as ultimate point of reference the pattern of the human 
mind itself, which assures itself of reality and certainty within a framework of 
mathematical formulas which are its own products” (Arendt 1998, 284). With no way of 
rendering nuclear and quantum physics into conceivable speech and political action, the 
human subject is left with one certainty amidst this infinite doubt: its own subjectivity. 
The human, as the maker of Nature. 
 
As Heidegger cautioned, such an insertion of a carbonic human subject(ivity) into every 
thing and every relation, is the essence of metaphysical subjectivism. In it, human 
subjectivity as ego or ‘I’ (subiectum), becomes so prominent that it is no longer even 
noticed as it encompasses the planet, and absorbs itself. When everything in Nature, 
including humanity’s own social and political relations, becomes known only through 
devices such as GCMs, then ‘certainty’ can no longer be attained through the senses, or 
objectively, as object-ivity. Certainty becomes attained only by retreating inwards, into 
subjectivity. “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the 
manner of its Being and its truth” (1977b, 128).  
 
As noted in chapter 2, Heidegger’s metaphysics describe how this form of subjectivism 
emerged historically, precisely during and through the same socio-political 
transformations in Newtonian and Cartesian science, Nature, reason, and the modern 
nation-state, as described by Foucault and Arendt (also see Toulmin 1990). Their 
accounts are philosophically coeval, and the rise of Cartesian doubt and modernist 
notions of scale, temporality, and subjectivity are coterminous. It bears repeating once 
more that the discovery of biopolitical processes, and concepts such as society and 
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governmentality, emerged only through the background metaphysical transformations 
undergirding natural sciences and physics as this scientific age dawned. “Metaphysics 
grounds an age,” wrote Heidegger (1977b, 115), “in that through a specific 
interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that 
age the basis upon which it is essentially formed”.  
 
In today’s age of anthropos, therefore, what ‘is’ – facts comprehended as quantified 
scientific truths processed through computers models – is grounded on mathematical 
representations of Nature and Earth. The Anthropocene’s ‘truth’ is thus disclosed as it is 
modeled through simulations of the ESS, and is conceived always and only in-relation 
to humanity or the human subject as its steward. This carbonic subjectivism, in which 
“Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such”, is both extended and 
concretized through our modern physical and theoretical sciences, that work by 
challenging-forth and setting-upon Nature, bringing it into being as bounded, 
measurable, orderable objects. This is the essence of enframing: to reveal all that is, 
mathematically, so that a subjective world picture forms that is grounded on a 
calculative self-certainty.  
 
Like processes of data collection in the Anthropocene, this world is no longer what is 
visually apprehended and discussed socially, as being in our presence, cognized or 
comprehended from different perspectives. Rather, subjectivity works by re-presenting 
objects – whether scientific facts or truths, or objects seen in the world – back to itself, 
to be thought thereafter. To apprehend worldly beings not as presence, but as a re-
presented picture to our own selves, is what Heidegger called the world picture (1977b).  
 
Through the global spread of this shared metaphysical world picture through Western 
science, reason, and concepts such as the Anthropocene and ESS, “the more 
importunately, does the subiectum rise up, and all the more impetuously, too, do 
observation of and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man, into 
anthropology” (Heidegger 1977b, 133). Whether it is the quantified fluid dynamics of 
mathematized carbon at the atomic or the global scale, or the positing of the human 
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species’ limits through planetary boundaries, it is not only that humanity “is set before 
us, represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us—in all that belongs to 
it and all that stands together in it—as a system” (Heidegger 1977b, 129). Indeed, the 
translation of humanity into data, and its incorporation within the Earth system, is 
celebrated here: “global observation systems allow scientists to apply concepts that were 
only previously applicable at sub-system, regional or local scale to the Earth as a whole. 
The Earth itself is a system”, Steffen et al. exclaim (2004, 3, emphasis original). The 
point is – through carbon as medium and measure – to merge humanity and Nature 
together at last. “Science is at the threshold of a potentially profound shift in the 
perception of the human-environment relationship, operating across humanity as a 
whole and at the scale of the Earth as a single system” (Steffen et al. 2004, 3). This 
“profound” shift now manifests itself as a system of Earth science touting a 
homogenized form and understanding of humanity, whilst firmly placing the 
Archimedean point within humanity itself.  
 
The Anthropocene’s world picture is, therefore, not spatial nor visual. In this sense, 
scholars of contemporary globality focused upon visual images of ‘one world’ or the 
‘blue marble’ (see Deudney and Mendenhall 2016; Peoples, 2016), miss the point of the 
Anthropocene’s ‘world picture’. When we consider how it is possible to ‘think’ 
humanity as making nature in this way, the world picture becomes technological and 
metaphysical; a way of disclosing Nature mathematically as calculable, orderable, and 
controllable force relations – or, as planetary boundaries. These are processes portrayed 
objectively and mathematically, but always as a re-presented object ‘made’ for a human 
subject(ivity). The world picture is the self, and the self as Anthropos: humanity, 
steward, creator and controller of its own destiny and the planetary boundaries of 
Nature. The world picture may therefore be atomic, and it may also be global or 
epochal; but it is always drawn by a subjectivity relating objects back to itself. 
 
For example, in IR this technological subjectivism is explicit in what Biermann (2012, 
1306) calls an Earth system governance (ESG) framework. ESG “requires fundamental 
reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions toward more 
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effective Earth system governance and planetary stewardship”. It demands a new 
constitutional moment akin to post-World War II transformations, such as formation of 
the UN or Bretton Woods. To do so, it must also steer the “coevolution” of humanity 
and Nature by following the same blueprint as planetary boundaries: “the attempt at a 
quantified suggestion of the boundaries of the earth system that need to be observed in 
order to maintain the potential for human development and well-being” (2014, 33). 
Considered metaphysically, therefore, both ESG’s call for revised multilateral 
institutions in accordance with ESS principles, and the calls of critical IR scholarship for 
an Anthropocene of post-human, post-IR, or radical planet politics (see earlier), share 
the same conceptual foundation. Despite the noble intentions of all, they ultimately 
emerge from computerized models of the ESS that bring the Anthropocene into being 
only by quantifying and projecting Nature within mathematical ‘planetary boundaries’ 
to be stewarded by the human subject. Although IR scholars quickly embrace these 
boundaries, even IAM and GCM modelers declare that, within them, “human agency 
has been reduced to simplified, rational choice algorithms for the individual level which 
are applied to the average conditions over a large geographic area” (Verburg et al. 2015, 
13). In other words, behind the ESS calculations and ESG prognostications, anthropos 
of the Anthropocene is the rational economic man.  
 
If the way our concepts are formed and bounded thereby delimits what is socially, 
politically, and normatively thinkable and possible when we enact them (see 
Beronskoetter 2017; Crist 2013), then scholarship grounded upon quantified 
computerised simulations risks reinforcing only the possibilities inherent in calculative 
logics such as rational choice. This world picture thereby perpetuates the same 
underlying subjectivism that foments the environmental crises of the Anthropocene in 
the first place. If the Anthropocene and its planetary boundaries are always already 
projected and subjectified to humanity as lord and master of the planet, therefore, then 
‘how shall the consequence ever attack the ground on which it stands?’ (Heidegger 
1977b, 140).  
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Relationality: Anthropos as the Measure of All Things 
 
If we are presently caught in an intensifying subjectivist and technological rationality, 
then how is it possible to escape, or to think differently? Can politics or international 
relations be retrieved from its current projection of carbon at subjective and objective 
scales? What aims or research agenda might IR or global environmental politics pursue 
in the future? There remains to be explored the essence of thought as it is evinced 
through the Anthropocene’s technological subjectivism: relationality.  
 
Relationality describes the current mentality that is manifested through the physics of 
the ESS and in the overarching concept of the Anthropocene. Orienting subjectivity, it is 
what governs or conducts conduct thought the concept of this human epoch. In it, every 
referent object is projected and experienced as a measurable and calculable relation to 
subjectivity. No object is static, existing in-itself, or existing in the ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ that was existed prior to the Cartesian Moment. Rather, every thinkable 
referent is now ‘pictured’ by the mind and re-presented back to the subject, with the 
human made into its fulcrum or reference point. In other words, everything in our world 
picture is thus represented and made thinkable only as a subject-object relation 
dependent upon human agency. For example, a jet aircraft on a runway is no longer 
cognized or thought of as an object giving flight; it is only thought of as a fleeting 
relation to a human subject’s next destination, next meal, next meeting, next drink, next 
deadline, next flight, and so on. In this relationality, objects are replaced by the 
uncertainty of future human relations. And in the Anthropocene, a subject’s relation to 
climate change, the Earth, carbon, water, one’s daily carbon footprint, etc., all become 
fleeting relations of a human’s own potential impact upon a future they may never 
actually experience. Every ‘thing’ becomes an uncertain relation, reflected back to 
oneself.   
 
Once everything becomes only this implicit relation to everything else, the object itself – 
whether it is Earth, the carbon atom, or the supposed quantum entanglement of all life – 
actually disappears. When speech is replaced “by the extreme and in itself meaningless 
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formalism of mathematical signs” (Arendt 2006, 274), and when the objective world is 
no longer graspable by human senses, then certainty falls back upon the ‘I’. Humanity as 
the subject’s self-certainty is all that remains to grasp or assert.  
 
Heidegger (1977b, 135) calls this the “gigantic” – a rationality that is simultaneously so 
large and so small, that in its tendency to calculate everything at every space and scale, 
it moves beyond objects and the “purely quantitative”, the temporally uncertain, and the 
“Americanism” of globalisation, to become “precisely through this, incalculable” 
(1977b, 135). The ‘I’ of the human reemerges as a ‘We’ of homogenized thought. We, 
as a subjectivised humanity, Nature, and Earth system. “Man as a rational being of the 
age of Enlightenment is no less subject than is man who grasps himself as a nation, wills 
himself as a people, fosters himself as a race, and, finally, empowers himself as lord of 
the earth”, wrote Heidegger (1977b, 152). In this case, it is humanity as a global mass of 
carbon, leaving stratigraphic scars lasting eternity; and it is simultaneously one’s own 
carbon footprint, as they take their recycling to the curb of their home for collection by 
their local municipality. “In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man, 
the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of 
organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself” (1977b, 152). Precisely how this 
metaphysical (Earth) system of relationality operates, the ways that Nature remains 
correlative with science and political rationalities flowing through it, and how its 
intensifying subjectivism will transform or spread globally through such technological 
infrastructures as carbon, GCMs, IAMs, and other concepts and simulations (Edwards, 
2010; 2012), remains to be explored. In starting along this path, this thesis hopes to 
contribute towards future research in IR and the social sciences going forth. 
 
Chapter 7 and chapter 8 of this thesis will now engage two components of this 
relationality as it has emerged, and is expressed, today: temporally, in which humanity 
reflects itself as a ‘we’ of the human species projected into deep time; and in terms of 
security discourses of ‘entanglement’, where the mathematical complexities of quantum 
science serve to reflect human subjectivity back upon itself.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has traced how the Anthropocene emerged from the problematique, 
practice, and rationality, of climatic globality. It argued that the Anthropocene is not a 
concept that can be implanted from the ESS and simply applied to IR or the social 
sciences. It is not a governmental medium for (neo)liberal economic strategy, nor is it 
comprised of sovereign, disciplinary or even governmental forms of power. It is not the 
pinnacle of homo faber’s making of Nature as steward and master of the Earth, nor does 
it herald a transformation of the human condition as an entangled part of Nature. At its 
conceptual foundation, the Anthropocene celebrates and reifies the human subject. It 
privileges and sees carbon, the atom of life and the substrate of humanity, everywhere. 
The ‘making’ of nature occurs only at the level of atomic carbon, which echo today in 
GCMs and ESS models. As carbon is quantified and congealed into planetary 
boundaries, ESS projects a type of rational economic man instructed to work within 
these thresholds to safeguard life, Nature, and itself – the ‘human enterprise’.  
 
This chapter has also illustrated the emergence of an implicit rationality that undergirds 
the globality of climate change and the Anthropocene: a technological and metaphysical 
subjectivism. This ‘relationality’ fosters neither reflection nor humility. Instead, it 
responds to the processes of a science and theoretical physics too complex to conceive 
by the human mind, by projecting the human species as the Archimedean point of 
Being, the master of Earth, Anthropos; the maker and the measure of all things. This is a 
specific type of human relation to Being, Nature, Earth, and life, conceived now an 
excess of carbon and an excess of biopower. Humanity is tracing Nature, carbon, and 
itself, from the atom to the global cycle, seeking to fulfill its destiny by controlling 
geological space and time. This gives the impression of a human subject that is 
simultaneously individual and total; atomic and global; saving and destroying; the past 
and the future; the egoistic I, and the homogenized We.  
 
If biopolitics is considered as life being imbricated and used within political strategies, 
then researching the Anthropocene as an excess of carbonic biopower opens new 
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possibilities for research in IR. It is a new global biopolitics of carbon, in which 
everything – including temporality, uncertainty, Nature, and the other artifacts ‘made’ 
by a finite and mortal homo faber – becomes absorbed in the gigantic. Anthropos, 
always and everywhere seeing itself, as maker of Nature and hence the steward and 
destiny of Earth.  
 
It thus behooves IR to analyze the dangers and effects of the Anthropocene’s 
subjectivism; that the human 
 
…as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the 
earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man 
encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise 
to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always 
encounters only himself. (Heidegger 1977, 27) 
 
Everywhere, this relationality posits atomic and global human relations, upon relations, 
upon relations, ad infinitum.  
 
In the remainder of this thesis, the themes of Anthropocene temporality, security, and 
entanglement, will now be explored through the emergent concept of the Anthropocene, 
and its inherent technological subjectivism of relationality.  
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Chapter 7 – Temporality and the Anthropocene: 
Foucault’s End of History 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the temporal implications of the Anthropocene. 
Upon analysis, this concept moves far beyond the days, months, and years of clock or 
‘human time’ that frames the everyday background of IR and the social sciences. The 
Anthropocene spans geologic epochs and multi-million year timescales known as ‘deep 
time’. This vast timescale has been foreign or extraneous to discourses of IR and the 
social sciences, until now (see Hutchings 2008; Harrington 2016). As such, the recent 
admission of Anthropocene discourses into IR contains implicit temporal and conceptual 
limitations and possibilities that have not yet been considered. This chapter fills this gap 
by exposing how the Anthropocene’s notion of deep time contradicts and transforms the 
human time of IR and governmentality analytics.   
 
This chapter argues that the concept of the Anthropocene implies a new understanding 
of time and temporality that ‘ends’ history as it is currently perceived in disciplines such 
as IR. It arrives at this conclusion by following Foucault’s governmentality lectures of 
1977-1978, in which he describes our modern sense of time as an “indefinite 
governmentality of the state” (2007, 356). According to Foucault, this modern 
governmentality will eventually be confronted by “a final time”, in which the history, 
politics, and the indefinite governmentality of everyday statist time, comes to an end 
(Foucault 2007, 356). If we analyse the concept of the Anthropocene through this lens of 
governmentality, then it indeed points to the end of history as such. In this human-
epoch, the indefinite time of liberal statist governmentality that was grounded upon 
globally adopted norms of Western clock and calendrical time (see Hom 2010), must be 
replaced by a new form of geologic and deep time. When thinking in terms of geologic 
epochs, the days and years through which politics and international relations has always 
occurred, become irrelevant; a mere beat in the heart of Anthropocene time. This 
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transition to deep time not only transforms history, therefore, but how humanity is able 
to conceive of itself and to place itself within Earth history, and the universe: its 
cosmology. 
 
This takes us to the second argument of this chapter. Based upon the relationality 
identified in chapter 6, the Anthropocene asserts a new cosmological place for humanity 
in the cosmos by returning the human subject to the ‘centre’ of all spacetime. Whilst the 
birth of Christ previously functioned as the primary temporal dividing line or marker for 
(Western) human history, and for the “indefinite governmentality” of modern politics, 
this event is copied and replicated anew in the Anthropocene’s golden spike. 
Historically, clock or human time was based on the birth of Christ serving as what 
Arendt (2006) described as a marker for a twopoint infinity of past and future. The 
Anthropocene replaces this divine marker with its own human-made carbonic scar, as a 
new twopoint infinity of anthropos: the golden spike GSSP, or the new origin story 
marking the Anthropocene’s global stratographic signature across the entire Earth. In 
doing so, the Anthropocene’s temporality re-governs the cosmological and temporal 
order by ending human history, replacing it with the deep history of a geologic yet re-
humanised time. This new twopoint infinity is engendered by the human species, rather 
than by a divinity or the Earth’s geology. The state’s indefinite time of governmentality 
is thereby replaced by relationality; a temporality of deep Anthropocene time. With 
years dissolved into epochs, the liberal individual no longer gains certainty from its 
individualism or ‘I’, but must now derive certainty from a concept of humanity 
stretching across epochs, as a collective species (Chakrabarty 2009). 
 
This chapter makes this argument in four steps. First, it provides a short overview of 
Foucault’s cosmology of government. For Foucault and Arendt, the birth of Christ, and 
the chronological sequencing within deep time stemming from this event, resulted in 
what Foucault called the de-governmentalization of the cosmos. What the Anthropocene 
implies by returning humanity to the centre of Earthly Being, therefore, is a re-
governmentalization of the cosmos. Second, the chapter defines and clarifies the 
concepts of deep time and geologic epochs, in accordance with the Geological Time 
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Scale (GTS) of geological and stratigraphic sciences. Contrasting deep time with human 
time will thereby illustrate the profound paradigm shift, or transformation in underlying 
political rationalities, that is demanded in thinking and recognising the concept of the 
Anthropocene. Third, the chapter will review Foucault’s own discussion of time and the 
‘end of history’ from his Collège de France lectures of 1977-1978. Foucault claimed that 
statist governmentality facilitates a sense of temporal stasis, or an indefinite time and 
atemporality, of history. Yet, this was a human history that could also end. How? This 
leads to the final component of this chapter, which returns to the Anthropocene’s 
glorification of deep time as the re-governmentalization of the cosmos. It concludes that 
clock or human time is conceptually irreconcilable with the vastness of a geologic 
epoch. Hence, if IR is to embrace the concept of the Anthropocene as its adherents 
insist, then it must also implicitly discard the cosmological and temporal underpinnings 
of our modern “indefinite governmentality” and the state, so as to end history. 
 
The Governing of the Cosmos 
 
Prior to defining what discourses of the Anthropocene mean by ‘deep time’, we must 
first review what Foucault described as cosmological governance. Although rarely 
mentioned by Foucault, his depiction of a “de-governmentalized cosmos” (2007, 236) is 
what underpins common assumptions today concerning human time, deep time, and 
modern statist governmentalities. Contrary to this de-governmentalized cosmos, what is 
contained within the concept of the Anthropocene and its golden spike is a re-
governmentalized cosmos. What is meant by these terms?  
 
Throughout his 1977-1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, Foucault (2007) 
repeatedly describes pre-modern conceptions of Nature, Being, and time, and how these 
underpin modern forms of government. Prior to the emergence of governmental 
rationalities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Foucault places the human 
subject within an “historical-religious sovereignty” because preceding the “political 
government of men” came “the pastoral of souls” (2007, 228). Indeed, the concept of 
pastoral power is perhaps the best known of these forms of power.  
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However, Foucault has much more to say about the role cosmology played in shaping 
forms of power. Prior to the seventeenth century, he claims that sovereign princes and 
kings were still subject to “those two great poles of the Empire and the Church that 
represented a sort of great spiritual and temporal pastorate” (2007, 229). These existed 
in a cosmological order that “dominated the West and promised salvation, unity, and the 
fulfillment of time”, within a Nature governed by Divine power (Foucault 2007, 229). In 
this cosmos governed by a pastoral God, therefore, the territorial sovereign thereby 
governed according to Nature. This Nature was, in turn, divine; God was Nature. 
“Insofar as he governs, the sovereign does nothing other than reproduce a model [that] is 
quite simply that of God’s government on Earth” (2007, 233). This Earth, therefore, was 
an “anthropocentric world” governed from the divine, to the sovereign, to humanity 
(2007, 236).  
 
Surprisingly, Foucault stressed that there was, at first, no cosmological nor 
eschatological break in the transition from sovereign to governmental rationality. “There 
is no break therefore. This great continuum from sovereignty to government is nothing 
else but the translation of the continuum from God to men in the—in inverted 
commas—‘political’ order” (Foucault 2007, 234). Why no break? Just as the 
cosmological transformation engendered by Copernicus still retained the human being 
of Christian faith as its center and grounds (Arendt 2006), Foucault likewise notes how 
the transition from sovereignty to government in the Cartesian moment (see chapter 2) 
retained a similar cosmological and theological perspective. The anthropocentric 
world’s “theological-cosmological continuum in the name of which the sovereign is 
authorized to govern and which provides models in accordance with which he must 
govern”, thus continues on into early statist models of governmental rationality (2007, 
234). Although the Earth was de-centered from the cosmos, the human being was not. 
 
The purpose of the scientific practices of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, the Port Royal 
grammar, etc., “was to show that ultimately God only rules the world through general, 
immutable, and [scientific] universal laws” (2007, 234). Although there was a 
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bifurcation of religion and science here, their shared theological continuum bends, but 
does not break. For instance, Hobbes produced Leviathan based on secular Natural 
Laws, but he still died in mortal fear of “hell-fire”; Descartes produced a metaphysics of 
subjectivism (see chapter 2), yet he still “prayed to the Holy Virgin”; and Grotius 
quipped that “even God cannot cause two times two not to make four” (quoted in Arendt 
2006, 70), because he was searching for Natural Laws that not even divine intervention 
could alter. Each scholar, therefore, developed a philosophy operating in accordance 
with secular Natural Law, whilst retaining the “theological-cosmological continuum” of 
divine temporality within their own personal conduct. Ultimately, this remained a 
governmentalized cosmos. 
 
This brings us to a crucial transformation in temporal and political rationalities. It 
occurred through, and concurrently with, the application of Enlightenment sciences and 
geological timescales to politics. In the late-seventeenth century, these began to displace 
divine power from its cosmological role. Now, Nature increasingly became “laid out in 
terms of mathematical or classificatory forms of intelligibility” (Foucault 2007, 236) 
that no longer passed through the envelope of the human being. No longer did God 
govern nor reign over the world through scientific principles (2007, 235). Rather, 
Foucault notes that, as government and raison D’Etat replaced the pastoral government 
of divine Nature, the connection between politics and Christian eschatology and 
cosmology was similarly displaced. As physics and Western Enlightenment sciences 
isolated humanity from divinity, a “de-governmentalization of the cosmos” occurred 
(2007, 236). As will be discussed below, only through this de-governmentalization 
could historical science, clock time, and “modern governmentality and historical 
science”, then emerge by supplanting divine order (2007, 355). Models for a 
governmentality of the state could emerge only after models conceived as the divine 
governance of the cosmos, dissolved. Indeed, according to Northcott (2016), this de-
governmentalization reached its apex in the discovery of geological deep time, which 
shattered this outmoded theoretical-cosmological continuum by illustrating the sheer 
vastness of planetary time. No longer could God’s reign, or the 6,000 years of the 
Genesis 1 narrative, be channeled through sovereign power and scientific principles to 
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secure humanity’s place. In deep time, humanity could no longer be located at the centre 
of the Earth’s genesis, nor of the cosmos; the human subject became a mere blip, or as 
the saying goes, a grain of sand on an infinite beach. In awakening to its place as this de-
governed blip, the human being was now left to govern itself. As reviewed in chapter 2, 
this is also the moment when self-certainty through the Cartesian ‘I’ becomes fully 
entrenched. Rather than being certain of the Church doctrine’s placing of all Earthly 
creation within a Great Chain of Being, “the freeing of man to freedom as the self-
determination that is certain of itself”, subjectivity – as calculative thought – emerges 
(Heidegger 1977b, 148).   
 
Foucault’s subtle point here is that the cosmos is always governed in some way or 
another. The de-governmentalization of the cosmos thus facilitated the 
governmentalization of the state, and the forms of modern governmentality and 
calculation that we in IR and the social sciences take for granted today. This event 
occurred through a specific cosmological orientation, spurred on by the de-centering of 
humanity’s influence on Earth, best crystallised and articulated by the discovery of 
geological and deep time. Today, however, with the ‘discovery’ of the Anthropocene’s 
golden spike being celebrated in IR and the natural sciences, a new such cosmological 
order is being set forth. As will now be argued, it is a cosmology that re-
governmentalizes the cosmos, but not by placing a God nor a divinity as the ultimate 
sovereign power. Instead, it magnifies and intensifies the self-certainty of human 
subjectivity by asserting humanity as the most dominant geophysical and geological 
force of Nature.  
 
Prior to interpreting the cosmological implications of the Anthropocene, however, this 
chapter now turns to deep time, geologic epochs, and the Anthropocene’s golden spike. 
 
Deep Time: Geological Epochs and the De-Centering of Humanity  
 
Time is often introduced to readers in IR through St. Augustine’s pithy summary of time 
in his Confessions, which remains apposite for us today. “What then, is time?” St. 
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Augustine asked. “…if no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, 
I know not” (taken from Stockdale 2016, 1). Although time underpins our everyday 
experience and Being in the world, it presents unique difficulties to scientists and 
philosophers alike, because it is ultimately a subjective inference: “We create a concept 
of external, non-personal time by analogy, by imposing an order, a constructed memory, 
on the evidence of external events” (Burchfield 1998, 137). This means that every 
objective classification and inter-subjective or social concept of time, are neither 
universal nor innate: “geological time, like historical time, lies forever outside the scope 
of our direct experience, [and is] an artefact. It had to be created or invented” (1998, 
137). Our everyday understanding of time can change. Temporality itself is a social 
practice. 
 
To claim that the Anthropocene ushers in a new geological epoch is to make a temporal 
claim referring to deep time (Dear 2016). ‘Deep time’ has a special name because it 
refers to the vast timescales of the Earth’s past, or geologic time. Geologic timescales 
are so large that they are literally incomprehensible to the human mind (Burchfield 
1998). For instance, to say that the Earth has existed for 4.5 billion years, is to refer to 
geologic, or deep time. This timescale far exceeds what we would ordinarily call 
‘human time’, which refers to our subjective everyday experience and familiarity with 
linear chronologies of seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, years, and decades. This 
chronotic time “renders life manageable, by providing a background frame in relation to 
which we can measure phenomena such as the length of the working day, the span of 
human life, or the duration of empires” (Hutchings 2008, 5). Indeed, in this 
chronological cosmological order of human time, the present is qualitatively the same as 
the past, and the future. All operate in accordance with a mechanistic or calendrical 
clock time (Hom 2010). In clock and human time, we build our lives and our worlds.  
 
Politics and international relations occur in human time. Hence, with the emergence of 
the Anthropocene and deep time, difficulties arise not only spatially, but temporally. As 
noted by Harrington, “The timeframe of the Anthropocene is indeed nothing more than a 
blink in geologic time, but trying to construct a political response for a cumulative series 
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of events over the course of a century, let alone a millennia, is a tall task indeed” 
(Harrington 2015, 495). Despite the importance of this task, IR has still not engaged nor 
grasped the full ramifications of this geologic or deep time for the conceptual 
foundations upon which the discipline is built. Embracing the Anthropocene demands a 
transformation of the subjective constructions of human time and temporality, to a deep 
time that IR has not prepared for.   
 
What exactly is deep time? Deep time is an historically complex concept referring to the 
multimillion-year age of the Earth and the universe. It emerged through a series of 
scientific advancements from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. This chapter now 
follows Northcott’s recent account (2016) of ‘deep time’ as first making an official 
appearance in scientific discourses when it was presented to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh in 1785, by Scottish geologist James Hutton.  
 
Working simultaneously as a farmer and a mineralogist, Hutton came to the conclusion 
that rocks were not universal nor innate objects brought directly into being by God in 
accordance with the Bible’s Genesis 1 narrative. Studying the mix of veins of granite 
and sedimentary rock on his farms, and interpreting the unique sedimentary 
constellations or ‘unconformities’ of twisting sedimentary rock patterns visible at Siccar 
Point on the coast of Edinburgh, Hutton theorised that these layers of rock strata formed 
through a different process than accepted narratives of divine creation. The formation of 
a stratum was framed as a process, beginning when rainfall eroded layers of soil and 
minerals that were carried to the ocean through streams and rivers, and were then put 
under tremendous pressure, compacted by the weight of the ocean. Stratum also 
combined with the cooling of magma that had erupted from the inner core of the Earth, 
to form layers of sedimentary rock strata (Northcott 2016).  
 
In Foucauldian terms, Hutton now put forth a type of counter-conduct – a different 
rationality or style of thinking – to that of pre-modern theological eschatology and 
cosmology. “Hutton argued that only a vastly deep temporal history could have 
achieved the present state of which he could ‘find no vestige of a beginning, no prospect 
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of an end’” (Northcott 2016, 100; Burchfield 1998, 137). This theory was contrary to 
both the science of the time, and the accepted theological accounts from Genesis 
asserting that the Earth was approximately 6,000 years old. Yet only from out of this 
new notion of deep time, was the geologist Charles Lyell and biologist Charles Darwin 
able to create and to expand upon it, through their own geologic and evolutionary 
theories (Burchfield 1998). In short, Hutton’s theory was unprecedented, in that it 
illustrated a new geological and Earthly timescale that had created Earth and Nature 
through geologic processes, and not a divine creator god governing humanity. 
 
The cosmological transformation engendered by the discovery of this newfound 
geological or deep time is difficult to overstate. For Northcott (and Arendt, 2006), 
Hutton’s deep time had a greater and more significant impact on Western religious, 
cosmological, and sociopolitical imaginaries, than even Copernicus’s argument that the 
Earth was at the centre of the universe. As noted above, whilst Copernicus had opposed 
the Ptolemaic cosmology supporting religious authority, he “did not challenge 
humanity’s central place in Earth’s history. Christian chronology from the second 
century of the Christian era had mapped human intergenerational history onto Earth 
history with only slight variations in calendric enumeration for more than 1,500 years 
before Hutton” (Northcott 2016, 101). After Hutton, however, through geological deep 
time, the centrality of humanity to the cosmos is eroded (see Toulmin 1990). The 
“history of the Earth is divided into a much longer set of eras that had nothing to do with 
God, Christ or humanity, and which extend back over roughly four billion years” 
(Northcott 2016, 102). This is the emergence of the ‘human time’ or historical time with 
which we in IR are today familiar with today (Hom 2010). Through this event, the 
duration, magnitude, and “diversity of the successive periods of life revealed by the 
fossils it [rock layers] contained produced an inescapable impression of vistas of time 
stretching far beyond the scope of human history” (Burchfield 1998, 139). 
 
Why is it important here to recall the displacement of humanity from eschatological and 
cosmological order that occurred with the invention of deep and geologic time? First, 
the BC/AD two-era chronology that scaffolds and supports today’s everyday notions of 
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human time, dates from Hutton’s scientific intervention into eschatology. It remains 
today “so influential that it is represented in astronomical clocks, digital computers, and 
printed and online encyclopedias and history books” (Northcott 2016, 102). Whilst 
‘Before Christ’ and ‘Anno Domini’ remain, their underlying nomenclature has shifted as 
BC became secularised as BCE (Before Common Era). Yet despite its present 
secularisation, the fulcrum of this twopoint infinity into past and future remains that of 
Christ’s birth. 
 
Second, this discovery of deep time was not merely an historical or scientific exercise, 
but a political event. It fostered a transformation in political rationality that Foucault 
credits as the catalyst and foundation for today’s modern or “indefinite 
governmentality” (see chapter 2 for an account of the scientific processes emerging at 
this time, and how they delimited objects of society and population). It is thus to 
Foucault, and his positing of this indefinite governmentality as constitutive of our sense 
of time and history, that this chapter turns. 
 
Foucault’s Indefinite Governmentality and the End of History 
 
It is now common to read in IR that scholars have long made the ‘space’ for discussions 
of spatiality, but have not made the ‘time’ for temporality (see Hutchings 2007, 2008; 
Hom 2010; Hom et al. 2016;  Stockdale 2015). With the emergence of the 
Anthropocene’s notion of globality, however, time is now placed at the forefront of 
discussion (Harrington 2015). A transforming Earth system renders the concept of an 
atemporal international system, or permanent state structure, akin to “the visible hands 
of a watch running down” (Burke et al. 2015, 510). Rather than cling to outmoded 
concepts of states and international systems, therefore, we read that the Anthropocene 
re-imagines “our entire structure of social-political time. This time is both much longer 
than our contemporary horizons, taking in hundreds and thousands of years, and much 
shorter, requiring ameliorative action that should have begun yesterday” (Burke et al. 
2015, 510).  
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What are the ramifications or implications of this Anthropocene temporality to human 
time and history? Here, we may return to a comment made by Foucault at the conclusion 
of his famous 1977-1978 lectures at the Collège de France. In his final lecture on 05 
April, 1978, Foucault made a direct reference to human time, history, and 
governmentality. This reference has (surprisingly) remained unexamined in IR, despite 
the discipline’s recent ‘temporal turn’ (see Agathangelou and Killian 2016; Hom et al. 
2016). To quote Foucault, as he was summarising his lecture series of that year: “More 
schematically, and to summarize all that I have wanted to say, maybe we could say that 
raison d’Etat basically posited as the primary, implacable law of both modern 
governmentality and historical science that man henceforth has to live in an indefinite 
time” (2007, 355). By ‘indefinite’, he was referring to notions of stasis, and political and 
governmental constancy as atemporality: a perpetual time in which governed citizens 
tacitly assume that the state and its institutions “will always be there, and there is no 
hope of having done with it [the state]” (2007, 355).  
 
This indefinite time is what scholars have long noted is the ‘background context’ for 
both IR (Hutchings 2008), and discourses of the Anthropocene (Harrington 2015). As 
Hom (2010, 1151) has written, this “Enlightenment epistemology correlated 
conceptually with the emergence of the doctrine of raison d’etat, which lent legitimacy 
to discrete, autonomous territorial rule by substituting state interests for dynastic 
interests”. Statist governmentality thereby replaced the top-down forms of divine rule 
governing the cosmos. However, Foucault also raises the possibility that this modern, 
indefinite time – our indefinite time of modern governmentality and history – can end. 
How? According to Foucault, this would require a new form of counter-conduct, to  
 
 
… make it a principle to assert the coming of a time when time will end, 
and to posit the possibility of an eschatology, of a final time, of a 
suspension or completion of historical and political time when, if you 
like, the indefinite governmentality of the state will be brought to an end 
and halted. By what? Well, by the emergence of something that will be 
society itself. The day when civil society can free itself of the constraints 
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and controls of the state, when the power of the state can finally be 
reabsorbed into this civil society— . . . time, the time if not of history then 
at least of politics, of the state, will come to an end as a result.  
(Foucault 2007, 356, emphasis added)  
 
 
In other words, if our indefinite governmentality is comprised of one specific temporal 
form of rationality and practice, then it may also be replaced by other forms. Just as 
geologic time was a form of counter-conduct to the divine time of a governed cosmos, 
so a new form of conduct and rationality could transform our own naturalised rationality 
of politics, history, and time. If a new social practice and rationality emerges as a 
counter-conduct that subsumes the state, then a re-governmentalization of the cosmos 
should occur as well. The modern time consciousness through which we live our 
everyday life is, ironically, transitory. 
 
Foucault’s brief mention of ending time and history should sound familiar to IR 
scholars. Although broaching the subject in terms of governmentality, he is indeed 
referring to the concept of the ‘end of history’. Not, however, to IR’s familiar trope of 
Francis Fukuyama’s oft-cited piece in The National Interest, that posits the End of 
History as the inevitable “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” 
(1989). Instead, Foucault is harkening back to the emergence of deep time and how its 
discovery made this modern and statist form of governmentality possible. Since this is 
highlighted in the final summary lecture of his 1977-1978 lecture series, his comments 
on temporality should not be discounted or ignored. Rather, here, Foucault is pointing 
out that our modern understanding of government is “indefinite”, because of the 
cosmological transformations previously catalysed by Hutton’s geological displacement 
of divine and eschatological time. The twopoint infinity of BC/AD allows for both the 
indefiniteness of state governmentality, and for human time. 
 
Prior to arguing that the Anthropocene’s global biopolitics of carbon implies the end of 
this indefinite time and history (see chapter 6), this chapter must first outline the 
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cosmological marker that it replaces: the orienting of human time through a twopoint 
infinity of past and future.  
 
A Point in Time: Marking an Indefinite Past from an Indefinite Future 
 
It is crucial to note that the emergence of this ‘indefinite time’ and its de-
governmentalized cosmos is also what Arendt identified as the birth of our modern time 
consciousness. It is in stark contrast to “the Christian notion that mankind has a 
beginning and an end, that the world was created in time and will ultimately perish” 
(Arendt 2006, 67). Likewise, it is against the notion of divine governance working 
through Nature’s laws. Rather than a Christian narrative of beginning and end, our 
modern chronological notion of time and history depends on a specific point, or marker: 
“the modern computation of historical dates, introduced only at the end of the eighteenth 
century, that takes the birth of Christ as a turning point from which to count time both 
backward and forward” (Arendt 2006, 67).  
 
Why is this moment so important? Arendt stresses that what is new is neither the 
calendric nor chronological enumeration of time (accomplished by the Jews in the 
Middle Ages), nor when Dionysus Exiguus began counting time from the birth of Christ 
in the sixth century (2006, 67). Rather, this new BC/AD system was something far 
beyond a mere technical improvement “needed for scholarly purposes to facilitate the 
exact fixing of dates in ancient history without referring to a maze of different time-
reckonings” (2006, 67). It is now through the BC/AD of an endless deep and geological 
time, that  
 
for the first time, the history of mankind reaches back into an infinite 
past to which we can add at will and into which we can inquire further 
as it stretches ahead into an infinite future. This twofold infinity of past 
and future eliminates all notions of beginning and end, establishing 
mankind in a potential earthly immortality. . . . So far as secular history 
is concerned we live in a process which knows no beginning and no end 
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and which thus does not permit us to entertain eschatological 
expectations. (Arendt 2006, 68) 
 
No longer governed by God, Nature (and the state) then become fixed to a new concept 
that explains the movements and workings of both, in accordance with the 
Enlightenment science taking hold: scientific processes.1 As Foucault noted, “We are 
dealing with processes that can be known by methods of the same type as any scientific 
knowledge” (2007, 350). These processes may also be indefinite, occurring over 
geologic periods of time. Now freed from eschatological and theological narratives that 
contradicted notions of indefinite processes, scientists such as Lyell and Darwin could 
then conceive of “the Earth as presently constituted as a living ‘Earth system’ which has 
been uniformly created, and is still being created, by living processes which over long 
time periods change its appearance and constituent parts” (Northcott 2016, 101). As 
noted in chapter 2, it was also through the emergence of these scientific processes that 
population arithmetic – statistics – was able to divulge the processes comprising a 
state’s population, thereby revealing biopolitical patterns of a society, implying how 
best to govern them. Hence, the emergence of statist governmentality and deep 
geological time, through the discovery of this twopoint infinity of past and future. The 
de-governmentalized cosmos becomes one comprised of indefinite processes.   
 
Not only does this de-governmentalization of the cosmos through the BC/AD marker of 
deep time orient the time consciousness of statist and ‘indefinite governmentality’, but it 
fostered the rise of thinking about life in terms of ‘species’. After Hutton, “The 
dimension in which the population is immersed amongst the other living beings appears 
and is sanctioned when, for the first time, men are no longer called ‘mankind (le genre 
                                                        
1 Consistent with chapter 6’s critique of the Anthropocene’s concept of making Nature, it must be noted 
here that Arendt (as well as philosophers such as Marx, and historians such as Vico) cautioned long ago 
that human history itself became worthy of study only when it could be conceived of as a process made by 
humanity. With a de-governmentalised cosmos, if Nature extends into an infinite geological timescale of 
past and future, then ‘mankind’ can truly ‘know’ only what it ‘makes’ itself. As both Foucault and Arendt 
note, a paradox arises here: if history becomes a process made by humanity, then there must also come a 
point in time when this fabrication process itself must end. “[If] one takes history to be the object or a 
process of fabrication or making, there must come a moment when this ‘object’ is completed, . . . one 
cannot escape the consequence that there will be an end to history” (Arendt 2006, 79; Foucault 2007, 
253). 
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humaine)’ and begin to be called ‘the human species’” (Foucault 2007, 75). Why? When 
considered in deep and geologic time, an individual biological agent cannot be 
recognised on such a vast timescale. As noted above, a single human life loses the 
immortality granted to it through Christian eschatology. Again, the human being 
becomes one beat in the infinite heart of time. Hence, as one of the most prominent 
German historians of the time remarked: “What their species is for animals and plants . . 
. that is history for human beings” (J. Droysen, quoted in Arendt 2006, 75).  
 
As will be argued below, the transformation of human history into an understanding of 
species is what is implied, and even demanded, in the Anthropocene’s concept of 
temporality. “In it most radical form, the long-term perspective also brings human 
history in dialogue with the deep time of geophysical events and planetary tipping 
points” (van Munster and Sylvest 2016, 10). Yet the recognition of globality in terms of 
planetary tipping points ranging over geologic scales demands the eschewing of 
individual human lifespans. The only way to think of the Anthropocene’s temporality 
and human agency, therefore, is thus to reconceptualise human agency at the level of a 
collective species: “We may not experience ourselves as a geological agent, but we 
appear to have become one at the level of species” (Chakrabarty 2009, 221). Although 
an individual human can never experience the deep time of the Anthropocene, the 
human species can. For Chakrabarty (2009, 221), “We experience specific effects of the 
[Anthropocene] crisis but not the whole phenomenon.” The whole phenomenon, if it is 
to be experienced, is at the timescale of the ‘we’ of the species. 
 
If this collective ‘we’ of the species depends on a moment or marker that upsets or resets 
the BC/AD marker of Christ, where might this marker be found? This chapter will now 
argue that the end of human time and history demanded by the Anthropocene emerges 
through its concept of a geologic GSSP, the ‘golden spike’.  
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What is a golden spike?  
 
In order to discuss the temporal significance of the Anthropocene’s golden spike, we 
must first define it, and why it is relevant within geology and stratigraphy. Although this 
section is somewhat technical, readers should bear in mind that it also situates part of the 
argument of chapter 8. Without defining the basics underpinning the golden spike, not 
only is it difficult to make an argument concerning the concept of the Anthropocene, but 
there is no such thing as an Anthropocene epoch at all. 
 
Stratigraphy is “the most fundamental endeavor in geology”, and it has been “forever 
intertwined” with geological time (Aubry et al. 2000, 203). It is essential to the concept 
of the Anthropocene because it is what places the human epoch within the context of 
Earth history (Zalasiewicz et al. 2010). In general terms, ‘stratum’ refers to a horizontal 
layer of rock. This layer is the end of a process millions of years in the making, in which 
tiny pieces of rock called ‘sediment’ are eroded from soils on land, and slowly washed 
into lakes and oceans from the currents and flows of rivers and waterways. As sediment 
is slowly deposited on the floor of large water bodies, over long periods of geologic 
(deep) time, it is compacted by the pressure of the water into a stratigraphic layer of 
sedimentary rock. As different layers of sedimentary rock form on top of one another 
over millions of years, distinct stratigraphic layers or sections – strata – are formed. As 
Hutton discovered in 1785 (see above), these stratigraphic sections can be identified, 
studied, traced, and their geological age within a ‘deep’ time of millions or even billions 
of years, revealed (Burchfield 1998). 
 
Presently, a ‘Working Group on the Anthropocene’ at the Subcommission on 
Quaternary Stratigraphy, in London, UK, is deliberating over whether the Anthropocene 
is officially its own geologic epoch. If so, it must, therefore, be a formally recognised 
unit in the Geological Time Scale (GTS). The GTS is divided into a complex and 
hierarchical series of increasingly-detailed units, and operates as follows: we are 
presently residing in “the Holocene epoch (Greek for ‘entirely recent’; started 11,650 
BP [before present]), within the Quaternary Period (started 2.588 million years ago), 
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within the Cenozoic Era (‘recent life’; started 66 million years ago), of the Phanerozoic 
Eon (‘revealed life’; started 541 million years ago)” (Lewis and Maslin 2015, 172).  
 
For the scientists and geologists involved in this process, this is a serious endeavor and 
decision, and the stakes are high for stratigraphic disciplines and the science of geology 
more generally (Barry and Maslin 2016). The International Commission on Stratigraphy 
(ICS) is one of the oldest and largest bodies in the geological sciences (ICS 2012), and 
its “primary objective is to precisely define global units (systems, series, and stages) of 
the International Chronostratigraphic Chart that, in turn, are the basis for the units 
(periods, epochs, and age) of the International Geologic Time Scale” (ICS 2017, online). 
In other words, the ICS sets the global standards for expressing the history of the Earth. 
To designate an Anthropocene epoch would be unprecedented, in that this designation 
hinges upon whether humanity’s impact on the planet is substantial enough so as to 
warrant the re-designation of the human species itself, as mineralogical rock strata: “If 
humans now author the rocks, atmosphere and oceans with anthropogenic signatures, 
then the inhuman (as nature, earth, geology) becomes decidedly changed as a category 
of differentiation” (Yusoff 2016, 6).  
 
In general, two strange circumstances currently prevent the Anthropocene’s recognition 
as its own geologic epoch: first, all previously designated geological units and 
timescales have long since terminated thousands and millions of years ago, but the 
Anthropocene is ongoing; we are living in it. Secondly – and most importantly – 
“however these debates will unfold, the Anthropocene represents a new phase in the 
history of both humankind and of the Earth, when natural forces and human forces 
became intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other” (Zalasiewicz 
et al. 2010, 2231). In other words, in contrast with Hutton’s 1785 theory of deep time, 
the Anthropocene’s official scientific and geological designation would actually reunite 
humanity with the cosmos.  
 
As noted in chapter 6, there is currently a heated debate surrounding when the 
Anthropocene supposedly began, and hence what event or marker could officially 
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designate the onset of this geologic epoch. Divisions in the geologic time scale must 
represent this global stratographic layer and corresponding change(s) in the functioning 
of the Earth as a system, and hence, in “concomitant changes in the resident life-forms”. 
This occurs by identifying a beginning boundary, marker, or point: a Global Standard 
Stratotype-Section and Point (GSSP), commonly called a golden spike (Lewis and 
Maslin 2015, 172; Barry and Maslin 2016; Aubry et al. 2000). “Defining the beginning 
of the Anthropocene as a formal geologic unit of time requires the location of a global 
marker of an event in stratigraphic material, such as rock, sediment, or glacier ice, . . . 
indicating changes to the Earth system” (Lewis and Maslin 2015, 173). Despite its 
importance, IR scholars importing the concept of the Anthropocene have not paid much 
attention to the golden spike. Although Harrington (2015, 483) does note the decision of 
the ICS concerning whether or not to designate the Anthropocene as an epoch, the 
golden spike itself becomes secondary in his account to more explicitly “political 
questions about its start date and who is actually responsible for its emergence”. True, if 
“man is understood as an undifferentiated trace in the strata” (Yusoff 2016, 6), this 
ubiquitous global trace masks issues of race, class, gender, geography, development, 
etc., that are essential components of politics. Ultimately, however, the temporal 
significance of the golden spike itself, as a concept, again goes unacknowledged. It is 
treated as an innocuous or neutral scientific practice. 
 
Earth system scientist Clive Hamilton has rejected popular accounts, such as that of 
Lewis and Maslin (2015), as a “golden spike fetish” based on a “misplaced 
preoccupation” with specific markers or points (2015b, 105). Instead of confusing this 
marker for the epoch, for C. Hamilton the Anthropocene instead represents a more 
holistic transformation in the overall functioning of Earth systems, rather than specific 
or detectable impacts on limited or specific environments, locales, or ecosystems. In this 
account, the Anthropocene does not begin when humans make a significant impact on 
the Earth’s environment or ecosystems, but instead on the Earth as a totality: it must be 
a “a phase shift in the functioning of the Earth System. It is not a continuation of the 
past but a step change in the biogeological history of the Earth” (Hamilton 2015b, 100). 
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In contrast to Clive Hamilton, Lewis and Maslin retort that the Anthropocene is 
inexorably a temporal concept, in that any geological marker, by definition, requires a 
clear definition using the Geologic Time Scale. “Time is divided by geologists 
according to marked shifts in Earth’s state” using the fundamental principles of 
stratigraphy and GSSPs (2016, 109; 2015), and hence Hamilton’s claim that we are ‘in’ 
the Anthropocene is conceptually vacuous until this inherently stratigraphic claim is 
proven. “That human activity has altered Earth fundamentally is rarely questioned 
within scientific publications”, they note, and so what is crucial now, is to formally 
define the Anthropocene “so this paradigm shift can be ratified as part of the Geologic 
Time Scale, and more easily discussed and debated within and beyond the scientific 
community.” (2016, 111). 
 
The point here is that, when considering temporality, the contentious debate over the 
Anthropocene and its golden spike is not one over whether humanity has “made” or 
impacted the Earth, but when this foundational and emergent moment of humanity’s 
‘control’ over planetary processes began. This is summarised well by Smith and Zeder, 
for example, who attempt to resolve (or circumvent) this debate by stressing the need for 
the golden spike as a practical, but necessary, measure (2013). Their point is that a 
golden spike should exist, regardless of its precision or exactness. Zalasiewicz et al. 
(2011) agrees, noting that “for current practical purposes—a GSSP may not be 
immediately necessary.” Why? “At the level of resolution sought, and at this temporal 
distance, simply selecting a numerical age, such as the beginning of 1800 in the 
Christian Gregorian calendar, may be an equally effective practical measure” (2011, 
1050).  
 
Without the golden spike as its defining point and marker, there is no calendrical or 
chronological event from which to determine past/future, and hence no Anthropocene 
epoch. 
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The Golden Spike as the End of History: Re-Governing the Cosmos 
 
This brings us to the central argument of this chapter. As noted above by Foucault and 
Arendt, the de-governmentalization of the cosmos was catalysed by the scientific 
discovery of deep time. This gave rise to modern statist governmentality, in which both 
human time and human history are indefinite. As Foucault stated, this was the time of 
our own “indefinite governmentality”.   
 
The concept of the Anthropocene and its golden spike inverts this cosmological 
narrative. As Lewis and Maslin write, once humanity is granted the power to ‘make’ 
Nature and geological epochs, this “reverses 500 years of scientific discoveries, which 
have continually moved humans to ever-increasing insignificance” (2015, 112). The 
golden spike replicates the event of Christ’s birth and the temporality of BC/AD, and 
maintains a sense of indefiniteness, because it stretches similarly into an infinite past 
and infinite future. However, crucially, it also returns humanity back to the centre of its 
own cosmological order: humans are not passive observers of Earth anymore. “Homo 
sapiens are now central because the future of the only place where life is known to exist 
is being determined by the actions of humans. In fact, we would argue that humanity has 
become a geological superpower” (Lewis and Maslin 2016, 112). Indeed, as chapter 6 
argued, the emergence of the Anthropocene may be considered as a new and global 
form of rationality; a counter-conduct to what came before it. If indeed this “first form 
of counter-conduct is the affirmation of an eschatology in which civil society will 
prevail over the state” (Foucault 2007, 356), then it ends history. And so we now see in 
the Anthropocene a counter-conduct enveloping the globe through global cycles of 
carbon, CO2, and a new rationality of climatic globality . 
 
With the golden spike designating humanity’s ascension into deep time as a geological 
force, comes a re-governmentalization of the cosmos. Conceiving of humanity 
collectively, as “the human enterprise” (see Crist 2013), or as a species in deep time, 
imputes God-like status and meaning to humanity. “In Christian theological terms, the 
much quoted line from Genesis about humanity as having dominion over nature can 
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now simply be read as a statement of fact; this is the point of the Anthropocene” (Dalby 
2009, 164). Just as God once governed the laws of Nature prior to the Cartesian 
Moment, therefore, so it is now that Earth System Science (ESS) is asserted to govern 
the species of humanity in the deep history of the Anthropocene. As Dalby claims, the 
“point is that ecology no longer allows us to formulate humanity as separate from 
nature. This is now simply ontologically impossible; formulations premised on such a 
dichotomy make no practical sense in light of earth-system science” (2009, 164). Once 
again, it is the human subject that is now giving form and content to the Earth, as its new 
maker and master.  
 
As this thesis has thus far argued, to conflate humanity with Nature ontologically, 
represents a metaphysical subjectivism that actually privileges the human subject over 
Nature. The human subject relates itself to everything, endlessly, in what is called 
relationality. This chapter finds that the Anthropocene extends this same relationality 
not simply to space, but to temporality. Humanity re-governs the cosmos, but it asserts 
itself – from its past, as a golden spike, into the future as a ‘we’ of the collective human 
species – to mark a new two-point infinity of carbonic and human stratum, forever 
placed into the Earth. It is a new Genesis story. The human, writes Yusoff, “as an 
organism is made originary rather than parasitic of earth forces and is given a power of 
duration that far exceeds human sensibility [of deep time]” (2016, 13).   
 
Indeed, in IR, “No one would argue that humans are the only species to transform 
landscapes” (Harrington 2016, 488). It becomes clear here that the human subject(ivity) 
can, in the Anthropocene, “in the process of dominating other species, acquire the status 
of a geologic force. Humans, in other words, have become a natural condition, at least 
today” (Chakrabarty 2009, 214). If Chakrabarty is correct, and the Anthropocene’s deep 
time and deep history constitutes the human species as a “human collectivity, an us, 
pointing to a figure of the universal” (2009, 222), then what universal human arises from 
this “shared sense of catastrophe”? What type of humanity supposedly re-governs this 
cosmos engendered by a human spike driven into deep time? Indeed, Chakrabarty 
claims that “With this collapsing of multiple chronologies—of species history and 
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geological times into our very own lifetimes, within living memory—the human 
condition has changed” (2015, 180). Changed into what? 
 
As noted in chapter 6, Heidegger cautioned that subjectivity as an ‘I’ is shaped “always 
in keeping with the way in which [a human] wills himself” (1977b, 152). In other words, 
a human subject can think of itself, or be an ‘I’, but depending on the self-interpretation 
of its epoch, it may also come to think or ‘be’ a nation, a people, a race, or a subject 
picturing itself “as lord of the earth.” The ‘I’ can be cancelled out, however, by an 
insertion of an I, into the ‘we’ (1977b, 152). Indeed, even for Foucault, the “Western 
man is individualized” at the “price of subjectivity”, or subjectiviation (2007, 231). In 
this re-governmentalization of the cosmos, therefore, this individualisation can be 
rejected whilst the subjectiviation can be increased. How? Through the positing of this 
new twopoint infinity – a golden spike – grounded upon the human species itself, rather 
than that of the liberal individual, which arose temporally during the ‘indefinite 
governmentality’ of human time. “Species may indeed by the name of a placeholder for 
an emergent, new universal history of humans that flashes up in the moment of danger 
that is climate change” (Chakrabarty 2009, 222). Yet, like deep time itself, this human 
‘we’ as species is beyond our present comprehension. Our political rationality and its 
underlying metaphysics is not yet the subject of ‘we’, but of the Cartesian ‘I’. Hence, for 
Chakrabarty, “we can never understand this universal. . . . [it] escapes our capacity to 
experience the world” (2009, 222). It is, as of now, incalculable. And as argued in 
chapters 2, 4, and 8, incalculability implies a loss of objectivity, which throws the 
subject back upon itself for certainty. “This becoming incalculable remains the invisible 
shadow that is cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into 
subiectum and the world into picture” (Heidegger 1977b, 135). This is inherent in the 
concept of the Anthropocene and its golden spike, as both are defined by the 
“unintended consequence of human actions and shows, only through scientific analysis, 
the effects of our actions as a species” (Chakrabarty 2009, 222). Across epochs, dormant 
within this concept, is the assumption the individual human must become the ‘we’; 
humanity as a species, now collectively re-governing, stewarding, making, and destining 
Nature and the cosmos, as its relational centre.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the concept of the Anthropocene contains surprising 
ramifications for temporality, subjectivity, and human conduct. IR has presently 
imported and embraced the Anthropocene, yet without considering how its geologic and 
deep notions of temporality would render the human time of politics and IR irrelevant or 
obsolete if they came to fruition. Analysing and interpreting this concept through 
Foucault’s governmentality lectures, this chapter found that the ‘end of history’ 
discussed by Foucault is in fact realised in the concept of the Anthropocene. Its GSSP 
marker, or golden spike, posits a new twofold infinity of a geologic past and future, in 
which humanity re-centers itself within the Earth and cosmos as the centre of Nature and 
Being. The golden spike, at its conceptual core, thus re-governs a cosmological order 
that was de-governmentalized by Hutton’s discovery of deep time. The Anthropocene, 
in other words, ends history. 
 
This re-governmentalization of the cosmos implies that humanity can only project itself 
into an infinite geologic future as a species, as a collective We, or as an “epochal 
consciousness” (Chakrabarty 2009; 2010). It fosters its own “origin/ending story” across 
geologic timescales (Yusoff 2016). When the cosmos was governed, Nature was, in 
turn, divine; Nature was God. “Insofar as he governs, the sovereign does nothing other 
than reproduce a model [that] is quite simply that of God’s government on Earth” 
(Foucault 2007, 233). In the Anthropocene, we see that ‘government’ through the 
reproduction of a model indeed remains. However, it is now the model of the GCM and 
ESS operating at scales of deep time, and a golden GSSP spike that reinserts humanity 
at the centre of a re-governed cosmos, that orders reality. In the temporality of the 
Anthropocene, the human self is once again placed at the centre of past and future, now 
in a constant relation to all timescales. Perhaps this scenario was incidentally 
summarised by Bastian, when he wrote: “Our conventions for coordinating ourselves—
for telling the time—are thus simply not adequate in the current context” (2012, 24). “So 
while the clock can tell me whether I am late for work, it cannot tell me whether it is too 
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late to mitigate runaway climate change” (2012, 25). For the latter, only a golden spike 
driven by a universal human species now forming the Earth and transcending time, will 
do.
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Chapter 8 – Security, Entanglement, and the 
Paradox of the Anthropocene1 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how today’s discourses of the Anthropocene deal 
with existential insecurity. Debates about the nature of ‘security’ have been at the core 
of IR since the discipline’s inception. Interpreting the recent appropriation of security 
into the Anthropocene, therefore, grants us insight into how this concept’s implicit 
rationality and relationality inscribes itself into explicit disciplinary practices. 
 
Unprecedented in its spatial and temporal implications, it is no surprise that the 
Anthropocene is now considered as a global security problem. “Climate change may be 
the most obvious and pressing issue”, writes Dalby (2014, 2) “but the larger picture of 
an Earth system in transition provides the context within which security now needs to be 
rethought”. Yet, in order to rethink security within this transforming the Earth system, 
we are also told that recognising this “interconnection” with Nature overcomes “the 
post-Cartesian human pretense to mastery and calculation” (Burke 2010, 96). In place of 
securing the human being against death, therefore, security discourses now embrace the 
concept of ‘entanglement’ to secure the human subject within life or Nature. 
Entanglement emphasizes humanity’s enmeshment with non-human forms of life and 
matter. This new Anthropocene security thus “requires both dissolving the image of 
humans as unbounded and outside nature, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
diverse, entangled nature of humans with the multiple subjects also threatened with 
future catastrophe” (Harrington 2016, 494). 
 
This chapter argues that an epoch defined by and through the action of anthropos, the 
human, does not represent an entanglement of humanity with things, Nature, or the 
                                                        
1 Sections of this chapter have previously appeared in Hamilton, S. (2017). Securing Ourselves from 
Ourselves? The Paradox of ‘Entanglement’ in the Anthropocene. Crime, Law and Social Change, pp. 1-
20. (Forthcoming). 
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Earth. Instead, discussions of security in the Anthropocene illustrate and intensify a 
profound anthropocentric subjectivism: a dis-entanglement of humanity from Nature. 
The concept of the Anthropocene replaces what was once the primary and objective 
concern of security – i.e. survival, or avoiding death – with anthropos, the human being, 
as the new geological and spatiotemporal force to be reckoned with. With the 
catastrophic prognoses for the Anthropocene’s future making humanity’s temporal, 
ontological, and epistemological essence uncertain, a paradox forms: humanity must 
secure itself in the future from itself in the present, forming what this chapter calls the 
‘Paradox of the Anthropocene’. Upon deeper inspection, ‘entanglement’ is revealed as a 
strategy to ameliorate this existential paradox. It uses quantum sciences and physics to 
project a form of order; a ‘certainty’ of interconnection between humanity and Nature, 
into what is an otherwise uncertain Anthropocene future. Rather than securing its 
entanglement with Nature, however, the human subject grasps only its own relationality: 
“Thus even in science the object of research is no longer nature itself, but man’s 
investigation of nature. Here, again, man confronts himself alone” (Heisenberg 1958, 
24). 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a brief overview of how security and 
entanglement are commonly used and combined in IR’s literatures of climatic and 
Anthropocene globality. Second, it examines how a specific variant of security – 
“ontological security”, or the existential securing of a continuous sense of self1 – best 
encapsulates the problematiques of security discourses surrounding the Anthropocene 
today. Third, by examining the concept of quantum entanglement in greater detail, it 
outlines how the Anthropocene and quantum science are contradictory. The chapter 
shows how the metaphysical subjectivism outlined throughout this thesis is what fosters 
this implicit conceptual dis-entanglement from Nature and the Earth. ‘Entanglement’, 
therefore, emerges from technological enframing in ways akin to the ESS and GCMs 
                                                        
1 For a small but influential sample of the use of ‘ontological security’ in International Relations and 
security studies, see Huysmans, J. (1998). Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick 
Signifier. European Journal of International Relations 4(2): 226-255; Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological 
Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. European Journal of International 
Relations 12(3): 341-370; Steele, B.J. (2008). Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-
Identity and the IR State. London: Routledge.  
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explored in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7: quantum science ‘secures’ only the self-certainty 
of a calculating human subjectivity, rather than any enmeshed or entangled Nature. 
Security, therefore, is just as governed by technological metaphysics and subjectivism as 
the digitised renderings of the global climate or the Anthropocene. Entanglement 
manifests relationality; the human self, drawing its own world picture, to secure itself 
within it. 
 
Security in the Anthropocene 
 
As this thesis has illustrated, the Anthropocene is portrayed as a condition of 
unprecedented discontinuity in Earth’s geologic history. It is a human-made rupture that 
breeds immense uncertainty about the future of humanity and the conditions of life on 
the planet.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that ‘risk’ is typically invoked in discourses treating “known 
unknowns” as uncertainties to be analytically tamed and integrated into decision making 
processes (Daase and Kessler 2007, 412), the uncertainty of the Anthropocene is 
different. With its tipping-points, non-linear feedback loops, and its reach into deep 
time, its uncertainty is that of a “wild card, the unpredictable that can throw over the 
most careful planning”: an unknown unknown (2007, 412). With such unpredictable and 
intergenerational effects, the Anthropocene becomes “about securing the future,” notes 
Dalby (2013, 185), but doing so in in different ways, and on unprecedented scales as 
vast as the “remaking” of the biosphere. “Insecurity is now a geological matter, not a 
matter of just biology or ecology in a given set of natural circumstances” (Dalby 2015, 
3).  
 
So as to reduce geologic insecurity, we are told to recognize that “we cannot survive 
without accepting the cosmopolitan and enmeshed nature of this world. We are an array 
of bodies connected and interconnected in complex ways that have little to do with 
nationality” (Burke et al. 2016, 502). With statist ontologies transcended, security must 
therefore become more interdisciplinary and holistic, recognising the consanguinity of 
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life and non-life as a new condition of entanglement (Cudworth and Hobden 2013, 654).  
“This entanglement does not refer simply to co-existence between humans and the 
natural world,” stresses Harrington (2016 490), “but to a deeper type of entanglement, 
all the way down with other humans, beings, things, and processes. The concepts of self 
and other fade away.” This seems ordinary or commonplace to hear in our present 
moment: Our Anthropocene future is uncertain and insecure, but our entanglement with 
it is not.  
 
Ontological (In)Security and anthropos 
 
If this new entangled Anthropocene condition is accepted, then security logics must 
ensure physical survival in the future by first mediating the uncertainty of planetary 
conditions in the present. This moves security well beyond a focus on the individual, to 
planetary and Earth systems that, by definition, span temporalities of deep time (see 
chapter 7). The key here is that this systemic and geologic transition – from the stability 
of our current Holocene epoch to the unpredictability of the deep time of Anthropocene 
–  is defined by futures and Earths uncertain. Try as we may to model and predict the 
future conditions of the Earth system, no one truly knows how this security picture will 
actually play out (Verburg et al. 2016). In the Anthropocene, “There is no stable 
environment that can be protected or secured”, notes Dalby (2015, 16). There are only 
“different pathways into what will be different futures, each with pitfalls and 
difficulties.” Although the histories, similarities, and differences between risk and 
uncertainty are too expansive for this chapter to review in detail (see Daase and Kessler 
2007), uncertainty is considered here as a form of non-knowledge about the future and 
oneself. This means its dangers are conceptualised in terms of a “lack of knowledge” 
about the future state of the human enterprise, so that the more we know, “non-
knowledge also increases and we become more aware of what we do not know” (Daase 
and Kessler 2007, 419).  
 
The difficulty with this increasing non-knowledge and uncertainty, is that it becomes 
reflected back upon humanity and the human subject. “The Anthropocene confronts us 
 210 
with the condition in which we must redefine the very notion of the human and its 
freedom. There is, no more, a ‘human condition’ as such” (Burke et al. 2016, 521). As 
we erode the immutability of the stable Holocene’s background context, so this familiar 
narrative goes, so we erode the conditions that stabilize what it means to be human. The 
issue becomes, therefore, how an entangled Anthropocene security may best be applied 
to a transforming Earth and an uncertain human condition. The certainty and security of 
humanity in the Holocene becomes an existential uncertainty and insecurity of 
anthropos in the Anthropocene. 
 
If security is considered as something that defines “our relations to nature, to other 
human beings and to the self” (Huysmans 1998, 31), then the changing and 
unpredictable conditions of the Anthropocene are best captured by a concept dealing 
with the existential uncertainty of a discontinuous human self: ontological security. 
Having recently gained traction in IR, ontological security refers not directly to 
planetary, state, or physical security. Instead, it specifies how social and cultural 
practices secure the ‘human condition’ by constructing stable identities, routines, and 
meanings for humans.  
 
Understood broadly, ontological security is “a subject’s capacity to uphold a stable view 
of its environment and thereby ‘go on’ with everyday life” (Browning and Joenniemi 
2016, 31). It is the establishment and maintenance of an existentially continuous, stable, 
and consistent sense of self, or one’s being in a world. Here, the ‘self’ is taken as a 
subjectivity – an ‘I’ – that is certain of its own existence, or that it ‘is’ in being. Yet, 
what this being is – its ontology – is formed intersubjectively through norms and 
practices of selfhood, and its recognition. “Without ontological security,” writes Zarakol 
(2016, 1), “the self cannot know where it begins and ends,” and this is a prerequisite for 
any type of (physical) security, because “what is essential to the body (and its survival) 
can only be defined by the self.” It is a security that makes secure and certain what 
exactly a thinking ‘I’ is. And whether thinking of multiple-selves, entangled-selves, or a 
single subjective ‘I’, there is always some ‘self’ doing the thinking. 
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Only after a self is subjectively secured as what it is – single, multiple, entangled, etc. – 
may objective dangers, to oneself, or one’s community, group, or state – then be 
intersubjectively shared and established as meaningful. As Mitzen (2006) argues, even 
war and conflict may bring ontological security, because each can establish a clear sense 
of self-certainty and orderly routine to which a self can relate, and derive meaning. 
Ontological security is thus temporal; derivative of believing one knows what is coming 
in the future. Without this stable and secure self from which to engage and act in a 
world, security becomes amorphous.  
 
How is this ontology of the self shaped by security? For Huysmans (1998), ontological 
security establishes meaning by relating the self to practices of ordering and to objects 
of uncertainty. These may be described in two ways. First, social order and stability 
secures a human self by establishing feelings of continuity; by positioning people, 
practices, and things within a shared social context of repetition and continuation. 
Secondly, since security is always a strategy aimed at giving and enhancing meaningful 
life, it always mediates and articulates a specific understanding of, and relation to, death. 
Death is the fulcrum around which all meaningful security practices gravitate, because it 
is the ultimate object that security practices aim to avoid. Yet, death remains an 
ephemeral or abstract concept (it cannot be seen, touched, tasted, etc.), and so it is dealt 
with by the self and human groupings by concretizing it into specific objects and 
referents, which are then be incorporated into routines and habits. The uncertainty 
surrounding death is “displaced by concretized dangers, inimical forces ranging from the 
devil to criminals and rival states” (Huysmans 1998, 237). ‘Security’ involves, 
therefore, not only accounting for the power of other humans to kill, but “a fear of 
uncertainty, of an undetermined condition. . . . The way to deal with this fear is to 
objectify death” (1998, 235). Explicit acts securing one’s self against objective threats, 
evince this implicit foundational uncertainty surrounding death as the ultimate security 
threat.  
 
It should strike us immediately that the Anthropocene dissolves the traditional 
understandings of both ‘stable order’ and ‘death’ that are the prerequisites for modern 
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forms of ontological security. What it is to be human, and the nature of mortality, are 
now celebrated as being transformed in this coming planetary epoch. In the 
Anthropocene, fundamental relationships between humanity, the Earth, and even the 
human self and the future of its species, are made indeterminate and uncertain. As noted 
in chapters 6 and 7, for example, many scholars believe that humanity can reconcile 
itself with this temporal uncertainty only by re-conceptualising itself as an epoch-
spanning species, or as a ‘We’ of a collective “epochal consciousness” (Chakrabarty 
2009). Within IR specifically, the authors of the recent Planet Politics manifesto proudly 
declare that “We must face the true terror of this moment. . . . We must be in tension 
with status quo struggles within our disciplines,” so as to foster a revolutionary new 
global political project (Burke et al. 2016, 500, 502-503). The Anthropocene is always 
driven by the terror and uncertainty of non-knowledge, binding all together. 
 
At this point it is clear that by upsetting (inter)subjective status quos of order, and 
calling for new ideas, stories, myths, and social practices, the human pursues security in 
the Anthropocene to ameliorate non-knowledge, or uncertainty. In doing so, the human 
condition and the security threats it once normalized within everyday contexts of statist 
geopolitics, are upended and transformed. But what replaces these outmoded agents and 
structures of the old international statist order? This is where notions of ‘entanglement’ 
enter IR’s security discourses. “The advent of a truly entangled socio-physical nature 
emerges as a reason to radically challenge and rethink the possibility and desirability of 
unified scientific accounts of environmental change,” notes Lövbrand et al. (2011, 215). 
Now, knowledge in the face of uncertainty can be attained by experimenting with 
“multiple and situated ways of seeing and acting upon the hybrid world that we now 
inhabit.” In the “true terror” of the Anthropocene moment, therefore, human agency 
seems here to be rekindled in the face of uncertainty. If anything, the human self can be 
certain that it is entangled.  
 
Replacing the uncertainty of an atomistic human self with this entanglement of being(s), 
the Anthropocene’s all-embracing indeterminacy is also reduced. Entanglement instills a 
sense of order and stability in a future of terror and uncertainty. It does so by enmeshing 
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humanity with Nature itself: “we need to adapt to the world we have created . . . [while 
longing for] a future that allows us all to survive and honours our deep entanglement 
with the planet” (Burke et al. 2016, 500). Human self-certainty is now situated in a new 
context: the “multi-species, multi-sited entanglements within which all life is lived”, and 
which now “give us grounds for action” (Rose 2015, 130). Where Newtonian and 
modern scientific ‘knowledge’ had previously created equal amounts of ‘non-
knowledge’ that increased uncertainty, therefore, entanglement is positioned to have the 
opposite effect: the human self, as anthropos, can take action because of the certitude of 
its entanglement. Interconnection is a certain form of support and order.  
 
In the terror of the Anthropocene’s future, “When it is almost impossible to hierarchize 
threats and when the general impression is that one is in a permanent state of crisis and 
urgency, trust in the capacity to keep threats at a distance crumbles” (Huysmans 1998, 
243). In this uncertainty, entanglement’s relational order accepts the impossibility of 
distancing humanity from security threats. Instead, it celebrates the proximity of all 
beings, reducing the self’s distance to them by stressing its holistic interconnection will 
all matter. Any problems or threats remaining, therefore, are framed as a problem of 
anthropos, or the human maker. Humans possess agency to secure themselves against 
these threats, because there is no longer any distance separating them from the entangled 
perils of their own making. Certainty is thus attained: “Alone with his image of the 
future product, homo faber is free to produce, and again facing alone the work of his 
hands, he is free to destroy” (Arendt 1998, 144).  
 
This leads to a second crucial component of ontological (in)security in the 
Anthropocene: the epistemological uncertainty surrounding death and its mediation. 
According to Huysmans (1998, 237), the “driving force of knowledge is a fear of death 
as the undetermined. In that sense, death constitutes the condition of possibility of 
knowledge.” This future-unknown, death, congeals into objects that may then be 
researched and made known, thereby alleviating existential anxieties and insecurities. 
However, in the Anthropocene it is not death, but the human self – anthropos – that is 
substituted for death as the ultimate ‘object’ of future uncertainty, possibility, and 
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existential angst. In this human epoch, “what needs to be done, the future of humanity, 
the potential of technology and the prospects for civilization”, are all indeterminate and 
uncertain (Dalby 2016, 2). As noted in chapters 2, 6, and 7, traditional understandings of 
human mortality are displaced by assertions that the Anthropocene bestows upon 
humanity godlike or Promethean powers to make nature and its own human condition. 
The golden spike replaces Genesis as a new twopoint marker of deep time, reaching into 
past and futures unknown. Earth system scientists thus confidently declare that it is “an 
undeniable reality” that “we are taking control of Nature’s realm. . . . becoming the 
dominant force for change on Earth. . . . Remember, in this new era, nature is us” 
(Crutzen and Schwägerl 2011, online).  
 
If humans are Nature, and the Anthropocene demands the securing of humanity (and all 
life) from the unpredictable planetary conditions ‘we’ are ‘making’, then the aim of 
security becomes that of securing oneself from oneself. Humanity/Nature must be 
secured from Nature/humanity. The object stoking ontological insecurities and 
demanding new and unprecedented forms of knowledge to alleviate subjective 
uncertainty, is anthropos. We know ourselves, that we do not know the future condition 
of ourselves. Security in the Anthropocene condition is, therefore, humanity entangled 
not with Nature, nor with the planet, but most foundationally, with itself.  
 
This results in what this chapter calls the Paradox of the Anthropocene. For Huysmans 
(1998, 236), it was a paradox of death that generated the self’s ongoing quest for 
ontological security. Death is an awkward “non-object” for humans, demanding the 
most intensive possible reasoning because it is both the ultimate truth (i.e. we all die), 
and the ultimate absurdity (i.e. we may externalize and think of death, but we can never 
truly know it because its arrival ends all cognition and reflection). Simply put, “There is 
a paradoxical relation between death and knowledge” because knowledge is engendered 
and driven to know and to secure itself against what is ultimately impossible to know 
and to secure itself against (Huysmans 1998, 237).  
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In the Paradox of the Anthropocene, the human self becomes the abstract object of 
knowledge that drives and defeats both reason and security in this paradoxical manner. 
The future anthropos and its world of geologic uncertainty is just as intractable to the 
self as death. Destabilizing our subjective and collective meanings, the Anthropocene 
proclaims an ultimate truth (i.e. we are all human, and we all affect nature in some way 
that has created this human epoch); and it situates this truth within an ultimate absurdity 
(we must all rationalize our actions in the present based upon the actions of humans in 
the past, so as to make due with an uncertain and unpredictable future). The profound 
spatiotemporal uncertainty of not knowing which dangers to confront, which to ignore, 
when and how to do so, and what effect our behavior today ultimately creates in the 
future, results in ontological insecurity (Mitzen 2006).  
 
As noted above, this disorder and its ontological insecurity is commonly mediated in IR 
by stressing entanglements of “human relations and social institutions as embodied and 
co-constituted within systems involving a multiplicity of beings and things” and 
“relational systems” (Cudworth and Hobden 2013, 664). This chapter turns now to what 
entanglement is, and how it attempts to fill this knowledge gap opened by the Paradox 
of the Anthropocene. 
 
The Question of Anthropocene Entanglement 
 
‘Entanglement’ is now a popular term that refers to how humanity situates or orders 
itself in relation to nature, material things, and forms of matter in the Anthropocene. 
Rather than being ontologically distinct or existing as discrete entities, binaries and 
dualities of humanity and Nature collapse into a co-constituted and hybrid form. Hence 
the recent relevance of posthuman, trans-human, anti-human, etc., discourses in IR’s 
studies of the Anthropocene today (see Kuehls 1996). Indeed, there are widespread 
multi-disciplinary uses of ‘entanglement’ in recent literature about the Anthropocene, 
ranging across theories of materialism, posthumanism, and actor-network theory (ANT) 
(for a succinct overview, see Hodder 2014). Rather than delve into each use and variety 
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of entanglement, this chapter will now focus on the science and physics most commonly 
bringing it into being in IR’s Anthropocene discourses: quantum physics.  
 
Generally put, quantum entanglement refers to what Einstein once disparaged as 
‘spooky action at a distance’: the ability of particles or objects to instantaneously 
influence one another regardless of spatial distance, and – as some physicists now argue 
– regardless of time (Barad 2010). How is this conceivable, let alone possible? For 
Einstein, the ‘principle of locality’ described how the closer separate objects are to one 
another, the more they can influence one another in a causal sequence. Local distance 
and a cause thereby elicits local action and an effect. Entanglement, however, describes 
nonlocality or how separate particles can influence each other’s ‘spin’ instantaneously, 
regardless of tiny or massive distances (see Bell 1964). This nonlocal entanglement is 
“[p]robably the most enigmatic feature of the quantum world” (Holman 2014, 149). It is 
a generalized form of quantum ‘superposition’, which is a state of complete 
indeterminacy (as made famous by the thought experiment of Schrodinger’s cat). Here, 
think of an object such as an electron existing, but without any place or definite position. 
An electron in a superposition does not congeal into one detectable state until it is 
observed, meaning that, prior to observation, it seems as if it existed everywhere, and in 
all and any possible configurations. In other words, a “quantum superposition is a 
nonclassical relation among different possibilities, . . . [meaning that] being/becoming is 
an indeterminate matter”, and thus classical notions of identity, ontology, distance, and 
time, are undone (Barad 2010, 251).  
 
For Bohr, quantum entanglement pointed to how the apparatuses of measurement used 
in these experiments were actually what delimited and formed the concepts that made 
matters and forms of being/becoming thinkable and cognizable (also, see Heisenberg 
1958). What quantum entanglement implies, therefore, goes far beyond the simple and 
classical notion of two or more states/entities/events being intertwined or enmeshed. It is 
“a calling into question [of] the very nature of two-ness, and ultimately of one-ness as 
well” (Barad 2010, 251). No particle has a fixed nature or temporality, but these are 
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acquired only through a complex entanglement of ‘the object’ and its ‘agencies of 
observation’ in the measurement process (Barad 2010).  
 
This is hard to reconcile with IR and security studies, and for good reason: entanglement 
is confusing and counter-intuitive because it opposes the classical or neo-Newtonian 
physics upon which our everyday styles of thinking IR – our metaphysics – rest. 
Classical and Western (meta)physics tells us that physical objects are individual, 
bounded, measureable, and calculable; they exist on a linear plane of spacetime, moving 
from causes to effects. These may be predicted in the future, if we learn enough about 
their internal and external causal mechanisms and conjunctions, by measuring them. 
Wendt has recently noted how classical physics shapes the social sciences by 
determining the world in five ways: as material, separable, defined at micro- and macro-
levels, responsive to local stimuli or causal forces, and as comprehending behavior 
according to internal and external forces operating causally on bodies (Wendt 2015, 
151-152). So, in order to break away from this mechanistic, determinist, classical 
reading of reality, many scholars have now advocated post-Newtonian, complex, and 
non-human centered accounts of (social) reality (Cudworth and Hobden 2013).  
 
Enter quantum physics, which offers a drastic break in IR’s thinking from its classical 
Newtonian foundations of bounded and discrete entities. Recently, Der Derian (2013) 
has investigated how spooky connections of a networked global media result in 
spacetime oscillations between virtual and real wars, creating a type of “quantum war”. 
For Montgomery (2016), a quantum take on security offers the potential to grasp global 
processes that transcend national boundaries instantaneously, such as cyberspace 
processes or the local-global components of drone strikes. Like quantum states, he 
argues, these issues and entities span the globe, “potentially even existing 
simultaneously in multiple spaces or even, like quantum states, acting at a distance” 
(2016, 104). Here, with global yet simultaneous events transcending local spatialities, 
security studies is attempting to scrap notions of independent, discrete, ontological units, 
for quantum narratives of superpositionality and entanglement.        
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This brings us to the combination of ‘security’ and ‘entanglement’ in discourses of the 
Anthropocene. Although entanglement refers to the behavior of particles at the smallest 
of microscopic or quantum levels, as noted above, it is used commonly as an analogy 
linking disparate spatialities and entities together, from micro to macro levels. 1 
Declarations of our ‘entangled Anthropocene condition’ thus imply a quantum or 
paradigm-shifting transition away from classical understandings of Newtonian, 
localized, mechanistic, and bounded units such as bodies and states, to an understanding 
of politics and humanity as enmeshed with all life systems on Earth. Explicit calls to 
incorporate geophysical sciences such as Earth system science (ESS) and its popular 
planetary boundaries model (Biermann 2014; Burke et al. 2016), are indicative of this 
bid to re-conceptualize how security can and will operate: through enmeshed, complex, 
and simultaneous interconnections or intra-actions. This is rather different from the 
classical buffering of space(s) between a subject in need of protection, and the external 
object or threat from which it must be secured. The Anthropocene – we are told – thus 
renders old Newtonian security paradigms and assumptions obsolete. This raises an 
immediate question, which IR seems to have overlooked: can the Anthropocene and 
entanglement actually fit together? And if not, then why does IR now witness so much 
‘entanglement’ discussions in Anthropocene security discourses?   
 
Upon inspection, entanglement does not replace nor re-conceptualize our understanding 
of security in the Anthropocene. Ultimately, it tacitly embraces neo-Newtonian 
conceptual foundations that repeat classical scientific and metaphysical assumptions 
concerning humanity, physical security, and the manner in which a human self thinks of 
Nature and the Earth. In other words, the ontological insecurity prompted by the 
Paradox of the Anthropocene remains firmly upon Newtonian pillars, as shown through 
its discourses of time, science, and planetary boundaries. 
 
First, consider time. The Anthropocene relies upon sciences, epistemologies, and 
ontologies of a neo-Newtonian and classical understanding of geologic time. As 
discussed in chapter 7 and its review of the GSSP or golden spike, the Anthropocene is 
                                                        
1 For a direct application of quantum physics to social or ‘macro’ phenomena, see Wendt (2015). 
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ultimately dependent upon geologic science and stratigraphy, and their understanding of 
linear chronological history. Inherent in the concept of the Anthropocene is the strict 
temporal hierarchy of ever-finer hierarchical units or stages (dating from the earliest 
eon, to the more recent era, period, and finally, epoch). Basically, these divisions 
“represent differences in the functioning of Earth as a system and the concomitant 
changes in the resident life forms” (Barry and Maslin 2016, 3). The point here is not to 
dispute the social construction of these dating practices, nor to ignore their historicity or 
the fact they were initially constructed by the co-constitution of Victorian sciences and 
politics imbued with racist and misogynistic understandings about nature and humanity 
(see Dahan 2010). Rather, the point is that, ultimately, the conceptual foundation of the 
Anthropocene depends upon the measurement and recognition of discrete units of deep 
time that must be placed in a chronological and linear sequence in relation to anthropos, 
the human. If this linear Newtonian order is not followed, the concept of the 
Anthropocene becomes meaningless; just another point in time. 
 
Indeed, even IR scholars embracing ‘entanglement’ analogies of a planetary politics 
must accept how the Anthropocene “revolves around a series of technical and evidential 
questions about how to determine the boundary of a distinct ‘human’ controlled 
geological time unit” (Barry and Maslin 2016, 9). As argued in chapter 6, the implicit 
conceptual foundations of the concepts structuring subjectivity thereby shape the 
possibilities of how we may think and act. Again, if there is no geologically and 
stratigraphically discrete and sedimented temporal foundation to the Anthropocene – 
meaning, if the Newtonian chronological sequencing bringing this concept into being is 
suddenly bunk – then the concept loses its significance and impact. However, this raises 
the question of how an entangled human/Nature Anthropocene hybrid can truly form, 
when its recognition and justification ultimately depends upon hierarchical and classical 
understandings of discrete, differential, temporal measurements, as well as the insertion, 
identification, and development of humanity and its impacts into this linear geologic 
timeframe. Rather than non- or atemporal quantum entanglement, the conceptual root of 
the Anthropocene looks more like thin layers of rock strata secured in deep time, and 
layered through a strict linear temporal hierarchy.  
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Second, and following from this first point, the ESS that brings the Anthropocene into 
being depends upon complex mathematical computer simulations combining the physics 
of fluid (thermo)dynamics with economic theory (see chapters 4 and 6). It is worth 
recalling that these “Socio-ecological models are built based on our understanding of 
real-world systems, grounded in physical laws for the biophysical components, and 
economic theory and observations for the socio-economic system components” 
(Verburg et al. 2016, 332). Once again, these simulations operate by quantifying Nature 
into grids of small and discrete variables or ‘paramaterizations’, which then model 
“direct cause-and-effect explanations through multivariate statistics of available 
datasets” (2016, 332). These models project nature outwards under the technological 
and representational metaphysics of enframing (see chapter 2). Here, every ‘thing’ in 
nature becomes a represented object, challenged-forth into thinkable being as a 
calculable coherence of forces that are amenable to quantification and simulation 
(Heidegger 1977a; 1977b). These ESS models also lack the capacity to parameterize and 
predict the inexorably unpredictable social events and drivers of change, and hence, 
rational-choice algorithms from “economic theory and observations for the socio-
economic system components” are used (Verburg et al. 2016, 332). If ESS struggles to 
integrate society and human behavior into its models, then layering analogies of 
quantum physics on top of them appears epistemologically and ontologically 
incongruous. ‘Entanglement’ thus remains in our present Anthropocene discourses as a 
vague analogy or buzzword invoking holism. It is an attempt at ordering the uncertainty 
surrounding human time and security, as projected and set forth by the inconceivable 
mathematical complexity of ESS models.   
 
Although the basics of quantum physics also depends upon statistics and a type of 
quantum causality to make predictions, “quantum mechanics is incompatible with the 
view that physical observables possess pre-existing values independent of the 
measurement context” (Brickner 2014, 259). Nature might be manifested in certain 
phenomena in the macro world, but conceived through entanglement, these 
manifestations would be so incommensurable to everyday neo-Newtonian thought that 
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they would be “irreducibly beyond anything we can experience or beyond anything we 
can possibly conceive of” (Plotnitsky 2003, 1653). In other words, quantum uncertainty 
rules entanglement in a mind-boggling way, whilst the classical understandings of 
causality, and the certainty that we exist as human subjects that are self-certain of our 
own thinking ‘I’, still grounds our age in Newtonian and Cartesian metaphysics 
(Heidegger 1977b, 115). Indeed, as this thesis has thus far argued, these Cartesian and 
Newtonian metaphysics conducts and governs us so uniformly in and through global 
concepts such as climate change and the Anthropocene, that we barely even notice their 
metaphysical subjectivism as it becomes embraced and enacted in our everyday thought 
and behavior. This is relationality, and our world picture: everything becomes an 
insecure relation reflected back to the human self. Simply making explicit declarations 
that classical sciences and renderings of Nature are now ‘entangled’, therefore, does not 
actually make them so on an implicit or metaphysical level. It actually masks the self-
certainty of the Cartesian subjectivity making these claims. A classical Newtonian 
causality still objectifies quantum entanglement itself as a thing or object, to be used and 
related back to a human subject and world. Or, to put this another way: IR cannot simply 
overcome Western metaphysics, causality, and subjectivity, simply by reading about 
how to overcome Western metaphysics and then declaring it to be so. This move only 
intensifies the technological and metaphysical conceptual foundations engendering these 
claims. 
 
For example, Maslin claims the concept best framing the effect of humanity upon the 
Earth system is the planetary boundaries model (Barry and Maslin 2016, 2. Also, see 
chapter 6). These are discrete and quantitative boundaries, units, or limits, within which 
humanity should operate to achieve a safe space for human development. Likewise, it is 
this model that IR scholars are now basing their Earth System Governance (ESG) 
frameworks upon (Biermann 2014). Yet, these boundaries are inexorably social and 
subjective: they articulate “human-determined values of the control variable set at a 
‘safe’ distance from a dangerous level (for processes without known thresholds at the 
continental to global scales)” (Rockström et al. 2009, 32). Ultimately, these boundaries 
boil down to whatever norms and ethics have been established within the group 
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selecting its parameters: “Determining a safe distance involves normative judgments of 
how societies choose to deal with risk and uncertainty” (2009, 33).  
 
Finally, any notion of a quantified ‘safe’ space obviously retains the classical Newtonian 
epistemologies of calculating secure, bounded limits for the ‘future’ of humanity, that 
IR’s security discourses hoped entanglement would transcend. To counter the 
uncertainty of the Anthropocene, these boundaries prescribe a predictive orderly 
security. It is designed to reduce uncertainty within discrete limits or boundaries, so as 
to ensure the survival and development of the human enterprise from the 
unpredictability and uncertainty emerging outside of its limits. Indeed, humanity must 
respect the limits of these linear thresholds as “Earth’s ‘rules of the game’ or, as it were, 
. . . the ‘planetary playing field’ for the human enterprise” (Rockström, J. et al. 2009, 
32). The point here is that ESS and its planetary boundaries model replicates the 
Western secular cosmology outlined in chapters 6 and 7. This model works by explicitly 
measuring the distance between an ‘objective’ nature and humanity, rather than focusing 
on enmeshment per se. Nature is once again placed into a structural numerical box as the 
background context from which humanity must be contrasted in order to make itself 
secure.  
 
As Fagan (2016) has also noted, an implicit human/Nature dualism results from this. 
Any relation of the environment and security supposedly erasing the boundaries 
between humanity and Nature becomes itself a distinct and violent act, delineating or 
asserting what is or is not Nature. In this case, entanglement becomes, therefore, an 
analogy masking a neo-Newtonian ordering of subject to object that is actually inherent 
to the ESS, planetary boundaries, and thus to conceptualizing the Anthropocene. In 
short, if we were entangled, (1) there should be no boundaries or particulates, and (2) we 
could never know it.  
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Security as Dis-entanglement? 
 
If the analogy of ‘entanglement’ fails to cohere with the Anthropocene, then why has it 
gained so much traction in IR? As this section argues, rather than interconnection, it 
illustrates a profound dis-entanglement that is fueled by the existential uncertainties 
outlined above. Entanglement and the ethical appeals now attached to it are ultimately 
attempts to rekindle a sense of human agency that is otherwise lost in a world of the 
Anthropocene’s incalculability and unpredictability. Entanglement, therefore, is a 
quintessential example of the relationality that emerges in the globality of the 
Anthropocene: relating the human self to every object and referent, in an attempt to 
make itself more subjectively certain and secure. 
 
Humans are undoubtedly a part of, and drastically affect, Nature. However, notions of 
planetary stewardship, responsibility, accountability, enfolding and intimacy, etc., are 
only one side of the entanglement coin. If we are truly entangled beings along quantum 
lines, then we cannot choose what to be entangled with, nor how. We simply are. Yet, if 
this is the case, we must also be equally entangled with death, destruction, catastrophe, 
guile, etc. And yet despite this, it is stewardship, morality, and ethical responsibility in 
the Anthropocene that rises to the fore of our ethical compass and discussions. Why? If 
all being/matter is entangled, then why the assumption the latter values are somehow 
intrinsic to us, and the former are reprehensible and should be avoided?   
 
This capacity for ethical and moral choice and reflection about entanglement and human 
agency as safeguarding or intra-acting with Nature highlights humanity’s dis-
entanglement. Dis-entanglement is to recognize how the Western neo-Newtonian 
science and physics underpinning the ESS and the Anthropocene remains within a 
representationalist and technological metaphysics. It is dependent upon our own 
subjective certainty of our particular existence in a shared social world – as chapter 6 
defined it, our ‘relationality’ – and the care needed to orient this sense of self, its relation 
to the world, and the conduct of our conduct within it. Entanglement, in-itself – like all 
scientific concepts – is amoral, indifferent, and ethically vacuous (Arendt 2006). It 
 224 
simply ‘is’ as any mathematical projection ‘is’. From ESS to entanglement, therefore, 
“all quantification in science, appeals to our sense of objectivity, but even the most 
mathematically and computationally sophisticated model will not absolve us of the need 
for judgment, nor of the need to justify our judgments in human terms” (Oreskes 2000, 
80). Calls we now see in IR for safekeeping or interconnections with Nature, are thus 
social and human values or aspirations, therefore, rather than any scientific fact or proof 
derived from quantum.  
 
The argument here is not to evacuate the capacity for choice or ethics from the 
Anthropocene – again, a frightening thought – but to note how their use in security 
discourses concerning entanglement serves a particular function. Implicitly, this 
function is to make the human subject more certain of itself, in an otherwise uncertain 
situation, identified above as the Paradox of the Anthropocene. At first, it seems as 
though choosing with what, and how, one is to be entangled and interconnected, makes 
certain the agency of the self in an insecure epoch. But as Heisenberg (1958, 28) wrote 
about quantum phenomena, “Many modern creeds which claim that they are in fact not 
dealing with questions of faith but are based on scientific knowledge, contain inner 
contradictions and rest on self-deception.” Why is this certainty of a secure and 
entangled self based on contradiction and deception?  
 
All knowledge of quantum entails an implicit human self-projection and representation 
resulting from how its measurement procedures first bring these ‘objects’ into being. We 
can never know ‘entanglement’ in-itself as an object or thing, but only as it is described 
and made objective, through mathematical measurements. In other words, “As a final 
consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer 
deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them” 
(Heisenberg 1958, 15). Entanglement is always, therefore, enframed, and it is grounded 
on a human observation and projection of itself (its own knowledge).  
 
As Heymann (2010b, 591) has noted about GCMs and ESS, their endless quest to 
increase the resolution of the parameterization of their models increases their 
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uncertainty in turn. The higher the resolution and computational power, the more 
uncertainty regarding the future is produced. Order in this uncertainty and insecurity is 
implicitly achieved by asserting or recognising one’s Anthropocene entanglement. 
Interconnection with Nature becomes a pillar of stability. However, it becomes clear 
when considering what ‘quantum entanglement’ actually is, that this order stems from a 
self-certainty made by relating oneself to everything in this entangled world. Security in 
the Anthropocene comes from the choice of how to secure oneself, from oneself 
generalised as the anthropos of the future. This is a security of relationality, therefore, 
because it is the dis-entangled self that chooses what to be secured from, and what it is 
to be entangled or enmeshed with. Again, this is the essence of relationality and its 
world picture: “What is decisive is that man himself expressly takes up this position as 
one constituted by himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself, 
and that he makes it secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity” 
(Heidegger 1977b, 132). Ironically, it is only because we are dis-entangled from Nature, 
that we have the subjective space or world picture to then assert ourselves as entangled.   
 
This does not mean we should abandon hope for human ethics or morality, however. 
True, these entangled particles do not have agency; they simply are/not depending upon 
how they are affected by a human’s measurement apparatus. Yet for Foucault, ethics 
remains the practice of a self’s choice and freedom, but always within regimes and 
forms of ‘truth’ that are temporal and socially constructed amongst others, in shared 
practices (Foucault 2000e). Because we are dis-entangled, therefore, humans do have 
this socially constructed capacity for individual choice, judgment, and agency. There 
exists a shared human and social world of practices, traditions, cultures, and politics. 
And it is from this world that IR discourses construct, for an agent, the potential to 
choose with what to be entangled with, and how. Human subjects may retain the 
potential to act, even within the encroachment of a technological relationality. They may 
always question what implicit boundaries might hinder the explicit concepts they have 
taken for granted. The metaphysics grounding one’s age cannot be overcome through 
self-assertions (Heidegger 1977b), but it can be critiqued by problematising the tacit or 
banal practices and concepts shaping everyday lives. Ironically, entanglement reduces 
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this human capacity for critique by asserting relational forms of order from the top-
down. In seeking to gain ontological security, entanglement actually reduces agency, 
just as asserting oneself as ‘humanity’ might act as a homogenised epochal 
consciousness, species, or ‘We’ (see Chakrabarty 2009).  
 
This gap opened by our metaphysical dis-entanglement, therefore, is not a refutation nor 
disparagement of Anthropocene ethics. It is a call to act ethically through that same 
historical and social space. In this sense, the Paradox of the Anthropocene might be 
resolved, and existential security achieved, by acknowledging this dis-entanglement of 
one’s subjectivity from Nature and the future Anthropocene. A dis-entangled 
ontological security comes, at least partially, from knowing that entanglement under our 
current metaphysical circumstance is impossible. With this recognition comes 
continuity, through which we can choose to act. “Armed with ontological security, the 
individual will know how to act and therefore how to be herself” (Mitzen 2006, 345).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the Anthropocene fosters a new form of ontological 
insecurity: a Paradox of the Anthropocene, in which anthropos replaces death as the 
ultimate object of unpredictability and insecurity in the future. Humans are told to 
secure their present/future self from their future/present self. In response to the terror of 
an unpredictable and uncertain future wrought by itself as anthropos, many scholars 
now use the quantum concept of ‘entanglement’ to posit a new relation of anthropos to 
Nature. Entanglement implies order and certitude in otherwise uncertain times: 
epistemologically, to know more about humanity’s enmeshment with Nature is to know 
more about oneself, and Nature. Ontologically, if humanity has ‘become’ Nature, makes 
it as homo faber, and is even mineralized into geologic strata (Yusoff 2016), then the 
existential uncertainty surrounding human space, time, and mortality, is reduced. Rather 
than increasing the distance between the human self and security threats, entanglement 
interconnects them, and positions the human being as their maker and master. 
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Entanglement thereby appears as a way to order and mediate existential uncertainty, so 
as to gain ontological security. 
 
Upon analysis, however, the quantum implications of ‘entanglement’ are irreconcilable 
with the classical and neo-Newtonian foundations upon which the Anthropocene is 
grounded. As Heisenberg (1958) cautioned, the nature of quantum science means that 
humans are not measuring objective universals or referents, but only their own 
knowledge re-presented back to them through their own measurements. In a discipline 
such as IR where security is a key organising concept, the recent combination of 
security in the Anthropocene with ‘entanglement’ illustrates an attempt to alleviate this 
existential uncertainty by relating the calculating subject to every single referent it can 
cognate. Entanglement thereby forms a new type of order and certainty that reduces the 
anxiety experienced through Cartesian and Newtonian metaphysics, and the Paradox of 
the Anthropocene. However, in relating the human subject to everything – including its 
own security threats, in a future determined by itself as anthropos – entanglement is the 
pinnacle of what this thesis has identified as relationality. It secures a globality 
dependent upon technological subjectivism. Yet, it is the ability to choose or act within 
this uncertain Paradox of the Anthropocene, that a human subject’s dis-entanglement 
from Nature is highlighted. It is only by accepting one’s own subjective distance or 
separation from Nature and the Earth, therefore, that the capacity to act ethically as a 
human agent embedded within relationality, may be channeled into the capacity for 
critique. Dis-entanglement may thereby foster ontological security by recognising a 
continuous self, possessing at least this small certainty within an otherwise uncertain 
Anthropocene epoch. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion: Humanity at the Edge of its Epoch 
 
Probably never in human history [has] a single and universal understanding of climate existed.  
(Heymann 2010b, 593) 
 
The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The word ‘picture’ now 
means the structured image that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before. 
(Heidegger 1977b, 134) 
 
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the findings of this thesis. It then discusses 
the limitations of this project, emphasising what its research does and does not do. It 
concludes by outlining the implications of this research for International Relations (IR) 
as a discipline more generally, elaborating why the findings of this project are 
meaningful and important.  
 
This thesis project offered a novel interpretation of globality and (global) 
governmentality in IR. Its research has answered the question of how we in IR have 
come to ‘think’ of global climate change and the Anthropocene the way we do today. It 
has argued that a global governmentality shapes our thought and conduct whenever we 
think about the ‘global’ climate or the Anthropocene epoch. These concepts function as 
political technologies that render reality thinkable in specific ways. Through its 
genealogical tracing of these concepts and how they intersected with the nation-state and 
the discipline of IR, it illustrated how they emerged into being through a complex 
intersection of natural, scientific, and nuclear physics, sciences, practices, and 
discourses. It has also combined governmentality analytics and technological 
metaphysics to show how these concepts shape subjectivity when they are learned and 
used. Rather than create a global polity in accordance with traditional notions of 
spatiality or sovereignty, therefore, it has illustrated how this new form of global 
governmentality is ultimately (inter)subjective, and grounded upon scientific processes: 
its shared concepts of globality intensify an anthropocentric subjectivism, identified here 
as ‘relationality’. With every thought of the global climate or the Anthropocene epoch, 
the human subject is ultimately calculating, measuring, and seeing, itself. This is what 
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Heidegger described as the subjectivism of the world picture: “Man as representing 
subject, however, ‘fantasizes,’ i.e. he moves in imaginatio, in that his representing 
imagines, pictures forth, whatever is, as the objective, into the world as picture” (1977b 
147). Yet this world picture implies a potential shift of the subiectum: from the I of 
Cartesian metaphysics, to a self-certainty now established through the ‘We’ of a 
globalised notion of humanity as a species, reaching across unprecedented spatial and 
temporal boundaries.  
 
Despite being components of a greater whole, each chapter in this thesis project is also 
able to stand on its own, offering a novel and unique argument and contribution 
concerning how a piece of this puzzle of climatic and Anthropocene globality, came into 
being.  
 
Although situated in IR, readers may have noticed literatures incorporated here from 
other disciplines, such as the history of science (Edwards 2010), geography (Hulme 
2010), and Earth systems science (Crutzen 2002; Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). Some may (at 
first) consider this a limitation of this thesis, since its author is neither a climate scientist 
nor a geographer. However, a multi-disciplinary scope not only points towards potential 
and fruitful cross-disciplinary conversations in the future, but it highlights a crucial 
contribution of this thesis project. It is the first critical and genealogical analysis in IR 
concerning (1) How the global climate relates to the Anthropocene epoch specifically, 
and (2) How the scientific concepts underpinning governmentality, climate change, and 
the Anthropocene, shape the subjectivities, rationalities, and hence disciplinary debates, 
emanating from them. It has also been able to outline for IR a methodology for (global) 
genealogy and governmentality, that it hopes scholars will adopt going forth. Readers 
may have also noticed that the thesis does not delve heavily into authors steeped in 
science and technology studies (STS), new materialism, post-humanism, or Actor-
Network Theory (ANT). Although these literatures excel in analysing the relationships 
between science, society, and politics, they are each massive in their scope and breadth, 
and thus have largely been omitted due to (1) the space constraints of this thesis, and (2) 
the aim to elaborate more specifically on the combination of Foucauldian, Arendtian, 
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and Heideggarian philosophies. However, it is hoped that incorporating these literatures 
to both aid and to critique the claims made in this thesis, will be embraced by IR 
scholars in the future. 
 
Following from this latter point, it must also be mentioned that the position of this thesis 
is one that interrogates the historical and social construction of human thought across 
time. As such, it is at odds with critical IR scholarship that conceives of climatic 
globality and the Anthropocene as a relational ontology, indicative of a new ‘entangled’ 
human condition that upsets or overcomes binaries of subject/object or human/nature by 
reconceptualising matter and materiality. Contrary to these claims, this thesis has traced 
how the historical and social conditions underpinning present thought and discourse in 
IR emerged through a complex combination of scientific rationalities, technologies, and 
political interventions into environmental and global governance. It thus agrees with 
Arendt (1998, 183) that “The basic error of all materialism in politics . . . is to overlook 
the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique 
persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, 
material object.” The concept of ‘relationality’ developed by this thesis, and which it 
argues underpins our present global governmentality evinced through climatic 
globalities, is indeed intangible in this very sense – a relationship of power and 
knowledge communicated between thinking human beings in plurality – yet this makes 
it no less real, nor less important to consider when investigating why and how climate 
change and the Anthropocene ‘matters’ to us now, and in the future, as we endlessly 
relate ourselves to it as the ‘We’ of a human species now affecting the globe itself.    
 
Findings: Globality as the mask of subjectivism 
 
As Foucault (2007, 276) stated pithily in his 1977-1978 Collège de France lectures, his 
intention was never to provide “a genealogy of the state itself or the history of the state.” 
Rather, his intention was to interpret the practices and rationalities that combined, at a 
specific point in time, to make the state seem real; to bring the state into being as a 
tangible, thinkable, debatable, collection of shared and reflected practices. In elaborating 
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upon this aim, Foucault made an analogy that animates the spirit of this thesis: “My aim 
has not been to give you the history of the planet Earth in terms of astrophysics,” he 
quipped (2007, 276), “but to give you the history of the reflexive prism that, at a certain 
moment, allowed one to think that the Earth was a planet.” In other words, the goal of 
Foucault’s genealogy was not to provide a concrete or universal history that would stand 
for all posterity. Rather, the point of every genealogy is to interpret how, through a 
unique combination of social practices and ways of thinking, an object taken for granted 
– such as the Earth as a planet, or the globality of the climate – becomes an immutable 
or natural concept. The point is to make us question our present moment anew, whilst 
accepting with humility that this present will also inevitably change. This is what makes 
a genealogy ongoing, as a “critical ontology of ourselves [that] must be considered not, 
certainly, as a theory, doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating”, but an ongoing ethos of self-critique; “the historical analysis of the 
limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” 
(Foucault 2000, 319).  
 
With this impetus in mind, this thesis identified and proceeded through four essential 
stages of a genealogical analytic: problematisation, practice, rationality, emergence. 
After demonstrating that Foucauldian genealogy can be used concurrently with 
Heidegger’s metaphysics and Arendt’s analyses of the social, it moved on to trace how 
these concepts of climatic globality emerged in IR. It found the underlying 
problematique to be a catastrophic global climate change wrought by nuclear winter and 
calls for world order; its practice to be the complex computer simulations of GCMs, 
embracing a physics of fluid dynamics too complex for human calculation and 
cognition; its rationality to be one of powerlessness and failure, in which humanity is 
constructed as helpless to repair a concept of climatic globality always already damaged 
and broken; and finally, the emergence of a new political rationality in the early 2000s: a 
global biopolitics of carbon, rendered intelligible by computerised simulation models of 
the ESS, and ranging from atomic to global scales. From this genealogical event, this 
thesis was therefore able to analyse how these de-naturalised concepts structure forms of 
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temporality, security, and (quantum) entanglement that IR takes for granted across its 
literature today. 
 
If “modes of thinking themselves are made possible and structured through concepts” 
(Crist 2013, 139), then the scientific and mathematical foundations of the concepts of 
climate change and the Anthropocene structure a specific mode of thinking. Indeed, this 
thesis has illustrated this mode of thinking to be a form of global governmentality based 
upon scientific renderings of Nature. It is a mode of thought and conduct made thinkable 
only through simulations framing the atom of carbon and the human self in a specific 
way: as a quantified and incalculable relation of forces (Heidegger 1977a). This form of 
enframed governmentality has two effects directly relevant to IR. First, global climate 
change and the Anthropocene are de-politicised due to the technological and 
metaphysical constitution of their concepts as enframed, or thinkable only through this 
calculative ‘world picture’. As argued in chapter 4, the unpredictability required for 
inventive political action is curtailed, through a politics grounded upon natural science 
and physics. Once politics is oriented by a physics through which “nature reports itself 
in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains 
orderable as a system of information” (Heidegger 1977a, 23), action is restricted to the 
boundaries of possibility within this same system of information. Hence, this conceptual 
restriction becoming standardised within the shared GCM models that frame climatic 
globalities we take for granted. This results in endemic failures of climate governance, 
as noted in chapter 1 as it situated the context of climatic globality in the COP21 climate 
conference. This projects thus contributes to literatures on climate governance and 
planetary boundaries by stressing the implicit conceptual limitations that these scientific 
practices may place on policymaking. Prior to seeking solutions, policymakers must first 
ask how their problems have been made thinkable as a tangible political rationality.  
 
Second, another contribution of this thesis lies not in what this global governmentality 
does, but how it is made thinkable: through a technological and metaphysical 
subjectivism, that reconceives Nature as humanity. This subjectivism was outlined in 
chapter 2 and traced to its emergence in chapter 6. Chapters 7 and 8 highlighted 
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examples of how this subjectivism shapes contemporary thought in IR, by relating 
temporality, security, and entanglement, always implicitly back to the securing of the 
human self. Indeed, it was found that the way the human subject relates everything back 
to itself was accomplished through the common medium or substrate of carbon. The 
carbon atom is irreducibly present across space and time in discourses of climate change 
and the Anthropocene alike. Yet, whilst some IR literatures do examine the effect of 
carbon upon individual conduct and action (Rothe 2011; Paterson and Stripple 2010; 
Stripple and Bulkeley 2014), carbon and climate are not problematised, but treated as 
stable or universal concepts. These studies simply apply the carbon atom to the familiar 
liberal and statist narratives of governmentality cautioned in chapter 2. Yet, just as the 
application of physics to the entity of ‘population’ once allowed the processes of a 
society to be discovered and hence governed (Foucault 2007; Barry et al. 1996), so 
today does the application of the physics of ESS to the entity and territory of the ‘globe’, 
bring this new form of global governmentality into being. Through the carbon atom, it is 
a governmentality in which human subjectivity is endlessly related to the Earth and 
governed through mediums such as CO2. As the complexity and sheer incalculability of 
the scale and processes of these global flows are outlined, human certainty becomes 
grounded in the self as its foundation. What emerges from this carbonic subjectivism is 
what this thesis has identified as relationality: a form of subjective conduct in which the 
only possible way to cognate and think about the world, is to relate it to oneself as an 
external object one has made, and hence controls. 
 
Limits: What this thesis does and does not do 
 
This section reflects on some potential limitations of this thesis, and how these are 
mediated or overcome by its methodology and conclusions. It also discusses new 
avenues of research in the future that it is hoped IR will engage. 
 
First, let us recall Foucault’s concerns over what he called the intellectual “blackmail” 
of either “being for or against the Enlightenment” (Foucault 2000a, 314). Here, Foucault 
was adamant that the ethos of genealogical methodology, the ongoing critique of 
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ourselves as a “limit attitude”, should not be misconstrued as a statement for or against 
whatever referent was being problematised. For instance, Foucault was neither for nor 
against the Enlightenment (nor the state!) per se, but his genealogical critique asked how 
these concepts emerged into historical being, so that the limitations these concepts 
created within thought could be reconsidered anew. This being said, it is no secret that 
Foucault remains ‘blackmailed’ to this day, still being accused of assaulting “Western 
civilization” itself through an immoral or truth-less nihilism (Hartman 2015, 3). 
 
In a like fashion, this thesis hopes to avoid being charged with an analogous ‘blackmail’ 
of the global climate or the Anthropocene. Indeed, a danger of this project might be that 
it is misconstrued as being ‘for or against’ these concepts. Hence, it should be repeated 
here that its point is to consider how the sciences rendering these concepts thinkable, 
shape and delimit the possibilities and limitations for thought and action enacted through 
them. Just as Foucault’s goal was to examine “the reflexive event, the set of processes” 
by which the concept of the Earth as a planet, or the state as a governing authority, 
entered into thought and action (2007, 276), so this thesis explored how the global 
climate and the Anthropocene have emerged into being and were made thinkable and 
debatable in IR. It does not reject the dire prognostications of climate science or ESS, 
but critiques how many concepts and practices emerging from them have become taken 
for granted without considering the boundaries and limits they place upon thought. 
 
Second, this thesis does not attempt to make ethical prescriptions or recommendations 
concerning what to do about global climate change and the Anthropocene. Although it is 
indeed sympathetic to the goals of many of the pieces of scholarship it critiques (e.g. 
Burke et al. 2016; Burke 2010; Mitchell 2014), the purpose of a genealogy is different. 
It asks how these claims are made thinkable, but it does not judge their moral or ethical 
worth. Indeed, this limitation ties in to what Bartelson (1995, 77) isolated as the 
“standard” list of objections to genealogy and Foucauldian scholarship. These include: 
an arbitrary outlook on history; a blurring of present and past; the denial of a universal 
or suprahistorical point of view; a study of fluid rather than fixed identities; and a 
sampling of cases and examples that “is never representative and does not cover the 
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wealth of sources.” Note, however, that each of these (supposed) limitations depends on 
maintaining a sense of the presentism/finalism identified in chapter 2. As Bartelson 
notes (1997, 77), if one accepts that the constitution of subjectivity changes over time, 
yet the point is to analyse the present and not the past, then: “it must therefore recognize 
that its own vantage point, its own perspective, is the outcome of the history 
reconstructed on the basis of it”, becoming elliptical in its form and narrative in its 
structure. In other words, one cannot claim to denaturalise immutable truths or concepts 
through nominalism, whilst also attaching them to universal or permanent moral 
structures that prescribe action. 
 
Despite this, the value of this thesis to scholars perhaps not persuaded by a genealogical 
methodology or governmentality analytic, still remains strong. For instance, aside from 
its findings concerning global governmentality, it has generated new insights into the 
nuclear foundations of the concept of the global climate and the tracing of carbon and 
CO2, that may be incorporated into future IR studies that choose to bracket Heideggarian 
metaphysics, Foucauldian governmentality, or the concept of relationality. Likewise, the 
implications of this carbonic relationality for IR today, as evinced in chapters 7 and 8 – 
i.e. that geologic time is irreconcilable with human time and history, or that 
‘entanglement’ discourses are irreconcilable with the Anthropocene itself – may still be 
adopted for consideration or debate in discourses of time, security, quantum physics, etc. 
Although this genealogical tracing has demonstrated the implicit technological 
subjectivism underlying the concepts of the global climate and the Anthropocene, IR 
scholars eschewing genealogy or governmentality may still respond to the unique and 
specific contributions generated in each chapter.  
 
Finally, a limitation of this thesis might be, what appears at first glance, to be a 
collection of disparate or unrelated subject matters. Each chapter engages a slightly 
different combination of philosophers, and substantive content – from Foucauldian 
genealogy and governmentality, to Heideggerian metaphysics, to Arendtian analyses of 
the human condition. It also engages a wide range of applications and practices, from 
world order and nuclear winter in Bulletin, to quantum science in paradoxes of 
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Anthropocene security. Yet – like taking steps back from a mosaic, or listening to the 
complete album of a musician such as David Bowie or Radiohead – when considered as 
a whole, this thesis presents a unified account of how its problematised referents came 
into being, and how in each case examined here, they subjectify humanity through 
incomprehensibly complex sciences and physics. To quote Arendt, each chapter touches 
upon how the scientific concepts we have taken for granted  
 
brought about the world we live in and resulted in the Atomic Revolution, 
[and] has led into a situation in the sciences themselves in which man has 
lost the very objectivity of the natural world, so that man in his hunt for 
‘objective reality’ suddenly discovered that he always ‘confronts himself 
alone’.” (Arendt 2006, 271). 
 
Each chapter of this thesis is thus a piece of a puzzle that forms the same overarching 
picture: a globality that is not of Nature, but has crystalised recently through a reflexive 
prism of technology, carbon, and subjectivity. This is a global governmentality in which 
we all partake, whenever we ‘think’ of climate change or the Anthropocene. It is a 
manner in which we are governed, and govern ourselves. 
 
With some of its limitations outlined, it is important to highlight how this thesis project 
can contribute to IR’s literature going forth. In chapter 1, this thesis stated that its aim 
was to diagnose what it is that rationalities of climate change and the Anthropocene 
‘do’. Once again, to quote Foucault: “People know what they do; they frequently know 
why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (quoted 
in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 187). With the subjectivist relationality of these concepts 
having been outlined through this genealogical project, the next question becomes: 
knowing what these concepts ‘do’, what can the findings of this thesis now do for IR in 
the future? 
 
First, this thesis not only enhances the potential to discover new and/or global forms of 
governmentality, but it also helps to answer the disciplinary question of whether IR’s 
recent dearth of “grand theoretical debate” signals the “End of IR Theory” (Dunne et al. 
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2013, 407). In this recent debate, IR scholars considered whether the discipline’s 
theoretical and philosophical wellsprings had run dry, and hence, whether grand theories 
encompassing global politics would yield to middle-range forms of analytical 
eclecticism. The findings of this thesis suggest not. From its application of 
governmentality and genealogy to new global referents, to Arendt’s basic point that 
‘natality’ or the capacity to begin something anew (and hence, something active and 
unpredictable) is part of the human condition (1998), this thesis demonstrates that 
concepts as familiar as the ‘global’ and the ‘subjective’ still contain hidden potential for 
new IR theories and concepts to emerge.  
 
Indeed, the capacity for IR theory to engage with grand theory and political philosophy 
may indeed be refreshed if naturalised and/or scientific referents stop being taken for 
granted, and are problematised accordingly. This project offers only one potential 
methodology and example for doing so, but it indicates that countless other projects 
could follow. Agreeing with Foucault and Arendt, therefore, it shows how even 
‘commonsensical’ concepts such as the globality of the climate, may generate new 
political insights if enough thought is dedicated to them with humility and creativity. 
“Each book transforms what I was thinking”, Foucault once said (2002e, 240). The goal 
of research is to transform the point of view from which we began, “and in order to not 
think the same thing as before.” The close reading of Foucault’s 1977-1978 lecture 
series conducted throughout this project supports this: it revealed notions of atomic 
biopower and global biopolitics (see chapter 6), and a form of governmentality ushering 
in the end of history (see chapter 7), that IR had previously ignored or overlooked. With 
a different genealogical lens, therefore, there is no reason to assume that other concepts 
and philosophies are not still waiting to be uncovered, within the work of Foucault or 
any other philosopher or thinker. 
 
Second, this thesis has outlined the potential for governmentality analytics to move in 
global directions by combining it with genealogy. This highlights the potential for a new 
form of global genealogy to be developed in the future. As outlined in chapter 2, the 
form of global governmentality evinced in this thesis underpins and precedes liberal and 
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statist governmentalities by grounding itself on how scientific processes are applied to 
political territories and concepts. What this methodology implies is that a genealogical 
inquiry and governmentality analytic may perfectly well be suited to other global and 
scientific concepts that are also used and naturalised in IR in similar ways. For instance, 
although Hom (2010) has recently claimed to “offer a genealogical account of modern 
time as a global convention”, his analysis – although erudite and fascinating from an 
historical perspective – does not actually engage in any specific Foucauldian 
genealogical, nor governmentality, methodologies nor analytics. It is grounded on 
secondhand sources alone (especially Toulmin 1990). Hence, combining a genealogical 
and governmentality analytic on Western time as a scientific global practice and process 
– through a global genealogy – opens the possibility for a new understanding of its 
history and contemporary conceptual limits. Indeed, a wide range of scientific and 
global concepts such as time, water, electricity, hospitals, cancer, etc., offers rich and 
untapped potential for an expansive variety of new rationalities and governmentalities 
that are global in scope, to emerge. It is hoped this thesis and its methodology can serve 
a toolbox for scholars to use, borrow from, and to critique and adjust accordingly, going 
forth into new considerations of global politics. 
 
Third, this thesis has argued that IR scholars must exercise greater caution when 
importing concepts from the natural, physical, nuclear, and quantum sciences. Each 
chapter has detailed how these scientific concepts contain implicit limits, boundaries, 
and possibilities that affect the discourses and forms of politics enacted from them when 
they are used. Indeed, perhaps this reflects a form of conceptual “amnesia” that the 
discipline of IR – and even its critical scholars – is recently succumbing to (see 
Neumann 2014). Here, although IR treats history as “something to think about, there is 
also the question of what we need to think with” (2014, 336). What this research project 
offers IR, therefore, is thus a firm reminder that history and philosophy are not bunk, but 
they are what IR must think with so as to go forth into a future of global concepts, crises, 
and politics. Like the models and simulations of atmospheric science or the movements 
of carbonic particles, no concept is neutral or objective, as is clearly demonstrated 
through the technologies of ESS and their treatment of humanity as a rational-choice 
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algorithm (Verburg et al. 2010) and of Earth systems as numerical grids and boxes 
(Dahan 2010). Problematizing the implicit foundation of the scientific concepts it uses, 
is therefore essential. In so doing, IR may include within its analyses how to think ‘with’ 
these concepts. Tracing when, how, and through what practices they entered IR, should 
help scholars in the future determine what they can and cannot do when concepts and 
practices of the sciences are applied to the sovereign and suzerain relations of states, or 
the geologic movements of the human species across time.  
 
The World Picture Drawn in the Sand 
 
Whether it is “globality” phrased in terms of globe, planet, or world(s), “we all inhabit 
and experience Earth not only as a meaning-bearing assemblage and physico-ecological 
support but also the very substrate of our species’ inbuilt experiences of struggle, pain, 
beauty, love and death” (Edwards 2016, 193). Globality is therefore deemed ubiquitous 
and commonsensical across IR, and the social sciences. Humanity must now “live in the 
age of the managed planet”, and climate change and the Anthropocene are thus human-
made threats to be solved, in futures perhaps not so distant. This is, as IR scholars now 
readily declare it, our inevitable future, our Earthly crises, our failed COP21, and the 
Earthrise of a shared planetary “world-picture” at which we all must now stare (Burke et 
al. 2016; Peoples 2016; van Munster and Sylvest 2016). 
 
What this thesis implies going forth is that the greater the scale, complexity, and 
catastrophic potential of globality, the more it is buttressed and framed by an 
anthropocentric subjectivism. The more humanity claims to make nature, the more it 
evinces and channels itself into the same processes it laments. The Anthropocene epoch 
in which we must now transform IR – and our climate, ourselves, our human condition – 
is now elevated to an IR “at the end of the world” (Harrington 2016, 489). Yet this 
human world has indeed seen such ends before. As Foucault himself wrote at the 
conclusion of The Order of Things,  
 
 240 
And yet the impression of fulfilment and of end, the muffled feeling that 
carries and animates our thought, and perhaps lulls it to sleep with the 
facility of its promises, and makes us believe that something new is about 
to begin, something we glimpse only as a thin line of light low on the 
horizon – . . . prove no doubt that man is in the process of disappearing. 
(1973, 384, 385)   
 
Like Foucault, the Anthropocene similarly claims that “man is an invention of recent 
date”, and humanity’s transformation into Nature and the Earth’s systems will erase our 
modern human condition “like a face drawn into the sand at the edge of the sea” 
(Foucault 1973, 387, 385). Or, in the case of anthropos, bombed into a single layer of 
rock stratum, lost in a geologic infinity of deep time. 
 
However, from the carbon atom, to global atmospheric processes, to thinking of 
humanity as a geologic species and geophysical power, it seems that humanity remains 
resilient. It appears consigned to project, measure, and calculate itself as Nature; to 
recognise planetary imaginaries and globalities, by relating them always, and implicitly, 
to its own position as subject. Today’s ‘end of the world’ is a position from which 
certainty is now derived, and intensified, because our understandings and concepts of 
globality are far beyond human conception and cognition once their mathematical 
constitution is actually considered. “This becoming incalculable remains the invisible 
shadow that is cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into 
subiectum and the world into picture” (Heidegger 1977b, 135). Hence the relevance of 
the world picture to climatic globality today: it is the self, deriving certainty from its 
own subjectivity, projecting itself as the maker and measure of all things, because 
behind the curtain of its concept of Nature is a world now too mathematically complex 
to objectively grasp.  
 
In the concepts of climate change and the Anthropocene, humanity is framed as a 
species that not only draws its face in sand at the edge of a sea, but engraves itself 
within rocks bounding new epochs. Etched is the world picture of a carbon atom. 
Perhaps, as Foucault claims, humanity may indeed disappear into the waves of human 
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time, or the epochs and eons of deep time. But here – fossilized, mineralized, making 
itself into the Earth – humanity seems always to return, just to see itself staring back. 
Without recognising that this world picture is a self-portrait, humanity risks consigning 
itself to repeat this sketch, onwards into the cosmos, and inwards into itself,  
ad infinitum.
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